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A FAIR PRICE AND A FAIR DEAL: ON “ENTIRE FAIRNESS” IN FREEZEOUTS
[This Article is a revised and updated version of one published earlier by the author as: “Going Private at the Intersection of the
Market and the Law,” 62 Bus. Law. 775 (2007)]

Faith Stevelman [a1]
fstevelman@nyls.edu

Controlling shareholders can compel the sale of minorities’ shares in freezeouts,
potentially to their financial detriment. To limit controllers’ opportunism and support the
value of minorities’ investments, the Delaware supreme court has endorsed strong minority
shareholder protections under the rubric of “Entire Fairness” – the governing standard
for cash-out mergers. However, the court of chancery has refused to apply Entire Fairness
to tender offer freezeouts, and is advocating unifying freezeout doctrine around a looser,
deferential standard of review. The influence of popular and Congressional concern over
excess plaintiff lawyers’ fees and discovery costs is likely making itself felt, although the
true extent of these litigation agency costs is unknown and likely overstated. This influence
is evident in three recent court of chancery cases analyzed herein (Pure, Cysive and Cox),
which advocate lesser scrutiny of controllers’ transactions. There are several problems
with the court of chancery’s proposed reforms, including that they conflict with Delaware
supreme court precedent. A fair price duty is crucial to minorities’ bargaining leverage
with controllers, and controllers’ power financially to oppress minorities if their freezeouts
are thwarted (“inherent coercion”) remains a genuine concern for equity. Lack of minority
consent is still a problem that equity should be responsive to. This Article presents the case
for applying Entire Fairness review to cash-out mergers and tender offer freezeouts. The
sole exception should be when a controller authorized an independent committee to
conduct an auction or market check and agreed to sell if a substantially higher offer for the
company surfaced.
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INTRODUCTION
This Article analyzes the legal doctrines governing “freezeouts,” which are a form of going
private transaction. [1] In a freezeout the person or entity that has the status of a controlling
shareholder [2] at a company purchases its remaining publicly-traded shares. [3] The exiting
minority shareholders usually receive cash for their shares, which terminates their financial
interest in the corporation. The stakes for minorities are thus quite high. As for the controller,
once the company becomes wholly owned, it may be kept as a privately held entity, merged into
another business entity owned by the controller, or sold to a third party.
Controllers stand to make substantial profits from purchasing minorities' shares in
freezeouts.[4] The harder question is whether minorities do passably well-- and even what
passably well should mean. When minorities present claims of unfairness in future freezeout
suits, the fundamental legal question will be whether the courts will employ the heightened
fiduciary standards of fair dealings and fair price developed under the rubric of “Entire Fairness”
to ensure that controllers are not profiting to the detriment of minorities in these transactions. In
contrast to the direction signaled in a triad of high profile decisions by the Delaware court of
chancery, [5] this Article contends that the “Entire Fairness” [6] standard should govern in all
fiduciary freezeout claims against controllers, with one important exception. [7]
As a matter of legal structure, freezeouts occur most commonly through cash-out mergers [8]
or tender offers combined with short form mergers (a “tender offer freezeout”). [9] The structural
features of freezeouts are straightforward. Indeed, in both instances, the background, statutory
requirements do not differentiate between controllers and third party acquirers. What makes
freezeouts distinctive, and highly significant for corporate fiduciary law, is that controllers'
formal and informal authority over the target's board, in combination with their other power
advantages, in essence allows them to operate at both sides of the freezeout. That is, while
controllers are buyers in freezeouts, they can also influence the sell side of the deal in their
private interest -- to the minority’s detriment, potentially. Such self-dealing is at the crux of
corporate fiduciary law, and hence so is the standard to be applied to freezeouts.
Under Delaware fiduciary law at present, controllers can block the controlled company’s
directors from initiating an auction to sell the company, and from pursuing other financial or
transactional alternatives more consistent with the minorities' best interests. [10] Controllers'
dominating influence over the board is complemented by their direct legal power to vote in their
self interest – hence to block many other transactions which might be beneficial to minorities.[11]
The result is that controllers can pressure minorities to sell in a freezeout through the
omnipresent if implicit threat that they could be made worse off by the controller if they opposed
its offer. Courts have named this concept “inherent coercion.” [12] Inherent coercion operates in
freezeouts based on tender offers as well as those based on cash-out mergers. Both formats
present substantial dangers of coercion and overreaching by controllers-as-insiders. [13]
As a general matter, corporate law affords controllers discretion to vote and sell their shares
in their self-interest.[14] However, once a controller's authority to inhibit the board’s impartiality
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is relevant in a corporate transaction, the courts apply heightened fiduciary standards to the
controller's conduct. [15] Most significantly for this Article, the Delaware supreme court has
judged controllers' opportunity for self-dealing in cash-out mergers as being so substantial that it
has mandated that without exception courts should apply the Entire Fairness standard to
minorities' claims of unfairness in these transactions. (This steadfast adherence to the Entire
Fairness standard in cash-out merger freezeouts is referred to herein as the “Lynch Doctrine.”)
[16]

Because the Entire Fairness Standard, like other fiduciary standards, is inherently openended, [17] and because freezeouts involve complex valuation disputes, [18] their adjudication
requires courts to address fundamental questions in corporate law. Most especially, Delaware’s
equity courts must balance their historic obligation to protect vulnerable parties -- minority
shareholders in freezeouts -- against the goal of facilitating wealth producing corporate
transactions. [19] The quality of the fiduciary doctrine governing freezeouts is especially
important because it is principally state corporate fiduciary law, [20] rather than state statutory or
federal law, [21] that defines the scope of controllers' rights and duties and minorities'
entitlements in freezeouts. And Delaware's freezeout doctrine is preeminently important because
a majority of the largest U.S. public companies are incorporated in Delaware, [22] and also
because many states model their corporate laws on Delaware's. [23]
Nevertheless, Delaware's freezeout doctrine is presently in disarray. Courts apply the exacting
Entire Fairness standard to controllers' cash-out mergers, consistent with Weinberger v. UOP,
Inc. [24] (“Weinberger”) and Kahn v. Lynch Communications Systems, Inc. [25] (“Lynch”) –
landmark decisions from the Delaware supreme court. (The latter is the progenitor of the Lynch
Doctrine.) However, based on an arguably over-broad reading of the supreme court’s decisions
in Solomon v. Pathe Communications Corp. (“Solomon”) [26] and Glassman v. Unocal
Exploration Corp. (“Glassman”)[27], the court of chancery has not applied fair dealings or fair
price requirements to tender offer freezeouts.[28] Moreover, this doctrinal disjunction has arisen
without the Delaware supreme court’s ever thoroughly considering the matter.[29]
This is ambiguity is harmful for Delaware fiduciary law, and for capital market efficiency.
But in the near term, controllers may profit from the market failure likely to arise from such
doctrinal irregularities. To clarify, controllers (rather than target boards or minority shareholders)
initiate freezeouts and hence dictate their formal structure. Furthermore, controllers have broad
leeway rapidly to alter and hence arbitrage transactional structures, and their attendant legal rules
and constraints, in their self interest (indeed, even after the freezeout has commenced). Given
this discretionary authority, the complexity of freezeout doctrine, and controllers' incentives, it’s
likely that controllers are gaming a substantial degree of market failure to profit in freezeouts. In
this respect, the perpetuation of different equitable standards for freezeouts, including disparate
legal price criteria, is undermining minorities' welfare and increasing the cost of public equity
capital.[30]
The Delaware courts have become increasingly sensitive to the current disarray in freezeout
doctrine and its ill effects. In a recent trio of cases the court of chancery has proposed sweeping
reform. [31] These cases are In re Pure Resources, Inc. (“Pure”), [32] In re Cysive Inc.(“Cysive”),
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and In re Cox Communications Inc. Shareholders Litigation (“Cox”). [34] In Pure, Cysive and
Cox the court has proposed unifying freezeout doctrine -- a proposal also endorsed by this
Article. However, the court has proposed that the controller-friendly, deferential, “business
judgment rule” [35] standard should apply to both freezeout formats, unless either the directors or
a majority of the minority shares has rejected the controller’s offer. (The application of
deferential, business judgment review to freezeouts where there’s been such “Dual Ratification”
is referred to herein as the “Cox Reforms.”) [36]
[33]

The Cox opinion proposes that a freezeout's receipt of Dual Ratification constitutes adequate
evidence of its fairness. [37] So long as there’s been Dual Ratification, the court of chancery has
opined in Cox, strict scrutiny of the freezeout for fairness is wasteful for the litigants and invites
abuse by plaintiff lawyers. [38] A further, unstated assumption in the Cox opinion is that
controllers will obtain Dual Ratification most of the time. Were this not so, the Cox Reforms
would not achieve their expressly intended effect: reducing litigation and encouraging
freezeouts. Hence, if the Cox Reforms are followed, freezeouts will be subject to less vigorous
and less frequent judicial review.[39] Consistent with Cox's express objectives, most shareholder
claims would be dismissed on the pleadings. [40]
This Article devotes careful attention to the reasoning in Pure, Cysive, and Cox because they
represent a watershed in the court of chancery’s analysis of freezeout doctrine. They are likely to
have a profound influence on minorities' welfare in future freezeouts, and shape future courts’
adherence to the Entire Fairness standard. [41] The Cox opinion contends that allowing deferential
review in freezeouts that receive Dual Ratification will more squarely situate freezeout doctrine
within the core framework of Delaware fiduciary law. [42] The court of chancery has also
represented that the proposed reforms will reduce meritless litigation, [43] benefit minority
investors, [44] and strengthen the capital markets. [45] But many of these positive claims are
exaggerated, as are the criticisms of applying Entire Fairness to freezeouts, as described below.
Returning to doctrinal specifics: the transactional choreography applied to cash-out mergers
and to tender offer freezeouts represents different judicial responses to three related legal
questions. These are (i) whether controllers have a legal duty to pay at least a minimum “fair
price” for the minorities' shares in a freezeout, (ii) whether public stockholders have adequate
freedom and ability to reject and defeat an unfair freezeout offer, and (iii) whether target
directors are unduly constrained in their ability to act in minorities' interests in freezeouts. At
present, Delaware’s freezeout doctrine endorses unduly disparate answers to these questions
based on the formalistic structure of the freezeout. Nevertheless, for both forms of freezeouts,
the doctrine allows that if a controller has adhered to the court’s view of best practices
(“transactional choreography”), then it will receive more favorable judicial treatment if the
transaction proceeds and is contested. This promise of comparatively more favorable (i.e.
lenient) treatment in litigation provides the incentive for controllers to adhere to the transactional
“steps” prescribed by the courts.
To recap, as the Delaware chancery court has read the Solomon and Glassman decisions, in
tender offer freezeouts so long as controllers refrain from egregious coercion or deception of the
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minority shareholders, the freezeout transaction will be reviewable under the deferential business
judgment rule standard. [69] To the contrary, in doctrine evolving from Weinberger and Kahn v.
Lynch, the courts apply strict scrutiny, allowing controllers at most a beneficial shift in the
burden of proof if the freezeout has been approved either by disinterested directors or a majority
of the minority of shares. [70] Such ratification produces merely a shift in the burden of proof,
however (so that notwithstanding the self-interested nature of the transaction, the plaintiffs must
prove its unfairness). [71] This favorable burden shift is the maximum benefit controllers can
obtain from such approvals under the “Lynch Doctrine;” the Entire Fairness standard will apply
in any event. [72]
This Article recommends unifying freezeout doctrine under the Entire Fairness standard.
Entire Fairness should apply unless the controller has allowed the minority’s representatives to
conduct an auction or market check, and the controller has agreed to sell its block if its bid is
substantially bettered by a third party. [73] If a controller proceeds without following this new
transactional choreography, it should face the Entire Fairness standard if the transaction is
litigated.[74] Where controllers are unwilling or unable to comply with this condition, there is
only a simulacrum of real bargaining and no basis to presume the fairness of the freezeout.[75]
Part I of this Article reviews the doctrinal framework for cash-out mergers established by
Weinberger [76] and Lynch, [77] and then contrasts this with the doctrinal framework for tender
offer freezeouts which has developed from Solomon [78] and Glassman. [79] Part II critiques the
three disparate legal price regimes that are relevant to freezeouts, elucidating how controllers can
arbitrage their differences in their self interest. [80] Part III digs deeper into contemporary tender
offer freezeout doctrine, and especially the recent alterations to tender offer freezeout doctrine
proposed by the court of chancery in Pure[81] and Cox. [82] Part IV debunks the court of
chancery’s harsh criticisms of Entire Fairness review in freezeouts, as presented in Cysive [83]
and Cox. Parts V and VI, respectively, are devoted to analyzing the importance of fair price and
fair dealings for minorities, while Part VII contends that inherent coercion has neither been
disproven nor minimized as a threat to minorities’ welfare. Part VIII details the Article’s law
reform proposals.
I. FOUNDATIONS OF THE DOCTRINES GOVERNING FREEZEOUTS
A. THE ENTIRE FAIRNESS STANDARD FOR CASH-OUT MERGERS: WEINBERGER V. UOP
The Delaware General Corporation Law (“DGCL”) requires approval by a majority of a
company's directors and a majority of its outstanding voting shares as a condition to a company's
sale via a merger. [84] Because the controller owns the shares required to determine the outcome
of director elections, [85] the minority shareholders' voting power cannot stop a controller intent
on a cash-out merger. Voting power over the board might also influence board decisions on the
declaration (or nondeclaration) of dividends. More directly, a controller's stock ownership
affords it power to effect amendments to the bylaws, [86] approvals (or disapprovals) of sales of
substantially all assets, [87] and amendments to certificates of incorporation. [88] Hence, when a
controller presents a freezeout proposal, its power to compel the transaction, or take action
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injurious to the minority if it fails, is quite apparent to the target board and minority shareholders.
It’s the controller's power over the target's board that places freezeouts in the infamous
category of self-dealing transactions. If a controlled company’s board could operate with genuine
independence from the controller, then the controller would only be on the “purchase” side of the
transaction. The heightened fiduciary protections that courts apply to self-dealing transactions
under the duty of loyalty would be unwarranted. Corporate law provides that directors owe
fiduciary duties of care and loyalty to all shareholders equally, not just those who elect them. [89]
But once a controller is present, the directors are in a compromised, fundamentally conflicted
situation. If they act in ways that conflict with the controller's plans, their tenure on the board
will likely be limited. Finally, because boards are only composed of human beings, and human
beings tend to avoid professional confrontations unless they have something concrete and
substantial to gain, most boards will have a bias in favor of approving a controller's offer. [90]
Controllers' freedom to use cash-out mergers to force minority shareholders out of their
investment has been a persistently controversial question in corporate law. [91] In the late 1970s
the Delaware courts required a “business purpose” for cash-out mergers, in order to limit
controllers' opportunity to use them to expropriate wealth from minorities. [92] However in
Weinberger, in 1983, the Delaware supreme court rejected the business purpose requirement as
too indeterminate to protect minorities from overbearing controllers.[93] The court endorsed the
Entire Fairness standard as the better approach to protecting minorities. Specifically, in
Weinberger the court held that duties of “fair price” and “fair dealings”-- hence, “Entire
Fairness”-- apply to controllers' cash-out mergers.[94]
With respect to fair price, in Weinberger the court held that controllers have a fiduciary duty
to pay minorities at least their pro rata share of the company valued as a going concern (as
discussed further in Part II). [95] And because fair price is range rather than a finite sum,
Weinberger requires that controllers be accountable, also, for the fairness of the process through
which they acquire the minority’s shares in the cash-out merger -- i.e., “fair dealings” on their
part. [96] Weinberger's fair dealings requirement encompasses factors relating to how the
transaction is initiated, structured, and timed by the controller. [97] Despite the controller's
statutory authority to compel a cash-out merger, Weinberger exhorted controllers to allow some
qualified, independent party to negotiate the transaction’s key terms on the minority's behalf. The
court espouses the goal that the controller and minority’s representatives should be able to
bargain as if at “arms' length.”[98] Accordingly, as part of fair dealings, in Weinberger the court
emphasized controllers' fiduciary disclosure duty, as relevant to the shareholders’ decision
making regarding the merger or seeking an appraisal. [99]
Beyond providing a benchmark for liability ex post, Weinberger's fair price and fair dealing
standards have proven enormously influential in shaping controllers' tactics in planning and
negotiating cash-out mergers. [100] As mentioned above, the Weinberger opinion has encouraged
controllers to establish special committees of independent directors to negotiate for the minority
shareholders. [101] In so doing Weinberger established what is still the formative transactional
choreography for cash-out mergers. [102] Weinberger also encouraged what is now the accepted
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practice of having outside, independent financial and legal experts advise special committees
during the negotiations. [103] And Weinberger's emphasis on full disclosure has encouraged
controllers to disclose information about the timing, structure, motive and pricing of their offer,
independent of formal, securities law mandates.[104]
As mentioned above, controllers' freedom to eliminate minorities through cash-out mergers
has at times proven highly controversial. [105] This “unsettledness” is evident in the recent Pure,
Cysive and Cox opinions, as it was previously in the 1970’s, and even earlier.[106] This
controversy has sometimes flared into the public eye. During the bear market of 1973-74 for
example, controversy arose over the losses suffered by minority shareholders in freezeouts, and
the issue achieved national attention. In a speech at the University of Notre Dame, SEC
Commissioner A. A. Sommer denounced controllers' freezeouts as “serious, unfair, sometimes
disgraceful, a perversion of the whole process of public financing and a course that inevitably is
going to make the individual shareholder even more hostile to American corporate mores and the
securities markets than he already is.” [107]
After announcing a public investigation, in 1975 the SEC proposed two rules to protect
minorities' interests in these deals. In contrast to federal securities regulation's usual disclosure
oriented approach, both proposed SEC rules encompassed substantive fairness standards for
freezeouts. Proposed SEC Rule 13e-3A provided that a controller's offer must “constitute fair
value as determined in good faith by the issuer ... and shall be no lower than the consideration
recommended jointly by two qualified independent persons.” [108] Beyond requiring that the
offered consideration must be “fair,” proposed SEC Rule 13e-3B provided that controllers' cashout mergers must be motivated by “a valid business purpose.” [109] The proposed SEC rules also
required that the company’s counsel must opine that the cash-out merger met the applicable state
fiduciary fairness criteria. [110] In sum, in the mid 1970s, the SEC was on the verge of imposing
regulatory requirements which would virtually have shut freezeouts.
While the SEC was considering these rules, the overall shape of corporate federalism hung
in the balance. Lawyers attending an ABA meeting on federal securities regulation in the
summer of 1975 discussed a Yale Law Journal article published a year earlier by Professor
William Cary. [111] Cary's article decried Delaware's excessively permissive approach to
corporate law, and called for federal minimum standards to protect vulnerable public investors
from abuse by corporate insiders. [112] Cary's claims are so famous that virtually all corporate
legal academics are familiar with them. However, few seem to recall that Cary’s critique
coincided with and reflected widespread and fervent disapproval of going private transactions,
and especially Delaware's lax response to them.
Most significantly for this discussion, no recollection of this tumult, or the near preemption
of state fiduciary standards by federal regulations is reflected in the chancery court's recent
freezeout cases.[113] But the history of the SEC’s near preemption of fiduciary standards for
freezeouts is significant. [114] First, it highlights that both the popular and legal acceptance of
freezeouts is recent. Second, it reinforces that excessively lenient state corporate legal standards
invite federal intervention which will not uncommonly be more heavy-handed. Viewing
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freezeout regulation in this historical perspective, it is harder to presume that looser fiduciary
safeguards are best – either for investors or state corporate law. [115]
In the end, the movement to federalize freezeout regulation was truncated. In its final going
private rule, Rule 13e-3, [116] the SEC backed away from its proposed substantive fairness
standards for freezeouts. Instead, the Commission hewed to its traditional disclosure-oriented
approach. The SEC may have been influenced to do so by the U.S. Supreme Court's 1977
decision in Santa Fe v. Green, which broadly reoriented federal securities law away from the
substantive regulation of internal corporate affairs. [117] Also, by 1977 the need for a federal
“business purpose” requirement had been obviated by the Delaware courts' own affirmation of a
business purpose requirement for cash-out mergers.[118]
The movement to federalize freezeout regulation had been shut down before Weinberger was
decided in 1983. But even after the Delaware supreme court’s decision, many crucially important
questions about freezeout doctrine remained unresolved. Most notably for this discussion, in the
early 1990s, a split developed in the court of chancery over whether approval of a cash-out
merger by the controlled entity’s independent directors was sufficient indicia of fairness to allow
business judgment rule review.[119] Weinberger had contradicted this position, in dicta; but
apparently not expressly or forcefully enough to preclude subsequent controversy. [120]
B. ALWAYS ENTIRE FAIRNESS, BUT A BURDEN SHIFT WITH APPROVAL: KAHN V. LYNCH
In 1994, in its decision in Lynch (Kahn v. Lynch Communications, Inc.), the Delaware
supreme court definitively addressed the effect of disinterested consent on the standard of review
in cash-out mergers. Lynch held that the coercive authority of controllers taints the reliability of
consents in cash-out mergers even when they appear freely given. On this basis Lynch held that
disinterested, informed consents by directors or minority shareholders must be regarded merely
as indicia of fairness – warranting only a shifting the burden of proof in controllers’ favor.
Deferential review under the business judgment rule standard is never appropriate in this setting,
the court held. [121]
As stated earlier, the logic behind the inherent coercion notion is that independent directors
and minority shareholders will rationally fear that the controller might take financial retribution
against the minority if the offer is rejected. [122]). Consequently, their consent cannot be presumed
freely given. In reaching this conclusion, Lynch validated sentiments earlier affirmed in
Weinberger [123] and Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co. [124] And the court rejected the court of
chancery precedents which allowed deferential review in controllers’ cash-out mergers[125] (as
well as ones allowing deferential review in self dealing transactions where no controller was
present). [126] In Lynch the supreme court aligned itself with the court of chancery's opinion in
Citron v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. [127] which had elucidated the operation of inherent
coercion. In this manner Lynch has become the authoritative, landmark case affirming the
appropriate judicial caution where controllers might otherwise benefit from inherent coercion.
Nevertheless, in Lynch the supreme court was sensitive to encouraging such informed,
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independent consents as a therapeutic measure in the minorities’ interest. To encourage the
practice, in Lynch the court provided that controllers would obtain a beneficial shift in the burden
of proof where such informed, independent consent had been obtained (as mentioned above).
[128] Based on Lynch’s teachings, where a court rules that the consents are valid (informed,
uncoerced and sufficiently numerous), the plaintiffs will have the burden to demonstrate the
unfairness of the freezeout, instead of the controller having the burden to demonstrate fair price
and fair dealings. (Ordinarily in Delaware fiduciary law, once self-dealing by a fiduciary is
shown, the fiduciary must prove the inherent fairness of the transaction.) [129] It is this
unwaivering skepticism of voluntary consent in freezeouts, and related insistence on strict
scrutiny for fairness, that is the target of the court of chancery’s ire in the recent cases.
C. IN CONTRAST: THE LEGAL BACKGROUND TO TENDER OFFER FREEZEOUTS
What is the background to modern tender offer freezeout cases, such as the Siliconix and Pure
decisions? Freezeouts structured as tender offers with short form mergers did not occur until the
final years of the twentieth century. [130] Hence before this there was no tender offer freezeout
doctrine per se. Nor has the supreme court addressed these transactions, to date.
In its Solomon decision, in 1996, the Delaware supreme court considered a controllers' tender
offer to purchase minorities shares: but the transaction therein did not contemplate a second step
cash-out merger. [131] Subsequently, in 2001 in its Glassman decision, the Delaware supreme
court held that fiduciary fair dealings criteria are inapplicable to controllers’ short-form mergers.
But once again, even in Glassman, there was no deliberate combining of a tender offer and short
form merger to go private. [132] Hence, tender offer freezeout doctrine is still very new. Many
doctrinal issues relevant to these transactions have never been addressed, and none have been
resolved by the supreme court authoritatively.
The contrast with cash-out merger doctrine is striking in this regard. The Lynch Doctrine
(especially its unwaivering adherence to Entire Fairness for controllers’ cash-out mergers) is the
outgrowth of decades of judicial analysis.
Though the supreme court has not ruled expressly on a tender offer freezeout, it has ruled on
controllers’ self dealing transactions (other than cash-out mergers, that is).[133] Even in these
other settings, the court has applied the Entire Fairness standard. Against this background, the
court of chancery’s recent “rebellion” against Entire Fairness for freezeouts appears anomalous –
indeed adventurous (from the perspective of stare decisis). In sum, because the Delaware
supreme court has never expressly endorsed a departure from the Entire Fairness standard for
tender offer freezeouts, it’s premature to assume there are two genuine, separate “tracks” in
freezeout doctrine – one mandating Entire Fairness and the other, far more lax.
This is true notwithstanding that in Siliconix and Pure, the court of chancery has presumed
that the business judgment rule is the baseline. These decisions were based on Solomon's “no fair
price duty absent malfeasance” [134] admonition, in combination with Glassman’s rejection of a
Entire Fairness for short form mergers. Accordingly, though neither Solomon nor Glassman
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expressly addressed a genuine tender offer freezeout, the decisions have exerted a formative
influence on the court of chancery’s fiduciary doctrine governing tender offer freezeouts. This
influence is apparent in Siliconix, [135] Pure, [136] and Cox, [137] as described in detail in Part III.
The above discussion is not meant to suggest that tender offers or even short form mergers
were unregulated or were uncommon through the twentieth century. This would not be true: each
was practiced by acquirers in a variety of contexts. But they had not been combined as a vehicle
for going private.
In Delaware, short-form mergers were authorized by mid-century, indeed even prior to
“regular” cash-out mergers, and they became commonplace. [138]
As for tender offers, federal law has of course played the leading role through the Williams
Act and the SEC's regulations promulgated thereunder. [139] Enacted by Congress in 1968, the
Williams Act focuses principally on promoting full and accurate disclosure to the recipients of
the tender offer. [140] It also includes certain anti-manipulation requirements intended to bolster
target shareholders' ability to make unhurried, rational choices about whether to tender or hold
their shares (as described below). With respect to disclosure, the Williams Act and SEC’s
regulations impose extensive disclosure requirements on bidders and on target directors in tender
offers, [141] with substantial prohibitions on fraud to back them up. [142] Furthermore, in tender
offer freezeouts -- where a controller combines a tender offer and short form merger -- the
aforesaid disclosure requirements are further complemented by those arising under the SEC's
going private rule, Rule 13e-3. [143] Finally, in tender offer freezeouts (as in other tender offers),
the Exchange Act requires the target company's directors to publicize their opinion of the merits
of the offer in a Schedule 14D-9 filing. [144] With respect to the anti-manipulation rules, where
the bidder's offer is for less than all shares, there is a pro rata acceptance requirement which is
designed to limit the pressure on shareholders to make hurried choices. [145] By virtue of Rule
14e-1(a) tender offers must remain open for at least 20 business days [146]. The SEC's rules also
give shareholders the ability to change their mind by creating withdrawal rights. [147]
Furthermore, the Williams Act requires that if the offeror increases the price before the
expiration of the tender offer, the higher price must also be paid to shareholders who have
already tendered. [148]
The legislative history of the Williams Act speaks loudly of Congressional intent to favor
neither bidders nor targets; [149] hence neither controllers nor minorities in the case of tender offer
freezeouts. Again, Congress' focus was on affording the offerees the information necessary to
make rational, informed choices in their self interest. [150] Furthermore, the federal scheme is not
intended to preempt state regulation of the rights and roles of bidders (controllers here) or
offerees (minorities). With respect to financial matters: nothing in federal scheme addresses the
appropriate allocation of gains from a freezeout tender offer (that is “fair price”). And with
respect to fair process, nothing in federal tender offer regulation addresses the role of target
directors in responding to a tender offer and/or protecting minorities’ interests in the face of one.
Congress, the SEC, and the federal courts have allowed state corporate law to occupy the field in
regard to target directors’ duties in tender offers: both with respect to third parties’
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(noncontrollers’) and controllers’ tender offers.
One explanation for why tender offers did not earlier become popular as vehicles for
freezeouts is that it is impossible wholly to eliminate the minority shareholders through a tender
offer. To transform a tender offer into a freezeout, controllers commonly effectuate a short-form
merger after the tender offer is completed. Through the short-form merger, with they may
effectuate unilaterally, controllers are able to eliminate the last, holdout minority shareholders.
Section 253 of the DGCL provides that once a controller has obtained at least 90% of the
outstanding voting stock of the target, it can effectuate the short-form merger almost
immediately by making a simple filing with the secretary of state. [151] No agreement or
negotiation with the target directors, or vote by the other, minority public shareholders is
required. If a controller obtains 90% or more of the target company's stock in the tender offer, its
power to effectuate the second step of the tender offer freezeout – that is, the short form merger - is assured.
Given that the transactional technology to combine tender offers and short form mergers had
existed for decades, it’s surprising that controllers had not seized this route for going private
earlier. Probably the best explanation for this is that uncertainty over what standard of review
governed the short form merger discouraged this technique. [152] Then in 2001 this ambiguity
was eliminated. When the Delaware supreme court's Glassman decision resolved that the Entire
Fairness standard would not be applied to short-form mergers, [153] many commentators predicted
that tender offer freezeouts would eclipse cash-out mergers as the preferred going private format
(because of the absence of the Entire Fairness imperative). However, the empirical evidence does
not suggest that there’s been any such dramatic shift in freezeout formats to date. [154]
A full critique of Delaware’s tender offer freezeout doctrine appears in Part III. But some
early observations are appropriate here. In their development of tender offer freezeout doctrine,
the Delaware courts seem to have been guided, curiously, by the tenor of federal tender offer
law. Second, the absence of a statutory tender offer provision in the DGCL made the courts
uncertain about their role in promulgating standards for target directors and controllers in the
latter’s tender offer freezeouts. The state law prohibition on “fraud” and “coercion” was read to
add little to the federal securities’ laws’ prohibitions and mandates. In this respect, the corporate
doctrine governing tender offer freezeouts is highly distinct, if not anomalous from the fiduciary
standards governing other self dealing transactions or most M&A transactions. Even with respect
to mergers with third parties, the duty of care is elevated. [155] And federal law’s “disclosure-isenough” approach has not limited the growth of equitable standards relevant to boards’
appropriate defensive response to third parties’ tender offers.[156] That is, outside of tender offer
freezeouts, in the M&A area, extensive fiduciary requirements sit atop the state statutory and
federal architecture. In sum, Delaware's passive response to target directors' fiduciary duties in
responding to a controller's tender offer cannot be explained by de jure or de facto federal
preemption.
Nor is it plausible that the Delaware courts have presumed that target shareholders are
sufficiently protected from coercion by the bright line requirements of the Williams Act and the
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SEC’s regulations (e.g. the all holders'-best price, pro-rata acceptance, minimum 20 days' time
provisions, etc. described above) First, none of the cases suggest this rationale, either expressly
or implicitly. Second, the legislative history to the Williams' Act evidences Congress' intent to
maintain a “level playing field” – i.e. to favor neither bidders nor targets (the objective is
reiterated in the federal cases interpreting the Williams’ Act as well [157]). Since equity has seen
fit to afford target directors defensive authority in the interest of protecting shareholders in
regular tender offers (i.e. from coercive or inadequate bids), minorities would seem to warrant
similar and indeed more protections from controllers’ tender offer freezeouts – though this is not
where the doctrine is at present..[158] Because robust defensive authority exists for target
directors in “regular” tender offers, it cannot be that the Delaware courts’ laissez faire approach
to minorities' rights in controllers’ tender offers reflects a considered judgment about the
adequacy of federal protections. [159]
In explaining its rationale for limited minority protections in controller’s tender offers, the
court of chancery has often pointed to the fact that the DGCL is silent on the subject of tender
offers – a fact which is indisputable. [160] The problem is, of course, that this silence is equally
relevant to tender offers by noncontrollers, where the courts have afforded target directors ample
defensive authority..[161] Where the Delaware case law addresses the silence in the statute, it has
observed that no corporate level transaction occurs in a tender offer. But once again, this
observation does not make sense of the gap between target directors’ broad authority in regular
tender offers and their slim or nonexistent defensive authority vis a vis controllers’ tender offers.
Nor does it account for statutory anti-takeover provisions such as Delaware’s section 203, which
is relevant to third parties’ bids.[162] Prior to Pure, the Delaware court of chancery did not treat
controllers’ tender offers as self-dealing transactions – perhaps because, formally, they fall
outside of the “at both sides” paradigm of a self dealing transaction. And they did not apply
heightened equitable protections in minorities’ interest..[163] But once again, the observation does
not fit with the courts’ affording defensive authority to target directors vis a vis third parties’
tender offers.
D. Freezeout Reform and Contemporary Public Policy
The recent reforms to freezeout doctrine are being fueled and shaped by public policy and
popular sentiment – more than legal precedent. The Cox Reforms coincide with two sweeping
contemporary trends affecting corporate law and the capital markets. The first is the widespread
acceptance of public companies -- even major public companies -- being taken private.[i]
Changes in the credit markets have temporarily halted the pace of going private transactions. But
depressed equity prices are likely to drive another wave of going private deals in short order. The
Cox Reforms are expressly aimed at facilitating more freezeout transactions
The focus below is the success of law reforms intended to curtail investor class actions.[ii] The
Cox Reforms are also expressly aimed at discouraging suits against freezeouts [iii] Even the
invective against lawyers who file suits contesting freezeouts is part of this. [iv] Full consideration
of the Cox Reforms thus requires some consideration of the utility of litigation (and the resulting
case law) in shaping M&A transactions and influencing capital market values. [v]
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The proper scope to be afforded investors' claims of fraud and overreaching (in a variety of
transactional settings) has been a longstanding matter of controversy in corporate law. [vi] At the
national level, the contemporary push to limit shareholder suits began with Congress' enactment
of The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PSLRA”). [vii] The PSLRA imposed
significant procedural hurdles to plaintiffs' proceeding with securities class actions, which
influenced shareholders’ ability to contest a variety of M&A transactions. [viii] Shortly thereafter,
in the name of preventing savvy plaintiffs' lawyers from circumventing the procedural
requirements established by the PLSRA, Congress enacted The Securities Litigation Uniform
Standards Act of 1998 (“SLUSA”), which intensified this effect.[ix] SLUSA preempts most
private investor class actions alleging misrepresentation under state securities law and common
law fraud. Indeed, it came close to preempting (proscribing) fiduciary class action claims against
freezeouts. [x] And notwithstanding the sweeping corporate governance reforms enacted in the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“SOX”), [xi] Congress eschewed provisions that might have
increased investors’ ability to bring class actions against corporate transactions of a variety of
sorts. [xii]
As a last minute “save,” in SLUSA, Congress left intact shareholders’ ability to bring
fiduciary class actions for fraud and unfairness against a variety of corporate transactions,
including freezeouts. [xiii] Nevertheless, many commentators and legal scholars claim that
shareholder suits impose gratuitous costs on corporations and the economy, so that they should
be radically limited. [xiv] These scholars and commentators argue that corporate fiduciary law
would function adequately if it were essentially a hortatory, normative force. In this mode, the
state courts would allow damages, or even allow claims to proceed to trial, only in the most
egregious cases. [xv] Consistent with this trend, the Delaware courts have increasingly limited
shareholders' ability to go forward with derivative and direct class. [xvi]
In sum, the jaundiced view of shareholder class actions and the lawyers who bring them
reflected in the Cox opinion mirrors the widespread popular and policy viewpoint that investors
can largely fend for themselves, and that markets are apt to increase wealth where there is
minimal legal “intrusion.” [xvii] In just this vein, Cox contends that in freezeouts, the piece-work
of equitable review is rarely worth the cost to the litigants and the economy. Its proposed reforms
are intended to promote controllers' ability to have freezeout claims dismissed on the pleadings.
[xviii] In this regard the Cox Reforms are inspired by this “pro-market/deregulatory” ideology,
even more than by empiricism or doctrinal logic. [XIX]
By advocating retaining Entire Fairness as the presumptive standards for freezeouts, this
Article parts company with commentary that portrays shareholder suits in unqualifiedly negative
terms. It rejects the view that the M&A and capital markets would thrive under a system of
minimalist fiduciary safeguards and increased checks on shareholder suits. In the alternative,
Delaware's seminal M&A jurisprudence has validated transactional best practices that have
helped balance controllers’ and minorities’ interests in freezeouts (and the welfare of bidders and
targets in general). [XX] In specific, in the Weinberger tradition, the Delaware courts have
validated the employment of special committees, independent legal and financial advisers,
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clearer heuristics for appropriate disclosure and other criteria designed to promote “fairness,”
“candor,” impartial decision-making by boards, and truly voluntary consent by minorities. [XXI]
In freezeouts, as in other high-profile M&A transactions, the courts have assumed the role of
“transactional choreographers,” [XXII] and this transactional choreography – as it has shaped
transactions and influenced the capital markets -- has the character of a public good. [XXIII]
The Cox Reforms would discourage many claims against freezeouts from ever being filed –
including some number of meritorious claims. With respect to claims which are filed, it would
allow most of them to be dismissed on the pleadings. This raises interesting questions relating to
legal process and the operation of corporate law as a public good. Most pertinently: can
corporate law positively contribute its “transactional choreography” (and thereby limit agency
costs in M&A transactions) if most claims are dismissed on the pleadings? If the Cox Reforms
are followed, how will the courts’ message to deal planners and the markets be affected by this
additional roadblock to freezeout claims proceeding?
Finally, from the perspective of corporate law production, will savvy plaintiffs’ lawyers take
their freezeout claims to other jurisdictions which might read Delaware freezeout doctrine
differently – for example, by staying closer to the supreme court’s dictates than the
contemporary trends endorsed by the court of chancery? [XXIV]

II. FAIR PRICE: INCONSISTENT LEGAL APPROACHES
At present, in Delaware, there are three distinct legal regimes that define minorities' financial
entitlements in freezeouts. First, in tender offer freezeouts, consistent with the Solomon decision,
[164] the court of chancery has declined to impose a (fiduciary/equitable) fair price duty on
controllers. [165], Secondly, the appraisal statute provides that shareholders eliminated in a cashout merger are entitled to “fair value” in an appraisal proceeding. Appraisal proceedings can be
brought against unitary (single step) cash-out mergers and short form mergers (the back end of
tender offer freezeouts), however they cannot be brought by shareholders who regret selling into
the tender offer portion of a freezeout. [166] Thirdly, as a matter of equity -- under Lynch's Entire
Fairness standard -- minorities who are eliminated through a cash-out merger are entitled to
receive a “fair price” for their shares.[167] Obviously, these three frameworks present
nonequivalent, possibly conflicting financial entitlements for minorities in freezeouts.
There are two ways these financial entitlements are relevant to minorities. First, they define
the remedies that minorities might obtain, ex post, in a contested freezeout. Secondly, probably
most importantly, they influence freezeout prices ex ante: setting a benchmark for the prices that
minorities will demand and the prices that controllers will offer in freezeout bids and
negotiations. [168]
Finally, these background financial entitlements influence the market trading price of
minority shares as a general matter – outside of freezeouts. Consistent with the efficient capital
markets hypothesis, the prices that minorities will pay for their securities at the time of their
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original issuance will reflect a judgment regarding the securities' relevant risk/return profile. The
risks will include the potential for opportunism by insiders, including controllers. [169] There are
many factors that influence the risks relevant to an investment, of course. But it should be
obvious that having three non-equivalent legal frameworks defining minorities' financial
entitlements in freezeouts creates a distinct risk in itself. By creating inconsistent and opaque
understandings about the financial entitlements attaching to a minority stake the law is
promoting market failure in pricing these securities – in freezeouts and in general..[170]
Achieving clarity in the scheme of financial entitlements relevant to freezeouts should yield
two forms of economic benefits. First, if minorities have a clear fair price entitlement, this will
limit controllers’ ability to use freezeouts to capitalize on their overall capacity for overreaching.
Second, a clear, legal fair price entitlement in freezeouts should enhance private companies’
ability to sell minority stakes in the public markets at an advantageous price. [171] Hence,
achieving a unified doctrinal approach to fair price in freezeouts should benefit investors and
companies overall. [172]

A. TENDER OFFER FREEZEOUTS: NO LEGAL STANDARD FOR PRICE
As stated earlier, the Delaware supreme court’s decision in Solomon has come to stand for the
proposition that controllers have no fair price duty in their tender offers. [173] As described further
in Part III, there is little discussion within Solomon itself for this conclusion. The court simply
states that in “totally voluntary” tender offers, shareholders will be able to make choices in their
best interest. But the problem with the viewpoint, and the “no fair price duty” approach, is that it
ignores the inherent and pervasive power advantages possessed by controllers.
The second problem is that in controllers’ tender offers, the absence of a fair price duty is
presently complemented by a weak role for the target board of directors. As mentioned above, in
third parties’ offers, as exemplified by Unocal, Delaware fiduciary law envisions an activist,
defensive role for the target directors.[174] But this defensive authority has not been affirmed for
target directors in controllers’ offers, to date. [175] In a third party's tender offer, if the offered
price seems low, the board or special committee will have a variety of defenses it can deploy
while seeking financial or transactional alternatives. [176] In addition, if the third party's bid
remains too low, an alternative, better bid will likely appear on the scene. Because outsiders
cannot compete with controllers’ offers on a level playing field (at least without the help of the
target independent directors), the controller will benefit from the absence of a fair price duty.
Additionally, the controller can use its voting power to thwart a sale to a third party, and to
influence the board, in a variety of ways, to support its offer. [177] In addition, the controller can
benefit from inside information to launch its freezeout; federal securities law disclosure duties
are of some help here, but they are not a cure-all. Access to this kind of inside information, and
the timing advantage it affords controllers, creates a substantial risk of opportunism in
freezeouts. This risk, too weighs in favor of a fair price duty in controllers’ offers. [178]
These advantages are not relevant to third parties’ bids. Third parties must compete against the
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market for corporate control. Third parties will not ordinarily have inside information giving
them an advantage over other bidders. Nor will they be able to use the threat of inherent coercion
in their favor. For this reason, the fair price duty is not appropriate vis a vis third parties’ tender
offer bids.
Corporate law's role in reducing agency costs -- and hence firms' cost of capital -- is also a
reason to enforce a fiduciary fair price duty in controllers’ bids. [179] Where the controller’s
presence is deemed to reflect a heightened risk of opportunism and overreaching, the minorities’
shares will trade at a discount to the firm’s going concern value. [180] The controller’s power to
use the threat of self dealing to force the market stock price downward – which would make an
unfairly low tender offer freezeout bid comparatively attractive – gives it an unfair benefit in a
freezeout, and one which is harmful in general. If controllers are not legally required to pay at
least pro rata going concern value in their tender offer freezeouts, then they will have an
incentive to press the board to undermanage the firm and to overreach to drive down the market
price of the minorities’ shares in anticipation of launching a freezeout. [181] In the absence of a
fair price requirement, the greater the controller's malfeasance, the deeper the market's
apprehension, the steeper the market trading discount, the lower the price the controller can offer
and still succeed in a tender offer freezeout. [182] In sum, the absence of a fair price duty in
controllers' tender offer freezeouts is a hole in the web legal prohibitions protecting minority
shareholders and capital market values.
B. APPRAISAL’S “FAIR VALUE” STANDARD (AND CASH-OUT MERGERS)
Delaware's appraisal statute [183] offers some financial redress for shareholders who are
eliminated through a cash-out merger at less than “fair value” (as defined by statute). [184] By its
express terms it applies only in a merger (or consolidation, but not a tender offer) and only in one
based on cash consideration. [185] Appraisal could possibly be available in the back end, shortform merger portion of a tender offer freezeout, but appraisal is not a possibility for shareholders
who sell into a controller’s tender offer, as mentioned above. [186]
Section 262(h) of the DGCL provides that in an appraisal action shareholders should receive
the “fair value” of their shares. [187] According to the statute, the court of chancery shall:
determine the fair value of the shares exclusive of any element of value arising from
the accomplishment or expectation of the merger or consolidation, together with
interest, if any, to be paid upon the amount determined to be the fair value. In
determining such fair value, the court shall take into account all relevant factors.
As evident from the express language, valuation in appraisal actions is complicated by the
fact that the statutory language gives only this loose definition of fair value. [188] Given this loose
mandate to take into account “all relevant factors” in performing the appraisal, the task of
creating a workably clear standard of “fair value” has fallen to the courts.
There are certain longstanding ambiguities in the definition of fair value reflected in the
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Delaware case law. [189] The thorniest of these relates to which forms of post-merger gains should
be included in “fair value.” [190] But leaving aside this significant problem,[191] the core concept
of fair value for appraisal purposes is clear and has remained so: shareholders are entitled to be
receive the value of what has been taken from them in the transaction.[192] For purposes of an
appraisal, corporate shares represent a pro rata interest in the company valued as a going
concern. “Fair value” is thus often referred to as “going concern value” or “intrinsic value.” [193]
“Going concern value” was enshrined as the core concept of appraisal’s “fair value” by the
mid 20th century, as reflected in the often cited case of Tri-Continental Corp. v. Battye. [194]
Thirty years later, the Delaware supreme court cited Tri-Continental favorably and expansively
in Weinberger's landmark treatment of fair value in appraisals. That is, in Weinberger the court
validated going concern value as the core concept of appraisal value. (It's remarkable but true
that Weinberger both established the foundation of modern fiduciary freezeout doctrine for cashout mergers and also the foundations of modern appraisal methodology, as relates to the concept
of fair value.) Weinberger rejected the mechanistic “Delaware block method” that had governed
valuations in appraisal actions previously. [195] In its place, the court endorsed “a more liberal
approach ... [to] include proof of value by any techniques or methods which are generally
considered acceptable in the financial community....” [196] Consistent with the forward-looking
notion of going concern value, and modern finance theory, discounted cash flow is the most
accepted valuation methodology for appraisal actions. [197] Most importantly for this discussion,
Weinberger affirmed that appraisal is intended to be an expansive, and that courts engaged in
appraisals should proceed accordingly. [198]
The expansive, forward looking interpretation of “fair value” established by Weinberger has
held to the present. For example, the supreme court's decision in Glassman affirmed
Weinberger's expansive approach to fair value analysis in appraisals. As stated in Glassman:
[t]he determination of fair value must be based on all relevant factors, including damages
and elements of future value, where appropriate. So, for example, if the merger was timed
to take advantage of a depressed market, or a low point in the company's cyclical earnings,
or to precede an anticipated positive development, the appraised value may be adjusted to
account for those factors. [199]
Glassman's definition of appraisal’s fair value thus expressly speaks to the problem of
opportunistic timing in cash-out mergers, which is a special concern in freezeouts. In addition,
Glassman, like the other modern cases interpreting fair value in appraisals, attributed little
significance to the public trading price of the minorities' shares, consistent with the concern over
the minority discount in the public markets. [200]
The logic of appraisal value as going concern value has held up remarkably well under
contemporary financial economics. [201] In particular, the fair value requirement allows valuecreating freezeout mergers so long as minority is not left worse off -- that is, so long as the
merger is Pareto-superior. [202] This fits with the economics-based logic that Delaware corporate
law should encourage transactions that increase wealth, as long as no party to the transaction is
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left worse off. [203]
Unfortunately for minorities in freezeouts, there are features of the appraisal statute that
radically limit its utility. These limits and hurdles often make appraisal's “fair value” an
unobtainable remedy for minorities in freezeouts.[204] As described previously, the Delaware
statute contemplates that appraisals are available only in mergers.[205] Appraisal’s fair value is
unavailable to shareholders who sell to a controller in a tender offer. Indeed, aware of this,
controllers often launch “clean up” tender offers even where they have executed a cash-out
merger contract – as a device to limit their financial exposure to appraisal actions. Second, In
addition, appraisal is unavailable if the freezeout contemplates that the consideration in the
merger will be securities. This is true whether the securities are those of the controller or another
publicly traded corporation, irrespective of whether the securities have voting rights. This limit is
remarkable given the controller's unilateral ability to determine the number and kind of securities
offered in the cash-out merger. [206] Minorities must formally dissent from the merger in order to
go forward with an appraisal action.[207] Also, appraisal rights can be perfected only by the
record holders of the shares [208] – a formalistic requirement which creates confusion and
indirectly defeats some number of valid appraisal claims. Also, the time period for initiating an
appraisal action is brief -- 120 days from the date of the merger. [209] Hence it is not uncommon
for minority shareholders to miss this window of opportunity to proceed with an appraisal. In
order to proceed with an appraisal, the plaintiff shareholders are generally required to submit
their stock certificates to the Register in Chancery, and may have their action dismissed if they
fail to do so. [210] Appraisal proceedings last four years on average, [211] and shareholders will not
have received any consideration for the shares prior to their conclusion – a factor which deters
many appraisal proceedings.[212] Finally, the absence of a class-based mechanism for proceeding
in appraisal actions limits their efficacy. [213] The costs of pursuing individual and even
consolidated appraisal actions are often prohibitive for minorities.
In sum, leaving aside the clarity of appraisal's promise of going concern value, the limits and
practical hurdles that apply to appraisal proceedings have sent negative signals to minorities
about their ability to obtain fair value via appraisal actions. Accordingly, as they weigh the
relative merits of proceeding with a freezeout, and which route to choose, controllers can
significantly discount the cost of judicial appraisal awards. Appraisal’s limitations mean that the
equitable cause of action arising under Lynch's Entire Fairness standard is of great importance
for minorities confronting a freezeout.
C. “FAIR PRICE” AND EQUITABLE ACTIONS AGAINST CASH-OUT MERGERS
Professors Gilson and Gordon have described the cause of action arising under Lynch's Entire
Fairness standard as “the equivalent of a class appraisal proceeding without the need for
shareholders actually to perfect their appraisal rights.” [214] While true in some respects, the
statement fails to take account of meaningful quantitative differences between “fair value” and
“fair price.” To backtrack, the professors are absolutely correct that the equitable cause of action
for fair price is not limited by the myriad formal requirements which limit appraisal’s
efficacy.[215] This is in itself is a powerful argument for rejecting the Cox Reforms and refusing
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to limit Entire Fairness in freezeouts.
But even focusing narrowly on quantitative metrics, there are reasons to believe that the
equitable “fair price” standard promises minorities something better than “fair value.” [216] As
stated in Weinberger, if the controller is found culpable of gross misconduct “[the] appraisal
remedy ... may not be adequate in certain cases, particularly where fraud, misrepresentation, selfdealing, deliberate waste of corporate assets, or gross and palpable overreaching are involved.”
[217]

This possibly higher range of “fair price” was validated, also, by the Delaware supreme
court’s decision in Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc.,[218] a case which involved a fiduciary action
against a controller’s cash-out merger. In Cede the court indicated that rescissory damages, or
their financial equivalent (indeed any expansive financial remedy deemed equitable under the
circumstances) could be made available in a fiduciary action -- whereas the same would not be
true in an appraisal action. Cede affirmed that while the equitable remedy is extraordinarily open
ended, going concern value sets a hard upper limit in appraisal actions. In an appraisal, the courts
have discretion to award interest going back to the merger date (to compensate for the value-loss
attributable to the delayed payout).[219] They also have discretion to award litigation costs to the
plaintiffs. [220] But based on the statutory language, as interpreted, appraisal’s “fair value” is
indifferent to malfeasance by an acquirer -- even where the acquirer is a controller/fiduciary. In
this regard, especially when the practical impediments to bringing an appraisal action are
accounted for, the appraisal remedy is likely to under-deter fiduciary wrongdoing in
freezeouts.[221]
Looking to the substance of corporate fiduciary law, there are additional reasons to conclude
that the base line of fair price is higher than fair value’s. It is well acknowledged that the remedy
for breach of fiduciary loyalty may encompass disgorgement of profits by the fiduciary. Where a
fiduciary is found to have taken a corporate opportunity, for example, the Delaware courts have
endorsed imposing a constructive trust to recapture the profits for the benefit of the shareholders.
[222] In addition, where a fiduciary has exploited confidential corporate information to profit
personally, shareholders may bring a derivative action to force disgorgement of such profits –
irrespective of showing harm to the corporation. [223]
The academic commentary has mostly elided the difference between fair value and fair price.
Unfortunately, Weinberger itself contributed to the supposition that the two financial standards
will often be congruent. [224] However, the “arms’ length dealings” language in Weinberger
suggests a price standard larger than fair value. If fair value affords minorities only a claim to
what has been surrendered in the cash-out merger, then they need not enjoy any gain from the
transaction. The controller would be free to capture all upside – all the anticipated synergy gains
from the merger. Although appraisal’s fair value does not require that the cashed-out
shareholders be made better off from the deal, the equitable remedy would seem so to imply.
Again this is implicit in the integrated approach Weinberger takes to “fair price” and “fair
dealings.”
Nor is Weinberger an outlier in this regard: in all fiduciary self dealing actions the
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defendant/fiduciary must prove that it did no better (and the beneficiary/shareholders did no
worse) than they would have if bargaining at arms’ length in the market. This by definition
implies that both sides should benefit in a “fair price” world. No rational independent directors
dealing at arms’ length would allow all the benefits to go to one side. Hence there’s no reason to
believe that rational, independent directors dealing with controllers at arms’ length would allow
the controller to capture all the benefits from a freezeout. Furthermore, there are transaction costs
attendant to freezeouts that incur to the minorities’ detriment if they do not share some measure
of the anticipated gain. Hence, the Entire Fairness standard and its fair price metric, as applied in
duty of loyalty analysis, requires that a transaction sponsored by a fiduciary must be mutually
beneficial (though not necessarily equivalently so) in order to be fair.[225]. This is as true in
freezeouts as it is in other self dealing transactions.
Again, this is evident in Weinberger itself. At several junctures the opinion states that fairness
in a cash-out merger should be equated to the outcome that would have occurred if the parties
were genuinely dealing at arms' length. As stated in the opinion’s famous footnote 7:
... fairness in this context can be equated to conduct by a theoretical, wholly
independent board of directors acting upon the matter before them, it is unfortunate
that this course apparently was neither considered nor pursued.... Particularly in a
parent-subsidiary context, a showing that the action taken was as though each of the
parties had exerted its bargaining power against the other at arms' length is strong
evidence that the transaction meets the test of fairness. [226]
As stated above, truly independent directors bargaining at arm’s length would not agree to a
transaction that merely left “its side” no worse off. Hence, this oft-cited passage from
Weinberger supports an understanding of “fair price” that is broader than that contemplated by
appraisal’s “fair value.” The same language and logic also explains why Weinberger insisted
that fair price and fair dealings are inseparable – that the determination of fairness is not a
bifurcated one between fair price and fair process. [227] The court’s constant return to the “as if at
arms’ length” heuristic affirms that “fair price” is intended to afford minority shareholders some
measure of the synergy gains from controllers’ cash-out mergers, as is not true in fair value as
going concern/replacement value. [228]
In sum, the equitable standard for “fair price” is not identical with appraisal’s “fair value;”
although they are both relevant to minority shareholders cashed-out through mergers.

D. THE NEED FOR A UNIFORM LEGAL PRICE RULE FOR FREEZEOUTS
The above discussion reveals why the equitable fair price remedy is not duplicative of or
gratuitous in light of the appraisal remedy. It also illuminates that the absence of any legal price
framework for controllers’ tender offers is an outlier. This discussion further illuminates that the
nonequivalent and indeed idiosyncratic price regimes relevant to freezeouts are undeserving
minorities' interests. Given these highly complex and nonequivalent legal price constructs
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relevant to freezeouts, it is impossible to believe that the capital and securities markets can aptly
price the risks attaching to minority equity investments.
In this respect, the three non equivalent price regimes relevant to freezeouts are most likely
contributing to market failure. This market failure may influence pricing at several junctures. A
lack of awareness of the true risks would inflate the price of the securities where private
companies issued minority stakes in public offerings. Alternatively, if market participants were
aware of the gross uncertainty created by these nonequivalent, ambiguous price regimes, this
could accentuate a discount in the price of these minority stakes, which might increase the cost
of selling public equity stakes unnecessarily. Finally, if the market is sensitive to gaps in
remedies for self-dealing by controllers, and there is no effective fair price remedy in a freezeout,
then controllers can push the limit of self-dealing and profit thereby in executing a freezeout at a
deep discount to going concern value.
Companies which were taken private in the past decade may soon seek to sell minority equity
stakes in the public markets. If the fiduciary protections against controllers’ self-dealing are not
shored up – and if the disparate financial entitlements in freezeouts are not “ironed out,” then
minorities should pay relatively less for these securities than they otherwise would. This would
be a bad result for the economy and for public companies in general. [232]
Though it has not commonly been observed, there is one important limit to controllers'
capacity to obtain “the best of all possible freezeouts” by arbitraging these different freezeout
formats and their comparative advantages. That is: once a controller has executed a cash-out
merger agreement with the board of the controlled entity, the Entire Fairness standard “sticks” to
the freezeout. This is true even if the controller elects to switch to a tender offer for its freezeout
-- the courts have applied the Entire Fairness standard to the entire transaction. In this respect,
the Entire Fairness standard has operated as a uniform backstop against controllers’ overreaching
in freezeouts and provided minorities meaningful leverage in bargaining with controllers. This
leverage would be lost if the business judgment rule became the presumptive standard for
freezeouts, consistent with the Cox Reforms. In light of the uncertainty being created by the three
legal price frameworks, and the “two tracks” in freezeout doctrine, the Delaware courts should
adopt a unified fiduciary standard for freezeouts – one which encompasses a fair price
requirement, consistent with Entire Fairness.

III. IN FLUX: CONTROLLERS’ DUTIES IN TENDER OFFER FREEZEOUTS
A. BACKGROUND TO THE RECENT TENDER OFFER FREEZEOUT CASES
This Part of the Article focuses on the court of chancery's recent reforms to tender offer
freezeout doctrine. [233] It finds fault with the notion, endorsed by Pure and Cox, that allowing
business judgment deference in tender offer freezeouts accompanied by Dual Ratification would
provide a robust safeguard of minorities’ interests in tender offer freezeouts. [234] While it is
unambiguously clear that Pure and Cox raise the playing field for tender offer freezeouts, their

Page 24

new criteria are incomplete and entirely too subject to manipulation by controllers. As such, they
should not be allowed to create an end-run around Entire Fairness review. [235]
A major problem with the new, bright line rules for tender offer freezeouts presented in
Pure and Cox is that they are not situated within a fiduciary, “fair dealings” framework. This is
part of their being incomplete and too easily subject to manipulation by controllers. [236] In
addition, in both Pure and Cox the court of chancery has eschewed imposing a fair price
requirement on controllers' tender offer freezeouts. As described immediately above, this has
negative implications for minorities’ ability to bargain in the face of controllers’ tender offer
freezeouts, and hence their ability to sell to controllers at a good price.[237] Accordingly, although
they appear to raise the level of judicial oversight over that pertaining ex ante, Pure’s and Cox’s
proposed new standards for tender offer freezeouts are largely window dressing. They would
perpetuate the minority discount and further controllers' capacity to profit from overreaching in
freezeouts based on tender offers.
In order to prepare for a detailed review of Pure’s and Cox’s proposed reforms to tender
offer freezeout doctrine, this section of the Article provides a detailed discussion of the Solomon,
Glassman, and Siliconix decisions which are their antecedents. These three decisions form the
essential backdrop to understanding both the ambitions and the defects which inhere in the
reforms proposed in Pure and Cox.
The conclusion of this Part III is that allowing deferential business judgment rule review of
tender offer freezeouts upon adherence to the Dual Ratification framework espoused by Pure and
Cox would still leave minority shareholders vulnerable in these transactions. This is a bad result
for minority shareholders, as well as corporations and the capital markets more broadly.
1. The Solomon Decision
That Solomon has been accepted as the landmark decision governing controllers' fiduciary
duties in tender offers is very surprising, in several respects.[238] First, the opinion is only an
affirmation by the Delaware supreme court of the court of chancery's grant of the defendant's
motion to dismiss. [239] Thus, the substantive questions of fiduciary duty which were at the heart
of the plaintiffs' complaint were not aired in a trial.
Secondly, more remarkably, Solomon includes only a very abbreviated discussion of the
substantive fiduciary law precepts for which the opinion becomes “famous” -- that is, controllers'
and target directors' limited fiduciary duties in tender offers. To the contrary, most of the
Solomon opinion focuses on the pleading standards applicable to fiduciary class actions. The
central issue before the court is the standard to be applied to dismissals for failure to state a cause
of action. [240] The plaintiffs argued that the lower court had erroneously applied a heightened
pleading standard, but the supreme court disagreed. Hence it affirmed the court of chancery’s
dismissal of the complaint in Solomon. [241]
That the transaction disputed in Solomon was not a genuine freezeout adds to the incongruity
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of the opinion's stature in freezeout doctrine. The controller, Credit Lyonnais Bank, was
conducting a tender offer for the small slice of Pathe Communications' public equity that it did
not own. Contemporaneously, it was also foreclosing on the 89.5% interest that it held as
collateral on a loan. On the day the tender offer was announced, the controller initiated an
auction to sell the 89.5% stock interest subject to the pledge. [242]
Although the case is accepted as landmark precedent on the scope of controllers' duties in
tender offers, the plaintiffs' amended complaint (as described by the supreme court) alleged only
fiduciary breaches against the controlled company's directors. [243] A close reading of Solomon
illuminates that the court was struggling with whether it should scrutinize the propriety of the
controller's or the directors' conduct -- and the reasoning expressly confuses the relationship
between these two distinct fiduciary questions.
The confusion is striking because in Solomon the supreme court made absolutely clear that the
amended complaint contained only two counts, both against the controlled company’s directors.
As described therein, the first count alleged a breach of care by the target directors (in failing to
“negotiate a sufficient tender offer price”). The second count alleged that the directors failed to
oppose the tender offer. [244] The supreme court affirmed the court of chancery's decision that
both counts failed to state a triable issue of fact or law.[245]. But instead of addressing this matter
of the target directors' passivity in the face of the controller’s tender offer -- the supreme court
merely reiterated the finding of the chancellor below that there was not “a fleeting doubt of the
fairness of the ... $1.50 tender offer price.” [246] That is, the supreme court addressed its attention
to the substance of the bid, instead of the adequacy of the directors’ response to it. On the
question brought by the complainants -- whether target directors could remain entirely passive in
the face of a controller’s tender offer – the court offered no analysis whatsoever.
In Solomon, the supreme court's failure to consider the substance of the plaintiffs' claims is
especially odd because these were essentially breach of care claims, and in breach of care claims
the Delaware courts usually focus on the adequacy of the process followed by the directors,
rather than the substantive merits of the disputed transaction.[247] Here, to the contrary, the court
avoided inquiring about the adequacy of the target directors' conduct, and looked to the
substantive adequacy of the offer – obviously, an entirely separate issue.[248] Solomon's failure to
discuss the extent of target directors' defensive duties and authority in controllers' tender offers is
a major shortcoming in the opinion and, strangely, it has inhibited the development of Delaware
case law on controlled companies’ directors’ duties to the present day.[249]
Returning to Solomon's discussion of controllers' duties in tender offers, again it is quite
limited and problematic even in the limited assertions made. First, as mentioned above, the
court’s assertions about price are unrelated to the claims brought by the plaintiffs (which again
were alleging breach of duty by the directors). Second, there is no inherent, logical link between
whether controllers have a fair price duty and whether the directors did or did not negotiate
vigorously in the minorities’ interest. The two legal issues are logically independent. On the
issue of the adequacy of the price offered, in the dictum that has made the case famous, the
Solomon court stated: “[i]n the case of totally voluntary tender offers ... courts do not impose any
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right of the shareholders to receive a particular price.” [250] The court cited the no fair price
principle as if the issue had been resolved earlier, and definitively. But this was not the case.
Indeed, the cases cited for the proposition do not support this conclusion. [251]
In specific, Solomon cites the Vickers Energy litigation and the Weinberger decision [252] as
precedent for there being no fair price duty in controllers’ tender offers. However, as clarified
below, neither of these decisions come close to supporting this conclusion. The lower court
opinion cited by the court in the Vickers Energy litigation was overturned on appeal in a manner
that expressly cast doubt on the portion of the opinion cited in Solomon. [253] And as for
Solomon’s reference to Weinberger (which involved a cash-out merger), the latter says
absolutely nothing about controllers’ tender offers. To reiterate, nothing either express or implied
in Weinberger supports the view that controllers have no fair price duty in making a tender offer
for minorities’ shares. Furthermore, since Weinberger unequivocally affirms controllers’ fair
price duty in cash-out merger freezeouts, there isn’t even a hint in the opinion that the supreme
court would affirm that controllers have no fair price duty in a tender offer. [254] Hence, Solomon
interprets the Vickers Energy and Weinberger decisions incorrectly. Nor is Solomon even
faithful to the overall spirit of the Vickers' Energy or Weinberger decisions, both of which place
tremendous importance on corporate law's role in supporting minority shareholders' capacity for
free choice. [255] In sum, although Solomon has been treated by the court of chancery as a
landmark decision resolving that controllers have no fair price duty in making a tender offer for
minorities’ shares, the opinion nowhere provides any relevant precedent or principled rationale
for this conclusion. [256]
Furthermore, although Solomon concludes that no fair price duty pertains in controllers’
tender offers that are “entirely voluntary,” the court failed to give meaningful attention to the
conditions of voluntariness in controllers’ tender offers.[257] That is a remarkable gap in a
Delaware supreme court decision – but it’s less than mysterious once one appreciates that so
little of the court’s attention was addressed to the substantive fiduciary duty matters in Solomon.
Again, the standard for dismissals was the major issue before the court. Hence, Solomon
unreflectively accepts that “total voluntariness” means the absence of fraud or express coercion
by the controller. [258] This gap between the absence of fraud and coercion and the facilitation of
a totally voluntary freezeouts is explored, seven years later, in the Pure decision. [259] *822
In conclusion, there are fatal flaws in Solomon's treatment of controllers’ tender offers.[260]
And these flaws have had a substantial effect on Delaware freezeout doctrine, especially because
the supreme court has not had an occasion to revisit the fiduciary doctrine governing controllers’
tender offers in the ensuing years.
2. The Glassman Decision
It was only in 2001 that the Delaware Supreme Court resolved that the business judgment rule
rather than the Entire Fairness standard would apply in short-form mergers. [261] Nor was this
result a foregone conclusion. The supreme court's 1971 opinion in Schnell v. Chris Craft
Industries, Inc. expressly validated the Delaware courts' equitable authority to supplement
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statutory mandates in matters of corporate governance.[262] Hence Schnell seemingly provided
authority for the supreme court to rule that the Entire Fairness standard’s requirements of fair
price and fair dealings applied in short-form mergers. Indeed, the equitable principles endorsed
in Schnell were applied most commonly in situations where a board's or shareholders' scope of
authority had been abridged or circumvented inappropriately.[263] Short-form mergers are
intriguing in this regard, because the statutory terms expressly provide controllers the power to
bypass the target's board and even the target’s remaining, minority shareholders. [264] Lynch
itself had also force to the idea that Entire Fairness was the appropriate standard of review for
short-form mergers. In Lynch the supreme court had described Entire Fairness as the “exclusive”
standard of review for parent companies' cash-out mergers of their subsidiaries. [265]
Weighing in the opposite direction, however, was the Delaware supreme court's 1962 decision
in Stauffer v. Standard Brands, Inc. [266] In Stauffer the court had held that absent fraud or
wrongdoing, appraisal would be the sole remedy available to dissatisfied minorities contesting
short-form mergers. [267] Controllers considering going private based on tender offers anxiously
awaited the supreme court's resolution of Glassman v. Unocal Exploration Corp. [268]
In 2001, in Glassman, the supreme court held that no equitable, fair dealings requirement
would pertain in short-form mergers. It based its decision on the notion that judicial implication
of a fair dealings requirement would expressly conflict with the streamlined process envisioned
in the Delaware General Corporate Law. Reviewing the decision carefully, it is apparent that the
court did not consider the issue cut and dried. The court reviewed five decades of equitable
decision-making in long and short-form mergers before it announced its holding deference to the
legislature precluded the application of fair dealings requirements in short-form mergers. [269]
Glassman held, furthermore, that in light of the absence of the fiduciary fair dealing requirement,
valuation disputes in short-form mergers would be reviewable exclusively through appraisal
proceedings. [270] According to the court, appraisal would provide the exclusive recourse for
aggrieved shareholders in short-form mergers “absent fraud or illegality.” [271]
Hence, after 2001, by combining the dictates of Solomon and Glassman, controllers were
empowered to proceed with combining tender offers with unilateral, short-form mergers as
vehicles for going private – and vehicles for avoiding judicial oversight under the Entire Fairness
standard of review. [272] These decisions were a comfort to controllers who sought to avoid
intensive judicial oversight of their freezeouts. [273]
However, its arguable that controllers and courts have erred in reading Glassman so broadly.
The Delaware supreme court may not have intended to resolve that Entire Fairness does not
apply to (the back end of) tender offer freezeouts. [274] Glassman itself did not involve any such
“premeditated” tender offer freezeout.[275] Furthermore, because prior to Glassman controllers
had very rarely relied combined tender offers and short form mergers as vehicles for going
private, there is reason to doubt that the supreme court realized the significance of its holding for
freezeouts. [276] And, as is true with respect to Solomon, in the six years since Glassman, the
Delaware supreme court has not had occasion to revisit the implications of its decision.
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In sum, Solomon and Glassman are unreliable as authority for the view that controllers have
no equitable fair price or fair dealings obligations in tender offer freezeouts. On the same basis,
they cannot reliably be understood to resolve that there are two distinct tracks in freezeout
doctrine: the Entire Fairness standard for cash-out mergers, but no fiduciary fairness criteria for
tender offer freezeouts. In this respect, the court of chancery decisions addressing tender offer
freezeouts have over-read the implications of Solomon and Glassman. Certainly, the court of
chancery is going too far in invoking these decisions as a basis for rebelling against the Entire
Fairness standard for freezeouts.
B. SILICONIX: DELAWARE'S FIRST TENDER OFFER FREEZEOUT DECISION
1. Siliconix's Facts
In Siliconix the court of chancery had its first opportunity to review a going private
transaction structured as a combined tender offer and short-form merger. [277] Siliconix provides a
provocative illustration of how far a controller could go in exerting a dominating influence over
the controlled company's board and minority shareholders, while successfully avoiding judicial
intervention on grounds that it had committed fraud or coercion. [278] In this respect, Siliconix
represents a “cautionary tale” of controllers’ power to overreach in tender offer freezeouts in the
absence of fiduciary safeguards.
The target of the freezeout was Siliconix Inc., a NASDAQ listed technology company that had
suffered through the market correction of early 2000. [279] The controller, Vishay Intertechnology
Inc, owned 80% of Siliconix's stock and operated in the same line of business as Siliconix. [280]
As described by the court, Vishay was attempting to exploit what appeared to be a fleeting
opportunity to acquire Siliconix's publicly traded shares at a favorable price. Indeed, the
freezeout allowed Vishay to eliminate a potential competitor. [281]
In February 2001, without prior notice, Vishay announced a cash tender offer for all of
Siliconix's shares. [282] Its SEC filings and public disclosures Vishay declared a “probable”
intention to consummate a short-form merger after the tender offer closed; hence the minority
shareholders could not be assured they’d have appraisal rights if they refused to tender. [283]
Vishay also announced that Siliconix would probably be delisted from the NASDAQ at the
conclusion of the tender offer. [284] This announcement would have deepened the minority's
concerns about the diminished liquidity and diminished value their shares would suffer after the
tender offer's consummation. Notwithstanding the federally mandated disclosure requirements,
Vishay was equivocal about its motives for the freezeout. [285] In particular, it failed to enunciate
a rationale for the price it was offering in its tender offer for the minorities' shares. [286] In these
respect Vishay's disclosures skirted the edge of legally acceptable disclosure. [287]
Vishay's tactics suggested a perfunctory effort to comply with the standards enunciated in
Solomon. For example, Vishay declared its willingness to negotiate with a special committee of
Siliconix's independent directors.[288] However, the resulting committee was quite obviously
dominated by Vishay. [289] Of the two special committee directors, one had been Vishay's lawyer
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until shortly before the transaction. [290] The other “had been active in providing banking
services” to Vishay several years earlier. [291] In addition, both special committee directors “were
friends of Vishay management (including Vishay’s chief negotiator in the freezeout).[292] The
aforementioned lawyer/director was appointed to the negotiating committee at the suggestion of
the person who would serve as Vishay's principal negotiator. [293] The opinion also indicates that
the two committee directors had been promised a special fee from the controller contingent on
the freezeout’s consummation – a shocking fact given they were serving as agents of the
minority shareholders. [294] Hence, as described by the court itself, in Siliconix there was no basis
to conclude that the committee directors were truly acting in the best interest of the minority
shareholders[295]. However, this finding had no effect on the court’s ruling.
Nor is the composition of the committee “worse” than the other features of the transaction.
The controller had vetted the special committee's selection of financial advisers. [296] And the
financial advisers' fee, too, was contingent on the freezeout's consummation. [297] Finally, the
committee’s legal adviser cautioned that “Vishay could not be compelled to sell its stake in
Siliconix” and could “commence a unilateral offer at any time.” [298] Once again the court's
exhaustive recitation of the facts suggests reasons to be concerned about coercion in the
freezeout. In fact, the opinion reads like a “worst case scenario” of corporate governance in
freezeouts. Yet despite the court’s description of the compromised composition of the
committee, the ambiguous and incomplete disclosures, the vetting of the committee's advisers,
the problematic “special fee” arrangements affecting the committee and its financial adviser, the
unilateral switch to stock consideration, and the surprise timing of the original offer, Siliconix
did not conclude that the controller’s freezeout should be stopped. Indeed, the court of chancery
rejected the minority shareholders’ requested.
Indeed, although the court paid lip service to Solomon's criteria of “total voluntariness,” [299]
the facts set forth in its opinion suggested there were many aspects of the freezeout which
inhibited the shareholders' freedom to choose not to tender to Vishay. As stated above, Vishay's
federally mandated disclosures were equivocal about its motive for going private, and silent
regarding the basis for the price offered.[300] And Siliconix's directors assumed a posture of
neutrality in the Schedule 14D-9, so the minority investors did not even have guidance from their
directors in evaluating the merits of the controller’s offer. [301] Finally, the special committee did
not attempt to obtain a fairness opinion from its financial advisors – hence this possibly helpful
information was also unavailable for the minority's consideration. [302]
In regard to the financial fairness of the freezeout tender offer, the court stated that in its
original cash offer, Vishay “made no effort to value Siliconix,” but instead merely applied a 10%
premium to the prevailing public trading price of the stock. [303] It also observed that Vishay even
lowered its final offer as part of its switch to stock consideration. [304] In addition, the switch to
stock consideration and finalization of the offer's other basic terms were resolved and publicized
without prior notice to the special committee ostensibly representing the minority. [305] The
controller's only bow to concerns over fair process was its apparent observance of a “majority of
the minority” minimum tender condition. [306] In sum, Vishay's tender offer freezeout for
Siliconix's outstanding publicly-traded shares presents remarkable facts, facts that suggest patent
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coercion and overreaching on the controller's part. And yet the court refused to intervene in the
minorities’ interest.
2. Coercion and Inadequate Disclosure by Controllers
In Siliconix the court even departed from the lax prohibitions against fraud and coercion
enunciated in Solomon, in a way that biased the proceedings against the plaintiffs. In addition to
having to meet the usual, heightened standard of irreparable harm applicable to obtaining an
injunction, [307] in Siliconix the court ruled that the plaintiffs were required to show “actual”
fraud, “improper” coercion, or conduct that was “coercive in some significant way.” [308] Again,
this reading goes beyond that “required” by Solomon itself. The court seems to have gone far out
of its way to allow the freezeout, at the same time that its opinion suggests that the court found
the facts worrisome. [309] Even as the court denied the injunction, it expressed consternation over
the “lesser scrutiny” applied to controllers' tender offers in comparison to cash-out mergers. [310]
In Siliconix, even the analysis of the adequacy of the controller's disclosures appears biased
in its favor. In the earlier decided Vickers Energy opinion, the Delaware supreme court had
mandated that controllers' tender offer disclosures must meet a standard of “complete candor.”
[311] But in Siliconix the court of chancery ignored Vickers Energy’s admonition about
controllers’ tender offer disclosures.[312] Rather than applying the “complete candor” standard,
the court asked merely whether the plaintiffs had proven there were material misrepresentations
by the controller. This analysis seems distorted both in terms of its substance (material
misrepresentation versus complete candor) and the allocation of the burden of proof. In Siliconix
the court concluded that “...[the plaintiff] has not met his burden of a preliminary showing that
there was a disclosure violation,”[313] and arrived at this conclusion despite the seemingly gross
disclosure flaws it had enumerated.
3. Directors' Duties in Tender Offer Freezeouts
The preceding discussion of Siliconix focused on the court's analysis of the conduct of the
controller, Vishay. Siliconix is also important for its treatment of target directors' duties in tender
offer freezeouts. [314] (Both the controller and the target directors were named as defendants in
the breach of fiduciary duty class action.) [315] Because in Solomon the supreme court had
avoided this subject, and in Glassman the court ruled against applying fiduciary fair dealings
criteria to short-form mergers, the Siliconix court found itself working off of a nearly clean slate.
There was virtually no direct precedent speaking to the nature and scope of target directors'
fiduciary duties in freezeouts based on tender offers.
Reviewing their actions, the court found the special committee directors' conduct passive
and wholly ineffectual. [316] Nonetheless, consistent with the strangeness of the rest of the
opinion, the court concluded that the special committee directors had satisfied the fiduciary
duties they owed the minority shareholders in the freezeout. [317] To be more precise, the court
reviewed the breaches of care and loyalty on the directors’ party alleged in the complaint, [318]
but then truncated its analysis of the complained of facts. Instead, it switched to a discussion of
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the Entire Fairness standard. The court stated that “unless coercion or disclosure violations can
be shown, no defendant has the duty to demonstrate the entire fairness of this proposed ...
transaction.” [319] In sum, as had been true in Solomon, in Siliconix the court conflated the
standard governing the controller’s conduct with that applicable to the target's directors.
At a later stage (the opinion is quite disorganized), the court once again inquired into the
directors' responsibilities in tender offers. It noted that the DGCL is silent about directors' roles
in responding to tender offers[320], and attributed substantial import to this statutory silence in
resolving that though wholly passive and ineffectual the directors had satisfied the equitable
duties they owed to the minority in this setting [321] Hence, in Siliconix the court elided the
obvious difference between statutorily mandated director obligations and directors’ fiduciary
duties (which of course arise from the case law’s interpretations of equitable principles). [322]
Secondly, the court rationalized that target company shareholders make individual decisions to
hold or sell in tender offers, rather than there being a “corporate” event.[323] Most notably, what
the Siliconix court failed to discuss was the accepted activist role of target directors in
responding to inadequate tender offers by third parties (noncontrollers) in the Delaware
jurisprudence. The absence of a “corporate level” event has not prevented the courts from
recognizing expansive fiduciary duties for target directors facing inadequate or coercive bids
from third parties. ding against hostile tender offers from noncontrolling shareholders or
outsiders. [324]
The Siliconix court paused over the issue of the adequacy of the committee directors' conduct
just long enough to be troubled by the implications of a recent ruling from the Delaware supreme
court, McMullin v Beran. [325] In McMullin the supreme court held that the target directors might
have breached their fiduciary duties by remaining passive in the face of the controller's preferred
sale transaction. [326] The Siliconix court even commented at length that in the freezeout before it
and the sale contested in McMullin, the minorities' “need for (and ability to benefit from) the
guidance and information to be provided by their boards” was virtually “indistinguishable.” [327]
In Siliconix, court also observed, that the financial alternatives for the minorities were analogous
in the two instance. They could “take or leave” the deal consideration offered unilaterally by the
controller (without meaningful guidance from their directors) or they could attempt to pursue an
appraisal action (although no appraisal rights were ensured in the Siliconix transaction, as stated
previously) [328].
The supreme court's disapproval of the target directors' passivity in McMullin clearly caught
the court of chancery’s attention in Siliconix. At this juncture, too, it seemed that the court was
deeply sympathetic to the minority’s plight, and would rule in its favor – that the directors might
have failed to fulfill their fiduciary duties to the minority in remaining entirely passive in the face
of the controller's preferred transaction.
But here too in Siliconix the court went out of its way to rule in favor of the controller. It made
much of seemingly minor, formalistic differences between the two transactions. (In McMullin,
the controller had forced a sale of the company through a merger with a third party,[329] whereas
in Siliconix the directors were facing a tender offer freezeout.) It read McMullin as counseling
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that directors of Delaware corporations have affirmative fiduciary duties if the controller is
forcing through a disadvantageous corporate sale, [330] and found no such sale in the
freezeout.[331] As it read McMullin, directors’ fiduciary duties are crucial in corporate sales, but
not in tender offer freezeouts – a distinction of little difference to the minority in Siliconix.
Finally the court made much of the different statutory framework for tender offer freezeouts and
cash-out mergers. [332] But in so doing the court made far too much of the statutory distinction,
while it ignored the Delaware fiduciary precepts relevant to target directors’ duties in tender
offers. In sum, Siliconix is an unsatisfying and provocative decision on many levels, and its
treatment of target directors' duties in responding to tender offers by controllers is particularly
unsatisfying.
Based on the result, these shortcomings were grossly apparent to Vice Chancellor Strine as he
wrote his decision in Pure.
C. PURE RESOURCES: NEW PRECONDITIONS FOR DEFERENTIAL REVIEW N TENDER OFFER
FREEZEOUTS
1. The Facts in Pure
The tenor of Pure suggests a generally favorable view of Unocal's freezeout offer. [333] And
certainly Unocal, the controller in Pure, proceeded in a manner that seemed less domineering
than the controllers in the freezeouts challenged in Siliconix[334] and Aquila. [335] Nevertheless,
upon closer examination, the facts set forth in Pure reveal that Unocal unhesitatingly sought to
benefit from its superior negotiating leverage, [336] from disclosure deficiencies, [337] from a
committee whose independence may have been compromised, and from consent terms that
systematically favored its interests. [338] Perceiving the latter forms of self-interested conduct,
certain minority shareholders of Pure Resources, Inc. sued for a preliminary injunction against
Unocal's proposed tender/exchange offer. [339] And they obtained the requested preliminary
injunction, although their victory meant relatively little. The court ruled that Unocal, which
owned 65.4% of Pure's shares, [340]) could go forward with its tender offer freezeout once it (i)
disclosed valuation data prepared by the investment bankers hired by the special committee, (ii)
provided a fuller description of the communications that had occurred between the special
committee and Unocal's representatives over the scope of the committee's authority, [341] and (iii)
amended the majority-of-minority consent provision to eliminate the counting of shares in the
minority group which had conflicting financial interests. [342] These were easy “fixes.” [343] They
allowed Vice Chancellor Strine, in his ruling in Pure, to advocate sweeping law reforms
plausibly beneficial to minority shareholders facing tender offer freezeouts (especially compared
to Siliconix). The court granted the requested injunction, but in so doing compromised the
controller's ability to go forward with the freezeout only in the smallest measure. [344] Indeed,
Unocal promptly consummated its tender offer freezeout after it implemented the changes
identified by the court. [345]
Pure describes the background of Unocal’s freezeout offer in great detail. Unocal had been
involved in Pure's business operations since Pure’s inception. [346] As part of the creation of Pure,
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Unocal obtained a shareholder voting agreement that gave it control over five of Pure's eight
board seats. [347] Unocal also benefited from a “Business Opportunity Agreement” that allowed it
to take commercial opportunities that otherwise might have been deemed (consistent with the
corporate opportunity doctrine) to belong to Pure. [348] The competitive operations of Unocal (the
parent) and Pure (the subsidiary), the prospect of favorable market conditions and the availability
of ready financing options for the subsidiary – together with the fact that Pure had genuinely
independent and ambitious senior executives [349] at its helm – all created friction between the
parent and the subsidiary which led to the freezeout offer.
Initially, Unocal's interest in acquiring Pure was out in the open and widely known to Pure’s
senior management. [350] In the fall of 2001, however, Unocal gave Pure's CEO notice that it had
resolved not to proceed.[351] Unocal’s interest in going forward returned, however, by the
following summer, but did not make itself public until Unocal announced a “surprise” freezeout
tender/exchange offer. [352] During the summer of 2001, as part of its original investigation into a
freezeout, Unocal's representatives on Pure's board had gathered confidential information from
Pure. [353] That Unocal had “permission” from Pure's management to do so [354] (as described in
the court of chancery’s opinion) illuminates how conflicted Pure's CEO and COO, were[355],
especially in light of their possessing valuable severance agreements which would be triggered
by a successful freezeout. [356] The court noted that Pure's management and Unocal's
representatives had discussed the fact that proceeding through a single step cash-out merger was
probably untenable; [357] presumably that meant that the insiders believed the transaction would
not pass muster under the Entire Fairness standard. (Especially problematic was the fact that
seven of the eight directors had financial interests potentially conflicting with the unaffiliated
minority stockholders’[358]). In this respect, the freezeout in Pure represents a vivid example of
controllers engaging in structural arbitrage.[359]
Unocal appears to have been well advised by counsel. It proceeded with the freezeout in a
way that was highly strategic and self-interested, and yet not patently coercive.[360] For example,
Unocal did nothing to thwart Pure's establishment of a special committee. [361] On the other hand
it aggressively interceded to limit the special negotiating committee's defensive authority when
this appeared vital.[362] In this vein, the opinion suggests that the committee’s conduct would not
have measured up to Weinberger’s criteria of “arms' length dealings.” The court of chancery
noted that Keith Covington, one of Pure's two special committee directors, was “a close personal
friend” of the controller’s President and COO. [363] Also troubling is the fact that after
negotiations over the freezeout's terms had commenced, Unocal took a harder line in enforcing
the Business Opportunities Agreement (“BOA”) than it had previously. For the first time, it
barred Pure's pursuit of an opportunity that implicated Unocal's commercial interests. [364] The
controller’s new approach to the BOA would reasonably have been interpreted by Pure’s
directors and minority shareholders as a sign of Unocal’s willingness to exploit its power
advantages if the freezeout were defeated -- i.e. classic inherent coercion in operation.
As the negotiations over the freezeout progressed, Unocal's representatives on Pure's board
refused to recuse themselves from the special committee's deliberations. [365] This would have
inhibited the special committee directors’ candor in responding to the controller's offer. Finally,
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most palpably, when the committee ultimately marshaled its courage and sought authority to
pursue alternatives more consistent with all the shareholders' interests, Unocal's representatives
on Pure’s board sounded the alarm. They aggressively confronted the special committee.[366] The
controller’s vehemence immediately quelled the special committee's “insurgency.” [367] The court
was definitive that Unocal had acted aggressively towards the committee to intimidate it into
backing down, [368] though some of the details were unclear.[369]. (Some of Unocal’s directors at
Pure had invoked the attorney client privilege to protect themselves from potential liability.) [370]
It was clear that the confrontation resulted in a pared down version of the committee’s mandate
(based on the board’s resolution). Thus the committee’s efforts to block the controller ended.[371]
The committee’s rebelliousness was expressed, merely, in its refusal to endorse the controller’s
offer in the Schedule 14D-9. [372]
Again, at a superficial level, Unocal's offer was attentive to fair process issues – that is, the
relevant transactional choreography. [373] Nevertheless, the opinion reveals significant grounds
for concern about coercion and overreaching on Unocal's part. For example, although Unocal
agreed to a majority-of-the-minority minimum tender condition, consistent with the minority’s
interest, [374] that minority approval condition was tainted by the conflicting financial interests
that existed within the what was denominated the “minority” block. [375] Unocal adopted a 90%
minimum tender condition, and agreed to consummate a short-form merger if it hit the target
level. However, the controller reserved the right to waive the 90% floor; that is, to close the
tender offer even if less than 90% of Pure’s shares were acquired.[376] The waivability of the 90%
floor meant that at the front end – at the time the minority shareholders would be making their
choice about whether or not to tender -- they would not know whether there would be a
subsequent short-form merger affording them appraisal rights. [377]
Furthermore, Unocal treated the special committee’s recommendation as supernumerary: it
did not condition it’s going forward on the committee’s approval (which it did not receive). [378]
And, indeed, Unocal did proceed and close its tender offer despite the committee’s stance of
neutrality in the Schedule 14D-9, as mentioned earlier. [379] (Subsequently, in Cox, the court of
chancery affirmed that special committee approval should be a prerequisite to deferential judicial
review for tender offer freezeouts, as described below.) [380] In addition, Unocal had openly
declared it was unwilling to sell its shares to a third party,[381] which radically decreased the
chance that a better, third party offer for the company would surface in the market. The
disclosures to the minority had not included the valuation studies conducted (purportedly) in the
minorities' interests by their financial advisers. (This the court required Unocal to rectify as a
prerequisite to going forward.)[382] Just as importantly it would seem, the minority shareholders
were not told about the committee's failed efforts to obtain blocking power and investigate
alternative transactions.[383] Also, the opinion notes that the committee did not obtain an
improvement from Unocal in the exchange ratio (over that originally announced). [384] And
because the court of chancery declined to apply Lynch's Entire Fairness standard, and instead
endorsed Solomon's “no price duty” standard, Pure does not contain any analysis of whether the
consideration offered the minority was adequate. The court merely noted the offered exchange
ratio, [385] and Unocal's observations about the size of the premium over the market trading price.
[386]
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Some apology for this lengthy description of the facts in Pure is in order. But these
worrisome facts suggest how disinclined the court was to act aggressively in the minority’s
interest. The facts are thus highly relevant to this Article's normative conclusions about
importance of applying the Entire Fairness standard even in tender offer freezeouts. The court of
chancery enunciated new standards for deferential review in tender offer freezeouts – thereby
raising the bar for controllers. [387] And the facts in the transaction are directly relevant to the
bright line rules for future tender offer freezeouts endorsed by the court in Pure. [388] These
bright line, anti-coercion rules have proven popular.[389] For example, Professors Gilson and
Gordon have written that they “... share the Pure court's conclusion that a fully empowered
special committee, including the Pure anticoercion litany and the right to say “no” affords
sufficient process so that entire fairness review in a freeze out merger can be eliminated.” [390]
For this reason, the tide pushing against Entire Fairness in freezeouts is strong, despite these
several opinions illustrating the continuing incidence of coercion by controllers therein.
This discussion of the coercive pressures brought to bear by Unocal in its freezeout is
intended to quell enthusiasm for loose judicial oversight in freezeouts. In the detailed review of
the facts of Unocal’s freezeout above, the ongoing extent of controllers’ coercive power comes
into view – including controllers’ willingness to subvert the efforts of independent negotiating
committees. In Pure the court of chancery chose to emphasize the more savory elements of the
offer: the absence of express threats of financial retribution, the formal constitution of a special
negotiating committee (that had its own advisers), the majority of the minority consent
requirement, and the controller's (albeit contingent) promise to execute the short-form merger.
At the same time, the court gave relatively less emphasis to several deeply worrisome attributes
of Unocal's conduct. By invoking the Solomon standard instead of Lynch’s Entire Fairness
standard, the court of chancery had room to object only to problems which the controller could
fix expeditiously. Viewed against the Entire Fairness standard, Unocal’s conduct in its freezeout
would have appeared unsatisfactory; against the loose standards of Solomon, it could be saved.
2. Doctrinal Analysis and Pure's Holding
Pure's holding should be stated with clarity at this point. First, the court ruled that the
Solomon tradition, rather than Lynch’s Entire Fairness standard, provided the proper framework
for analyzing Unocal's freezeout offer. [391] The court also expressed its view that Solomon's
“more flexible” standards for freezeouts are generally preferable to Lynch's “rigid” Entire
Fairness standard.[392] Ambitiously, the court improvised off of Unocal's freezeout to codify
certain preconditions to business judgment rule deference in tender offer freezeouts. As
presented therein, these new preconditions include: (i) the absence of express threats of financial
retribution if the freezeout fails, (ii) the observance of a majority-of-the-minority shares
minimum tender condition, (iii) a promise to complete a short-form merger if the controller
reaches more than 90% ownership in the target, and (iv) the controller allowing the special
committee (if one exists) to consult independent advisers and formulate an opinion on the merits
of the transaction. [393]
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It should be noted that Pure’s legal analysis is exceptionally wide ranging and thoughtful. The
court discussed three strands of Delaware case law potentially relevant to tender offer freezeouts:
first, Solomon “anti-coercion” standards, [394] second, Lynch’s Entire Fairness Doctrine [395] and
third, Unocal's progeny relevant to third party tender offers. [396] After this doctrinal “survey,” in
Pure the court of chancery endorsed the new, objective, “anti-coercion” criteria enumerated
below as preconditions to deferential review of the freezeout. In so doing, the court took a
positive step in the direction of protecting minority shareholders in tender offer freezeouts, [397]
compared to the status quo ante.[398] Yet Pure is ultimately dissatisfying because it stops short of
endorsing adequate protections for minorities in tender offer freezeouts.
Again, the court of chancery’s first bold move was its unqualified affirmation that Solomon
(and Glassman), and not Weinberger and Lynch, were the appropriate doctrinal framework for
reviewing the tender offer freezeout. [399] This had earlier been the route taken by the court of
chancery in Siliconix [400] and Aquila, [401] but the latter were far less wide ranging and insightful
than Pure. Hence Pure’s affirmation of the Solomon/Glassman tradition for tender offer
freezeouts is salient and bold.[402]
Remarkably, although the court declined to apply Lynch’s Entire Fairness standard, in Pure
the court expressed that inherent coercion by controllers is inadequately addressed within the
Solomon tradition for freezeouts.[403] Indeed, the court expended considerable effort to describe
how inherent coercion operates just as forcefully in tender offer freezeouts as it does in cash-out
mergers, if not more forcefully, in its view. [404] (Presumably, this was the basis for its departure
from the more powerfully laissez faire interpretations of Solomon.) Unfortunately, while the
court of chancery paid lip service to the problem of inherent coercion in tender offer freezeouts,
it proposed reforms fall far short in imposing requirements or standards of review which would
appropriately redress such coercive power. [405]
In its less than vigorous treatment of inherent coercion in tender offer freezeouts, the court
returned to the presumption that minorities can act in their self interest in freezeouts, so long as
the anticoercion “tests” it endorses are followed.[406] If they are, Pure, affirms, then business
judgment deference should apply to the freezeout – consistent with Solomon's logic. [407] But the
varieties of coercion noted in Pure are more wide ranging than the anticoerion rules adopted
therein. [408] In the end, Pure's doctrinal choices – the endorsement of an anti-coercion litany -do not seem to be driven by a conviction that they adequately redress coercion by controllers;
[410]), indeed, in Pure the court observes that minorities lack adequate leverage under the Solomon
framework.[411]). Rather, the driving force in Pure (and then in Cox) appears to be the court's
policy preference for limiting litigation in freezeouts and encouraging these transactions.[412]
These policy preferences are made explicit in the opinion, moreover.[413] The court concludes
that these policies mandate in favor of Solomon's “flexible” standards,[414] in lieu of Lynch's
which are too “constraining” and “litigation-intensive.” [415]
Ironically, most of the first half of Pure involves a lengthy “defense” of the need for a
minority-protective jurisprudence in tender offer freezeouts[416]. The court observed the unequal
bargaining power between controllers and minorities in freezeouts. [417] The court also affirmed
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that controllers have timing, informational, organizational, market and legal power advantages
which they can use to their advantage in both forms of freezeouts.[418] Throughout Pure’s lengthy
discussion of the Lynch Doctrine's validity, it seems that the court intends to expand the
application of Entire Fairness to tender offer freezeouts. [419] After this lengthy validation of
controllers’ coercive power in tender offer freezeouts it’s surprising when the court endorses a
short list of rules for “relatively noncoercive” tender offer freezeouts.
Pure is also the first Delaware decision openly to address the disjunction between special
committee’s authority in regular tender offers (based on the progeny of Unocal Corp. v. Mesa
Petroleum Co. [420] and Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc. [421]) and their limited defensive authority
in the face of controllers’ tender offers. [422] A brilliant jurist, Vice Chancellor Strine is of course
entirely fluent in the nuances of Delaware’s takeover jurisprudence. As a doctrinal matter, his
rejection of committee defensive authority is startling and unsatisfactory. [423] And the issue was
front and center before the court in Pure, because the committee had mounted a defense and
been quashed.[424]
Again, Pure’s failure to afford the special committee full defensive authority is a most
unsatisfactory feature of the opinion. As a matter of statutory law, it is the board of directors that
has authority to define the scope of a committee's power, not the shareholders. So it is odd, as a
matter of corporate law, that Pure affirmed the controlling shareholder’s power to truncate the
special committee’s authority. [425] Furthermore, since Pure's board owed fiduciary duties to all
the shareholders equally (consistent with the basic precepts of corporate law), [426] it’s virtually
impossible to see how the board could justify limiting the committee’s authority to explore
whether there were transactional alternatives more consistent with all the shareholders’
interests.[427] This is shortcoming in the opinion, to be sure.[428] On the subject of the special
committee’s being “shut down,” Pure is mostly silent. Nevertheless, Pure would have delighted
controllers in its observation that they need not allow a committee authority to deploy a poison
pill, and that a committee need not defend against a controller’s unsatisfactory tender offer
freezeout. As justification for this minority-unfriendly stance, the court noted merely the
“awkward sociology” of controlled boards and the “burdensome” implications for the common
law of a contrary rule. It did not unpack or defend what it meant by either, however.[429] In
another unpersuasive move, in Pure the court rationalized that the statutory underpinnings of
poison pills are less than solid. [430] In sum, in Pure, the court failed to reconcile the
jurisprudence affording target boards defensive authority in tender offers with its ruling limiting
such defensive authority in tender offer freezeouts.
With respect to special committees, to recap, in Pure the court held (merely) that the
controller must afford committees access to advisers and the time required for them to reach an
informed judgment about the offer.[431] In the end, remarkably, in Pure the court merely required
that controllers not stand in the way of special committees doing their job in taking some
position vis a vis the offer, as already required by SEC Schedule 14D-9. Furthermore, Pure did
not attribute independent significance to the committee's view of the merits of the controller’s
offer. The fact that the committee elected neutrality did not feature in the court’s ruling.[432] In
this regard, Pure takes the opposite approach from Weinberger, where the court afforded great

Page 38

weight to whether there had been an agent acting vigorously as the minority’s agent in the
freezeout.[433] Commentators have erred where they have concluded that Pure supports a robust
role for special negotiating [434]
3. Closer Analysis of Pure's New Requirements
Pure's new criteria for determining whether a freezeout qualifies for deferential review each
merit consideration.
First, the requirement that the controller cannot have made any express threats is, in essence,
an historical artifact. [435] (It reflects that in the cash-out merger in Lynch, the controller
threatened the committee that it would commence a tender offer at a lower price if the committee
failed to approve the cash-out merger. [436]) Especially given the role of counsel in modern M&A
practice, it would be truly odd to find a record of a controller making such an express threat. Put
simply, there is no need. Minorities, special committees and the capital markets are already well
aware of controllers' powers of financial retribution. Hence, the absence of express threats by the
controller is no indication of the freezeout’s voluntariness.
Second, even a majority-of-the-minority tender condition only mitigates the prisoner's
dilemma. It surely does not eliminate it.[437] There is enormous pressure to tender, even where
the controller’s price is well below going concern value. Shareholders contemplating a
controller’s intent on a tender offer know that they are legally powerless to maintain the status
quo. If the tender offer fails, the controller can switch to a cash-out merger, which it probably
can compel unilaterally.[438] Despite Pure’s added protections, shareholders' “reward” for
refusing to tender is that they will own shares that are more illiquid, probably delisted or trading
at a deeper discount. Otherwise, if there is a short-form merger, they may (though not assuredly
so) be able to pursue a costly, protracted appraisal action to obtain fair value. These
vulnerabilities loom large as the tender offer’s deadline approaches. Hence, a majority of the
minority minimum tender condition, as endorsed in Pure, is also a weak safeguard of the
minority’s best interest. [439]
Nor is Pure's proposed minimum tender condition analogous to the majority of the minority
voting consent under the Lynch doctrine.[440] The dynamics in tender offers favor tendering, in a
way that is not analogous to voting. Justice Jacobs noted this disparity in his opinion in
Emerging Communications, [441] for example. And even in Pure the court noted disparities
between mergers and tender offers that pressure minorities to tender. [442] Most obviously,
shareholders who dissent in a merger can still receive the merger consideration, whereas
nontendering shareholders are simply left behind. In addition, the more accelerated timing in
tender offers exerts pressure on investors to sell, [443] and the looming deadline increases the
salience of the premium over the market price. [444] The short time frame limits the target board's
ability to ascertain if alternatives more favorable for the minority are feasible, even where the
controller has allowed the special committee such liberal authority. [445] These factors operate
cumulatively and pressure minorities to sell in tender offer freezeouts. Finally, under the Lynch
doctrine, the minority's voting their approval merely would shift the burden of proof; in contrast,
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in Pure the court proposes that the easier-to-obtain minimum tender condition should serve as a
critical indicia of the freezeout's voluntariness.
Lastly, Pure's “90%-short-form merger” provision is also ineffective in meaningfully
mitigating the pressure on minorities to tender. [446].[447] First, in a fatal flaw, Pure's short form
merger provision simply gets the numbers wrong. Section 253 of the DGCL allows controllers to
consummate a unilateral, short-form merger once they own “at least” 90% of the shares.[448] In
contrast, in Pure the court provides that the tender offer freezeout will be deemed noncoercive if
the controller commits to effectuate a short-form merger at an equivalent price if it acquires
more than 90% upon the tender offer. [449] This disconnect means that a controller could acquire
precisely 90% of the minority shares and Pure’s short form merger provision, including its
guarantee of an equivalent price in short form merger, would be irrelevant [450] Hence, Pure's
short form merger provision does not reduce the controller's ability to “squeeze” the minority in
the front end of the tender offer freezeout, because it does not guarantee a minimum price at the
back end (This defect is of uncertain significance. Perhaps this numerical defect in Pure's shortform merger provision is a simple misreading of the statute. Perhaps the court meant “at least
90%” (i.e. the statutory standard) instead of “more than 90%” (as stated in the opinion). [451] But
the short-form merger requirement is a core element of Pure's “anti-coercion” proposals, which
would suggest that the court gave it thorough consideration. [452].)
The minority shareholders would also reasonably fear being left holding “super-minority”
shares. They will fear that there will not be any short-form merger at all, and hence no recourse
to appraisal. If a very small segment of the minority retains their shares because they believe the
tender offer price is inadequate, they may end up with stock that is effectively unmarketable and
valueless. Selling to the controller privately, at a later date, at a price of the controller’s choosing
may be their only viable option. Appraisal rights would not apply to such ad hoc, private stock
sales. In this respect, too, Pure's short-form merger “anti-coercion” requirement falls short of its
mark.
Perhaps most important, even if the short-form merger does materialize promptly, and is at
an equivalent price as the tender offer, under Pure, that tender offer will not have been subject to
a fair price requirement This is the most radical result of Pure's rejection of the Lynch Doctrine
in favor of Solomon. [453] Furthermore, Pure's new, bright line “anti-coercion” requirements are
not part of a broader fair dealings mandate. The duty of fair dealings is a feature of the Lynch
Doctrine -- which Pure expressly rejected for tender offer freezeouts. Absent the fiduciary
framework, Pure's new anti-coercion rules are highly manipulable for controllers. [454]
Finally, Pure’s treatment of Unocal’s disclosures to the minority is also troubling. First, as
was true in Siliconix, Pure allocates the burden of proving a disclosure problem to the minority.
This is anomalous: in Delaware cases where fiduciary self-dealing is present [455] courts require
the party relying on the “informed” shareholder vote (which would be the controller in this
instance) to demonstrate the adequacy of the disclosures.[456] Second, in the court’s discussion of
the S-4 and the Schedule 14D-9, the court again failed to apply the “complete candor” standard
to the controller’s disclosures, consistent with Lynch v. Vickers Energy, as noted previously. [457]
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In sum, although an extensive portion of Pure is devoted to describing controllers' myriad
opportunities for coercing minority shareholders in tender offer freezeouts, the opinion’s new
anti-coercion criteria fall short of protecting minorities in these transactions.
D. THE COX DECISION ADDS ANOTHER SPECIAL COMMITTEE REQUIREMENT
The Cox opinion amends Pure's anticoercion criteria for tender offer freezeouts in one
important respect. Cox recants the part of Pure's holding that attached no significance to the
special negotiating committee’s position on the offer.[458].
It’s essential to have the limits of Pure’s committee provisions clearly in mind in order to
appreciate what Cox does and does not add to the mix. To review, Pure's standards for target
independent directors are very limited. The court held merely that where a controller is found to
have hindered the target's directors from serving as informed, impartial advisers to the minority,
the freezeout would not be presumed fair (hence ineligible for business judgment rule
deference).[459] Furthermore, in Pure the court did not create an affirmative fiduciary obligation
on the part of controllers to create special committee (i.e. to allow the target board's to do so).
Pure merely assumes that such a special committee will have been created. Pure does not
address the equitable effect of the controlled company’s board failing to constitute a committee.
(Nor is it clear that Cox resolves this issue.) [460] Second, Pure did nothing to reinforce
meaningful standards for independent directors. To the contrary, in the transaction therein the
court counted “a close personal friend” of the controller's President and COO as an independent
member of the special committee.[461] Finally, the court expressly allowed that it was acceptable
for the controller to hinder the special functioning. Unocal’s representatives participated in
meetings where the committee was deliberating. [462] And, most remarkably, Pure's allowed the
controller to deny the committee blocking power and power to investigate alternative offers.[463].
[464] Finally, Pure did not afford the special committee’s failure to approve of the offer any
independent significance.[465] [466]
Cox revises Pure's stance on the importance of committees’ opinions for the standard of
review. [467] According to Cox, if the committee disapproves of the freezeout, then the Entire
Fairness should apply. [468] On this point the Cox opinion is absolutely clear: committee
disapproval should mandate the application of the Entire Fairness standard.[469]. There are
important caveats here, however. First, Cox provides only that the committee's disapproval will
preclude deferential review of the transaction. [470] The committee's disapproval does not
constitute the freezeout coercive or unfair as a legal matter. Secondly, Cox does not provide that
committees must be given real arms’ length negotiating authority in tender offer freezeouts, in
the spirit of Weinberger. [471] Cox simply does not address the part of the Pure opinion that
allowed the controller to block the committee’s defensive authority. [472] Neither Pure nor Cox
resolves the disturbing disparity between target directors' expansive authority in third party
hostile tender offers and target directors' circumscribed authority in responding to controllers'
tender offers.
The second important shortcoming in Cox's special committee provision is that it is stated
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ambiguously in the opinion. [473] Stated most succinctly, it is unclear what effect Cox would give
to a special committee's decision to remain neutral in a tender offer freezeout. The court first
states that deferential review would apply only if the committee did not “disapprove” of the
freezeout.[474] Subsequently, the court states that the committee's approval is a prerequisite for
deferential review. [475] This second version raises the bar: neutrality would trigger the Entire
Fairness standard.
The effect of committee neutrality in determining the standard of review is likely to prove
highly significant, actually. Special committees will be under great pressure not to disapprove of
a controller's tender offer -- at worst to be neutral. [476] Such neutrality is a valid option as far as
Schedule 14D-9 is concerned.[477] Given that neither Pure nor Cox gives the committee defensive
authority -- hence power to drive alternative options into the open -- the attraction for the
committee of remaining neutral would be intensified. Also highly significant in this setting is the
absence of a fair price duty. [478]). Combining these two limits affecting committee power, [479]
“neutrality” will commonly be the wisest course for committees concerned about the value
offered by the offer – especially given the legal presumption that absent outright fraud minorities
can decide for themselves whether to tender to controllers. [480] If neutrality is sufficient for
business judgment rule review, then committees will be under tremendous pressure to remain
neutral at worst. The result is that neither the committee nor the courts would be appropriately
enabled to protect minorities.
Indeed, Cox does not present its new committee feature as part of a law reform agenda aimed
at protecting minorities in freezeouts.[481] The tenor of Cox is radically different from Pure in this
respect. In Pure the court seemed ambivalent about balancing minority protections with the goals
of limiting suits and facilitating freezeouts. In Cox the court embraces the latter goals
wholeheartedly, and expresses little if any concern for minorities' vulnerability in these deals.
[482] Furthermore,[483] in addition to reducing shareholder litigation in freezeouts, and
encouraging more freezeouts, [484], the court is focused on the goal of unifying freezeout doctrine
(under the business judgment rule). These goals overshadow concerns over minorities’
vulnerability in freezeouts.
E. CONTEMPORARY TENDER OFFER FREEZEOUT DOCTRINE, IN SUMMARY
The ambiguities in Cox's conflicting special committee provisions are one salient example of
the shortcomings in the court of chancery's approach to *847 reforming tender offer freezeout
doctrine. A fair dealings requirement for tender offer freezeouts, would not magically define the
scope of unacceptable conduct by controllers therein. But a background fiduciary fair dealings
requirement would foreseeably alter the climate, so that controllers would not systematically
have the upper hand.
The imposition of a fair price requirement in controllers’ tender offer freezeouts would have
the same salutary effect. Without such a fair price requirement, controllers can do better in tender
offer freezeouts precisely on account of the equity market's apprehension of controllers' capacity
for self-dealing. As discussed further in Part V, minorities need a fair price requirement in hand
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in order to negotiate effectively with controllers.
Thirdly, neither Pure nor Cox make sense of the doctrinal disparity (and logical
inconsistency) in special committees having expansive defensive authority vis a vis
noncontrollers’ unsolicited offers, but not in tender offer freezeouts.
Finally, neither Pure nor Cox effectively grapples with the “total voluntariness” standard
enunciated in Solomon or the “complete candor” standard enunciated in Vickers Energy. Lynch’s
Entire Fairness Doctrine, and not the Solomon standards (even as amplified by Pure and Cox)
provides the appropriate foundation for the future of freezeout doctrine.

IV. SCRUTINIZING THE EFFECT OF ENTIRE FAIRNESS IN FREEZEOUTS
This Part analyzes the court of chancery’s recent criticisms of suits and settlements in cash-out
mergers. These criticisms of the Entire Fairness standard are enunciated most clearly in the
court’s Cysive[485] and Cox[486] opinions, as analyzed below. These criticisms of the effects of
Entire Fairness set the backdrop for this Article’s defense of the positive effects of the fair price
and fair dealings requirements in freezeouts, set forth in Parts V and VI, respectively.
A. CYSIVE DERIDES ENTIRE FAIRNESS REVIEW
1. The Facts in Cysive
Unlike most corporate law cases, in Cysive there was a trial fully airing the facts. The focus of
the case is the fairness of cash-out merger proposed by Nelson Carbonell, Cysive’s founder,
CEO and controlling shareholder. [487] Carbonell had sold a minority interest in Cysive in a
public offering in 2000, earning more than $62 million in the transaction. [488] Shortly after the
public offering, as we know, the market for technology stocks suffered a huge loss, and then an
attempted business reorganization by Cysive also failed. [489] Both Carbonell and Cysive's board
(composed of independent and management directors) agreed that fundamental change was
necessary if the company was to avoid liquidation. [490] They hired an investment bank and
commenced a search for a buyer. [491] After months of searching and not receiving any credible
offers, Carbonell offered to purchase the remaining publicly traded shares. [492] His good faith
toward the minority was manifest in his allowing an ongoing search for a third party buyer (i.e.
while he negotiated the minority’s acquisition via cash-out merger).[493] In addition, the price he
offered exceeded the current market trading price of the stock, and also the company’s
anticipated liquidation value. [494] In the end, the court held that Carbonell's cash-out merger met
the Entire Fairness standard – but not before it railed at the inconvenience and “inefficiency”
associated with Entire Fairness review. [49]
2. Litigating Factually-Intensive Questions in Equity
The opinion begins by noting there was a disagreement about the relevant standard of
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review. [496] The plaintiffs argued that Carbonell was a controller, hence Entire Fairness applied.
[497] The defendant argued that he was not, so the business judgment rule applied. [498] The court
observed that the answer was not self-evident because Carbonell owned just under 40% of
Cysive's voting shares, hence possessed less than absolute voting control. [499] Consistent with
established precedent, nevertheless, the court combined Carbonell’s managerial role [500] with his
voting power and concluded he was a controlling shareholder – hence subject to Entire Fairness.
[501] (In the language of this Article, a de facto controller).The court’s combining voting and
managerial power in analyzing the question of control represents an expansive approach to the
Entire Fairness standard, but not an unorthodox one. Nevertheless, had the court been searching
for a principled way to avoid Entire Fairness and streamline the proceedings, it had the
opportunity to rule against Carbonell's “controller” status and apply the business judgment rule
to the cash-out merger. [502]
Instead, Cysive issues a sweeping indictment of the effects of Entire Fairness review under
the Lynch Doctrine. It condemns what it describes as the exceptionally factually intensive nature
of fair dealings analysis, noting its relevance to both the burden shift issue and the resolution of
the merits of the claim. [503] The court criticized this feature of Entire Fairness review as “miring”
suits against freezeouts in “time consuming questions that are of little practical consequence.”
[504] Lynch has “so entangled the determination over the standard of review with the resolution of
the merits that the two inquiries are inseparable,” according to Cysive. [505] In sum, the court
condemns the Lynch Doctrine for making much of little and preventing the efficient adjudication
of freezeout suits. [506] Despite Weinberger’s clear mandate, Cysive questions whether the Lynch
Doctrine (review of freezeouts under Entire Fairness) should be perpetuated at all. [507]
The claims about the hypertrophied complexity of suits under the Entire Fairness standard
are odd in several respects. First, once self dealing is present, all claims of fiduciary breach are
governed by the Entire Fairness standard – at least as there starting point. Second, nuanced,
context-specific standards and complex facts are the hallmark of Delaware's M&A
jurisprudence.[508] (Many of the insights set forth in Cysive were elaborated two years earlier by
Vice-Chancellor Strine in a (co-authored) article published in The Business Lawyer.[509] The
article advocated in favor of employing deferential business judgment rule review in almost all
cases, consistent with the views enunciated in Cysive and Cox, [510] but that recommendation
has received mix reviews.[511]) Put simply, seen against the backdrop of the heightened
standards applicable in M&A transactions and transactions involving self-dealing, the Lynch
Doctrine is not exceptional. All these situations require the courts to scrutinize complex facts.
[512] The Lynch Doctrine looks relatively rigid only if deferential review is accepted as
optimal.[513] But deferential review has not been the accepted approach to controllers’ self
dealing transactions, despite Cysive’s protestations. [514] Cysive is correct that the Lynch Doctrine
allows more suits to go forward than would be true under the business judgment rule. This
reflects the accepted concern about controllers’ potential for opportunism.
Returning to specifics, Cysive is correct that some duplicative presentation of facts occurs in
adjudicating Entire Fairness claims.[515] But its hyperbole to conclude that Entire Fairness review
is fatally flawed for this reason.[516] As long as courts are able to impose limits on attorneys' fees

Page 44

(which they are), [517] the phenomenon of duplicative presentations of evidence should be
manageable for the litigants; it might even be beneficial: facilitating a more considered litigation
process in which controllers and minority representatives gradually reassess the merits of settling
or litigating further as the many issues in the dispute are resolved serially.
In one glaring example of such hyperbole, Cysive states that Entire Fairness review forces an
agglomeration facts and legal issues that is “passing strange.”[518] To support this conclusion the
court noted that neither the plaintiffs nor the defendant in the case had moved to have the
standard of review or burden of proof resolved prior to trial. [519] However, in Cysive, it was the
defendant, Carbonell, who requested the expedited full trial, in order to facilitate obtaining
financing to consummate the cash-out merger. [520] Hence, it was not unruly, dysfunctional
doctrine that forced the full trial forward in Cysive. [521] Rather, it was in the controller’s interest
to proceed to trial despite the many threshold issues which had not yet been resolved.[522]
Nothing about the trial suggests any essential dysfunctionality in the Lynch Doctrine.
3. The Importance of the Burden of Proof in Freezeout Suits
In criticizing the Lynch Doctrine for unduly prolonging litigation, Cysive observes that the
allocation of the burden of proof is generally of little practical import in these suits. [523] As stated
therein: “The practical effect of the Lynch doctrine's burden shift is slight.” [524] As a logical next
step, the opinion recommends amending the Lynch Doctrine to eliminate burden-shifting upon
disinterested consent.[525] Eliminating hearings contesting the allocation of the burden of proof,
Cysive contends, will accelerate the resolution of claims against cash-out mergers, and increase
controllers' chances of obtaining dismissals. [526] Nevertheless, it’s clear from reading between
the lines that the court is not recommending that controllers retain the burden of proving the
freezeout’s fairness.
Furthermore, Cysive describes the allocation of the burden of proof as excessively “time
consuming” and “of little practical consequence” [527] because the court portrays merely as a
tiebreaker. [528] As stated therein: “[S]hifting the burden of persuasion under a preponderance
standard is not a major move, if one assumes, as I do, that the outcome of very few cases hinges
on what happens if the evidence is in equipoise.” [529] Obviously “dead ties” are unlikely in
litigation. If the burden of proof operated only as a tiebreaker, the court would be correct in
noting its limited practical importance. But this is far too narrow a reading of the function of
burdens of proof in litigation.
In corporate litigation, as elsewhere, the allocation of the burden of proof exerts a
comprehensive framing effect on, both the interpretation of the facts and the law. [530] First, it
reflects a policy judgment about which party should bear the risk of ambiguity. [531] Under the
Lynch Doctrine, and the duty of loyalty in general, the judicial judgment is that the self-dealing
fiduciary should bear this burden – a conclusion that is nontrivial.[532] Hence, the Lynch
Doctrine's approach to the burden of proof takes account the superior bargaining power of
controllers,[533] but creates an incentive for controllers to expose their deals to approval or
rejection by independent directors and minority shareholders.[534] The burden-shift as reward also
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encourages candor, since the reward is only available if the controller can prove the consents
were fully informed.. [535] Hence there’s reason to believe that the burden shifting device under
the Lynch Doctrine is far from trivial.
Delaware's case law on corporate fiduciary loyalty also supports this conclusion. Courts
oversee something like a “pas de troix” in evaluating the allocation of the burden of proof in
cases of alleged loyalty breaches. [536] Once the burden-possessing plaintiff demonstrates that self
dealing is present, the defendant (the proponent of the self-dealing transaction) has the burden to
prove its inherent fairness -- unless it had obtained disinterested, informed director or
shareholder consent. If it did, then once again the plaintiffs have the burden to prove the
transactions’ unfairness. [537] Were there a broad consensus that the allocation of the burden of
proof was of little importance, this three-part framework would not persist. [538]
Evidence of the real, acknowledged importance of the allocation of the burden of proof is also
provided by the fact that controllers (and other corporate, fiduciary defendants) go to
considerable lengths to obtain disinterested consent.[539] Controllers commonly seek such consent
in freezeouts, moreover, although under the Lynch Doctrine, the maximum legal benefit they can
obtain is a favorable burden shift (rather than a return to the business judgment rule). [540] If they
did not believe that it mattered whether they or the plaintiffs had the burden of proof, controllers
would not bother in this regard.
Authoritative legal commentators also affirm the practical importance of the allocation of the
burden of proof. For example, in a retrospective of Delaware supreme court decisions (published
in 2005), former Delaware Chief Justice E. Norman Veasey stated that “... burdens [of proof] and
standards of review are often outcome determinative.” [541] Part VII describes in detail this
Article’s conclusions about the burden of proof in freezeout doctrine: that Dual Ratification
should shift the burden of proving unfairness to the plaintiffs. [542]
4. ENTIRE FAIRNESS AND MOTIONS TO DISMISS
Setting aside Cysive's policy conclusion that claims should be dismissed on the pleadings
whenever possible – it’s an exaggeration to conclude that Lynch's adherence to the Entire
Fairness standard precludes courts from dismissing nonmeritorious claims against cash-out
mergers at the pleadings phase.[543] Cysive seems to conclude the complex factual underlay of
cash-out merger cases precludes their being dismissed without a full trial. However, facts can
come before the court, without a trial, on documentary evidence and affidavits; and in cash-out
mergers and tender offers, the controller would have presented extensive, detailed information
about the freezeout in its mandatory SEC filings.[544] This information could be to the court part
of the complaint or in a motion for summary judgment. [545] If controllers provide the
comprehensive disclosures required by federal law, many freezeout claims should be resolvable
prior to a full trial.
In Cysive there were no such disclosures because the defendant requested the expedited trial
before they were required.[546] Even still, there was documentary evidence that a genuinely
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independent special committee had actively and effectively negotiated with the controller. [547] It
was undisputed that Carbonell allowed the committee freedom to continue searching for a third
party buyer. [548] The record showed that the special committee had twenty-one meetings,
contacted thirty-seven potential buyers, and obtained valuation analyses from two different wellknown, independent financial advisers. [549] The committee had negotiated a decrease in
Carbonell's requested termination fee, had refused his preliminary bids, and had denied his
request to cut off third party offers. [550] There were no disputes about these facts.[551]
Furthermore, going forward, the objective independence criteria for boards endorsed by the
NYSE and the NASD should facilitate courts’ determinations about committee independence.
[552] In sum, in many freezeouts, there will be dependable, objective or documentary evidence
which will help the court to resolve the burden of proof issue early on. [553]
Furthermore, there is reason to be skeptical of Cysive's contention that Entire Fairness review
imports an unparalleled level of complexity into corporate litigation. It simply seems implausible
that Entire Fairness review in freezeouts is meaningfully more complex than are other corporate
legal doctrines, or other features of modern civil litigation. [554] The more reasonable likelihood is
that neither freezeout transactions nor the doctrines governing them are more complex, on
average, than other forms of M&A transactions and the fiduciary standards applicable to them.
[555] Because the Delaware courts commonly resolve highly complex, fact-intensive disputes in
corporate transactions on motions to dismiss and motions for summary judgment, it is reasonable
to believe that they can do so efficaciously while adhering to the Lynch Doctrine. [556] That
claims under Lynch's Entire Fairness standard commonly go forward, is most likely indicative of
judges’ perception of widespread overreaching by controllers – and not their helplessness in the
face of the Lynch Doctrine. [557]
B. THE COX DECISION AS AN ADVISORY OPINION
The next sections of this Part IV provide an analysis of the Cox opinion's criticisms of
litigation under the Lynch Doctrine. [558] In many respects, these criticisms expand on those in
Cysive, analyzed above.
1. The Cash-Out Merger in Cox
The cash-out merger in Cox exemplifies many features of modern freezeout transactions. The
Cox family proposed a buyout of the public shares in Cox Communications, Inc, a company in
the broadband communications industry that had listed minority shares on the New York Stock
Exchange. The controlling family had previously taken the company public, and then private,
and then public again, consistent with its self interest and the company's need for capital. [559]
When the family announced its freezeout bid in the fall of 2004, it held 74% of Cox’s voting
stock and control over the chairmanship of the board. [560] Hence, the Cox family was
unequivocally a controlling shareholder as defined under the Lynch Doctrine.
The Cox family's initial $32 bid represented only a 14% premium over the average trading
price of the listed shares. The final price, which was agreed to both by the special committee and
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counsel for the minority shareholders, was only slightly better -- $34.75. [561] Consistent with the
minority’s best interests, the family agreed to go forward only if it reached an agreement with the
special committee. [562] The family also agreed to abandon the freezeout if the special committee
was unable to obtain a fairness opinion from its financial adviser. [563] Less favorably for the
minority, the family announced its unwillingness to allow a market check or sale of the company
to a third party. [564] This limited the committee's and its financial adviser's ability to evaluate the
company's true going concern value, hence the actual merits of the controller's offer.
Consistent with the established transactional choreography for cash-out mergers, the special
committee hired independent legal advisers (Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson LLP) and
independent financial advisers (Goldman Sachs). [565] Once the controller and the special
committee arrived at final terms, the merger agreement was ratified by the company's full board.
[566] The Cox family then made a tender offer for the minority's shares to accelerate the closing of
the freezeout and minimize its exposure to appraisal proceedings. After acquiring over 90% of
Cox Communications' shares in the tender offer, the family consummated the freezeout through
a short-form merger. [567] The Stipulation of Settlement reflecting the resolution of claims against
the freezeout was presented to the Delaware Court of Chancery a month prior to the closing. [568]
2. A Plan for Comprehensive Doctrinal Reform for Freezeouts
In Cox, neither the reasonableness of the price offered nor the issue of fair dealings was before
the court. [569] The sole contested issue was the fee the controller had agreed to pay the plaintiff
lawyers. [570] In Cox, the court used the fee issue as a platform to review Delaware freezeout
doctrine and propose comprehensive reform.
From the outset of the Cox opinion, the court's negative view of the conduct of the plaintiffs'
lawyers in the transaction is explicit. In one of its blander criticisms, the court described the
lawyers as having filed “premature, hastily-drafted makeweight complaints.” [571] Moreover, the
court expresses a palpable aversion to the conduct of plaintiffs' lawyers in claims filed under the
Lynch doctrine: [572] objecting to what it perceives as a nearly comprehensive pattern of abuse in
suits and settlements in cash-out mergers governed by the Lynch Doctrine. [573] The opinion
describes settlements in cash-out merger freezeouts as unfolding in a triangulated interchange
between controllers, special committees and lawyers for minority shareholders. [574] Cox
contends that these settlement negotiations are deeply problematic and also paradigmatic in suits
filed under the Lynch Doctrine; [575] that they represent an easy and unfair way for plaintiff
lawyers to earn fees from controller/defendants. [576] The specter of “free riding” plaintiffs'
lawyers [577] clogging Delaware's dockets with meritless claims [578] fuels the court's sweeping
invective against Lynch’s adherence to the Entire Fairness standard. Accordingly, Cox calls for
comprehensive reform: for reforming not only freezeout doctrine governing cash-out mergers,
but all Delaware freezeout doctrine. [579] In specific, Cox proposes that the business judgment
rule should apply as the presumptive standard of review in all freezeouts, [580] so long as neither
the target directors nor a majority of the minority shares disapproved of the bid.[581] This law
reform proposal is the culmination of Vice Chancellor Strine's opinions in Pure, Cysive, and
Cox. As applied, it would largely repeal the Entire Fairness standard in freezeouts. [582]
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Notwithstanding the comprehensiveness of the reforms proposed in Cox, the “emergency” that
“compels” their adoption relates only to one category of freezeouts (cash-out mergers), and one
category of cash-out mergers -- those announced as negotiable transactions. [583] At different
points in the Cox opinion the court acknowledged this. That is, it acknowledges that the abusive
pattern of settlements that drives its critique appears only in cash-out merger freezeouts
announced as negotiable deals.[584] In these other transactional settings, Cox notes, the
purportedly abusive pattern of hastily filed complaints and collusive settlements does not appear.
[585] This limited problem would not seem to require the “fix” of applying the business judgment
rule to freezeouts.
Instead confining itself to the fee dispute before the court, Cox engages in a tirade against the
“perverse incentives” generated by review for Entire Fairness under the Lynch Doctrine, and
presents a wide array of arguments why review for Entire Fairness in freezeouts should be
limited. [586] The over breadth in Cox's criticisms of review for Entire Fairness illuminates that
the court’s objections and reforms are fueled by its policy agenda and preference for limiting
freezeout litigation and facilitating freezeout transactions. [587] In Cox the court is not shy about
making these preferences explicit.[588]
But were Cox correct that controllers face “injurious” circumstances in proceeding with such
freezeouts, then, rationally, controllers would simply eschew announcing the freezeouts as
negotiable cash-out mergers. They would plan to acquire the minority stake tender offer
freezeouts (where loose fiduciary constraints have operated) or through cash-out mergers
publicized only after a contract had been entered into. That controllers continue to make public
announcement of negotiable cash-out mergers, suggests that they are not “victims” of ruthless
plaintiff lawyers, but rather that they enjoy some net benefit in so proceeding. The most likely
benefit would be controller/defendants’ achievement of comprehensive, early settlement of
litigation against the transactions, as facilitated by the United States Supreme Court's holding in
Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Epstein (as discussed further below). [589] Although Cox
acknowledges that there might be some benefit to controllers of these “early” settlements, [590]
the court focuses almost exclusively on the idea that Entire Fairness review unfairly penalizes
controllers and benefits plaintiffs’ lawyers,[591] producing meritless “Lynch litigation,” [592] and
harming companies and the economy in general. [593]
In essence, in Cox the court of chancery seized on the review of the settlement and fee dispute
in the Cox freezeout to present a comprehensive and controversial plan for revising freezeout
doctrine to accommodate lesser scrutiny. [594] Reviews of settlements have spurred such wideranging, influential opinions from the Delaware court of chancery in other instances (most
notably in Caremark, for example). [595] If the court of chancery had stuck to the issue before it,
and merely applied the relevant fee doctrine, it would not have had the opportunity to advocate
in favor of lesser review for freezeouts.
C. COX’S CRITICISMS OF THE ENTIRE FAIRNESS STANDARD FOR FREEZEOUTS

Page 49

1. Motions to Dismiss under the Lynch Doctrine, Again
Cox claims the Lynch Doctrine prevents even meritless suits against cash-out mergers from
being dismissed. [596] At several junctures [597] the court opines that the Lynch Doctrine “makes it
impossible for a controller ever to structure a transaction in a manner that will enable it to obtain
dismissal of a complaint challenging the transaction.” [598] Elsewhere the court observes that it is
“an undeniable reality that Lynch stated that any merger with a controlling stockholder, however
structured, was subject to a fairness review.” [599] To add emphasis the court hypothesized that
even if a controller offered a 25% premium above the market price, negotiated with a special
committee of perfectly wise and independent directors (“Bill Gates and Warren Buffett”), and
otherwise meticulously supported minorities’ free choice in the cash-out merger, its motion to
dismiss would be denied. [600] The hypothetical is offered up as “proof” that the Lynch Doctrine
is fatally inefficient and dysfunctional.[601] .
a. Are Claims under Entire Fairness Nondismissable?
In its Cox opinion, the court states that even “premature, hastily-drafted, makeweight”
complaints cannot be dismissed under Lynch’s Entire Fairness standard. [602] Consequently,
perceiving this, plaintiff lawyers file meritless cases against freezeouts and obtain “sizable”
fees.[603] Controllers agree to the fees (as part of settlements), Cox contends, to avoid further
litigation costs, including discovery costs.[604] The plaintiff lawyers attempt to justify their fee to
the court by pointing to the increased price won by the committee in its negotiations; but Cox
insists that the commencement of these suits contributes little or nothing to improving prices for
minorities. The opinion attempts to support this conclusion in its analysis of the available
empirical evidence, but the evidence is too unwieldy.[605] As an alternative support for its
conclusion, the court declared that it had not been presented even with one instance of plaintiffs
soldiering forward with their suit after the special committee had agreed to terms with the
controller. (This is referred to herein as the “Simultaneous Settlement” phenomenon.) Though
this Simultaneous Settlement phenomenon might mean many things, the opinion treats it as proof
of the inherent corruption driving these suits. [607]
Finally, according to the court, the harms arising from Lynch’s rigid insistence on Entire
Fairness go beyond the payment of excess attorneys’ fees. Rather, Cox contends that the Lynch
Doctrine is undermining Delaware’s system of representative litigation and impairing economic
efficiency (by frustrating otherwise profitable freezeouts).[608] As stated by the court, the Entire
Fairness standard is deterring “the procession of offers that provide valuable liquidity to minority
shareholders and efficiency for the economy in general.” [609] These assertions form the basis of
the court’s proposal for adopting business judgment deference in freezeouts upon Deferential
Dual Ratification.[610] [611]
b. Entire Fairness and “Mere” Valuation Disputes
In Cox the court contends that a plaintiff can avoid dismissal simply by disputing the price
offered in the cash-out merger. The court correctly observes that “financial fairness is a
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debatable issue.” [612] But this does not mean that alleging financial fairness is an open door to
the courthouse. On this point, the court has misread the relevant precedents. As provided in
Weinberger,[614] and also in Rabkin v. Philip A. Hunt Chemical Corp., [615] without a credible
claim of unfair dealing, a plaintiff cannot go forward with an Entire Fairness claim. Weinberger
expressly held that without a credible unfair dealing claim, minority shareholders would be
relegated to an appraisal remedy. [616] In Rabkin the supreme court affirmed the same rule. [617]
The case is widely cited for affirming that appraisal is not the sole remedy for aggrieved
shareholders where unfair dealings in a cash-out merger is alleged. [618] But Rabkin's also held
that without a fair dealing claim – in a “mere” valuation dispute – appraisal would be the sole
avenue for redress.[619] [620] Hence, the fair price aspect of the Entire Fairness standard does not
provide minorities, or their lawyers, an open invitation to proceed to discovery. Rabkin also
addressed the possibility that plaintiff lawyers would add a “mere allegation” of unfair dealing to
their complaints, in order to proceed in equity. In response the supreme court defended that “...
our courts are not without a degree of sophistication in such matters.”[621]
c. How Controllers Benefit from Early Settlements
Cox's core objection to the Lynch Doctrine is that even specious claims against freezeouts
result in plaintiff lawyers obtaining fees and controllers suffering needless expense.[622] The court
gives only momentary consideration to the fact that controllers can benefit from “early,”
comprehensive settlements of freezeout claims in state court.[623] These benefits come into view
upon reviewing the United States Supreme Court’s 1996 holding in Matsushita Electric
Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Epstein, [624] which held that the federal courts must extend full faith and
credit to state court settlements – including settlements of federal securities law claims. [625]
Congress had provided for exclusive jurisdiction of Exchange Act claims in the federal courts.
[626] This would include federal securities fraud claims involving controllers’ merger proxies [627]
and tender offer statements, of course. [628] But after Matsushita, litigating and settling in the
state courts may preclude further litigation of claims arising from the same transaction. [629]
Hence Matsushita's holding is critically important to controllers' decision-making about settling
fiduciary claims in freezeouts. As Professor Richard Painter has observed, “Matsushita ... makes
state court class actions advantageous for defendants who can settle state fiduciary duty and
federal securities claims together in state court.” [630]
There are particular reasons why controllers might prefer to settle in state corporate law
proceedings.[631] Apparently, larger settlements and attorneys' fees are paid by defendants in
federal securities class actions, relatively speaking.[632] In addition, if defendants obtain
disinterested ratification of the freezeout, as provided under the Lynch Doctrine, they are in a
highly favorable position vis a vis judicial review. [633] There are also substantial benefits for
individual directors defendants of going with the fiduciary/state proceedings. Charter exculpation
[634] and corporate indemnification rights [635] would help shield the defendant directors from
damages -- even if they were held grossly negligent. Neither shield would be relevant in federal
securities fraud suits, however. [636]
The costs and benefits of settling early look very different once Matsushita is part of the
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equation. Certainly, further empirical research is required. But it’s entirely plausible that such
global settlements of Entire Fairness suits in state court afford controllers a “cheap” way to
dispose of fiduciary breach and securities fraud claims against freezeouts.
d. Dismissals under Revlon versus Lynch
As further proof of Lynch’s dysfunctionality, the Cox opinion points to different dismissal
rates in claims under Lynch and Revlon. [637] The opinion asserts that courts routinely dismiss
nonmeritorious Revlon claims, [638] but cannot ever dismiss nonmeritorious Entire Fairness
claims under Lynch. [639] As stated therein: “Unlike any other transaction one can imagine -even a Revlon deal, it was impossible after Lynch to structure a merger with a controlling
stockholder in a way that permitted the defendants to obtain a dismissal of the case on the
pleadings.” [640] [641]
However, there are legitimate reasons why judges would be less inclined to dismiss Entire
Fairness claims under Lynch, than Revlon claims disputing sales of control. First, Cox is correct
that there are some parallels between these suits. They involve similarly complex facts, contextspecific and nuanced fiduciary mandates, and terrifically high financial stakes in most instances.
They involve a similar admixture of substantive economic issues (e.g. “fair price” and “best price
reasonably available”) and process-based safeguards (“best efforts,” “good faith” and “fair
dealings”). [642] But there are crucial differences. Revlon claims (involving sales of control) only
rarely present problems of self-dealing corporate fiduciaries, [643] whereas claims against
controllers in freezeouts always do, by definition. Revlon duties are more analogous to
heightened duties of care (as they relate to target directors); [644] whereas Lynch claims are a
variation of the duty of loyalty – the cornerstone concept of corporate fiduciary law. [645]
Revlon claims arise in sales of control, where absent egregious conduct, market forces should
provide some meaningful protection for shareholders, [646] but this is not often the case in
freezeouts. [647] The Lynch Doctrine’s insistence on strict scrutiny reflects this fact – that
controllers can stifle the operation of market forces which might otherwise benefit minorities.
Finally, individual directors (on special takeover committees) are most often the defendants in
Revlon claims; whereas controllers are more commonly corporate entities. Delaware corporate
law is loathe to hold individual, nonmanagement directors personally liable in the absence of
egregious self dealing or bad faith (which, again, are rarely relevant in Revlon cases). [648] This
policy disfavoring personal director liability would favor dismissals in Revlon cases, but would
be mostly irrelevant in claim under Lynch. Hence there are several principled reasons why the
courts would be more inclined to dismiss Revlon claims.
2. Attorneys' Fees in Settlements under the Lynch Doctrine
The assertion that plaintiff lawyers are gaming flaws in the Lynch Doctrine is at the heart of
the Cox opinion.[649] As stated in therein, the “incentive system that Lynch created for plaintiffs'
lawyers is its most problematic feature.”[650] The court also asserts that the pattern of settlements
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and fees in freezeouts is so out of control that it warrants scrapping the Lynch Doctrine.
However, if excessive plaintiff lawyers fees are the problem, this problem should be and can be
directly addressed, without overhauling freezeout doctrine.
Indeed, it is difficult to understand how or why excessive plaintiff attorney's fees could have
become a major problem in Delaware class actions, as Cox suggests. The court of chancery must
review all settlements in such class actions. Hence the court has legal authority and ample
opportunity to reduce the size of plaintiffs' attorneys' fee awards in these suits. The Cox opinion
itself states that “this court had been modest in awarding fees in [the class action] context.”[651]
[652] Indeed, in Cox itself the court determined substantially to reduce the size of the fee payable
to the plaintiff attorneys.[653]
It also exercised its authority to alter the fee doctrine relevant to freezeouts. In Cox the court
noted its discretion to apply either the Chrysler Corp. v. Dann standards [654] or the more
traditional Sugarland standards.[655] The court held that “complaints challenging fully negotiable,
all cash, all shares merger proposals by controlling shareholders are not meritorious when filed
under the Chrysler Corp. v. Dann standard.” [656] It further provided that going forward “no risk
premium should be awarded in fee applications in cases ... when a plaintiff suing on a proposal
settles at the same level as the special committee.” [657] Finally, Cox held that if a controller and a
special committee agreed to final terms in the freezeout, without including the plaintiff lawyers
in their negotiations, there should be “no presumed entitlement to a fee by the plaintiffs'
lawyers.”[658] In these “moves,” Cox has extended the transactional choreography for cash-out
mergers to encompass the conduct of plaintiffs' lawyers, and has significantly limited their
potential to earn fees from collusive settlements.
The court also deftly resolved the fee dispute before it. It approved a fee award of $1.275
million, instead of the $4.95 million fee the controller had agreed to pay.[659] Interestingly, the
settlement had not contemplated that the lawyers’ fees would reduce the price obtained for the
minority.[660] In essence, the court was not ruling in the minorities’ interests but rather acting as a
gatekeeper of the litigation system in altering fee doctrine and reducing the fee agreed to. [661]
In this sense the case demonstrates the courts’ ability to redress litigation agency costs – rather
than their helplessness.
Furthermore, the Cox opinion demonstrates that fee issue are fundamentally severable from
doctrinal issues inherent in applying Entire Fairness in freezeouts. The portion of the Cox
decision interpreting Chrysler v. Dann [662] and the Sugarland factors [663] is severable from the
opinion's condemnation of Entire Fairness review under Lynch. [664]
In addition, recent empirical data on fees in acquisition-oriented class actions, presented by
Professors Thompson and Thomas in a Vanderbilt Law Review article published in 2004,
conflicts with Cox's assertions about the gravity of the fee problem in Entire Fairness claims
against cash-out mergers. [665] Although they acknowledge the need for further research, [666]
these professors conclude that plaintiffs' lawyers' fees in Entire Fairness claims under Lynch are
relatively modest in amount. [667] The relatively modest nature of these fees becomes evident in
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comparison to the fees awarded in the settlement of federal securities class actions, for example.
[668] This modest nature of the fees paid to plaintiffs' lawyers in freezeouts holds true whether
they are considered on a percentage of recovery basis, [669] or on an hourly basis. [670] Just as
significantly, Thompson and Thomas illuminate the genuinely contingent nature of plaintiff
lawyers' receipt of any fees in freezeouts (and other acquisition-oriented class actions). [671] With
respect to freezeouts, Thompson and Thomas' data suggests that plaintiff lawyers receive fees in
less than forty percent of all the cases filed. [672] Their data contrasts with Cox's assertion that
plaintiffs' lawyers can earn “sizable fees” [673] merely by filing a claim under Lynch. [674]
Ultimately, even Cox itself (after excoriating the conduct of plaintiffs' lawyers in cash-out
mergers) observes that plaintiff lawyers have “moderated” the size of their fee requests in this
setting in recognition of the court of chancery's supervisory role.[675]. In sum, the existing
empirical evidence does not suggest that the plaintiff attorneys fees problem in freezeouts is a
substantial one. Most significantly, as illustrated in Cox itself, the Delaware court of chancery
has discretionary authority and ample opportunity to block the payment of excessive fees in the
course of reviewing settlements.
3. Litigation Commenced During Freezeout Negotiations
At the heart of the Cox opinion is the question of whether Entire Fairness suits add value for
minorities when they are filed while negotiations are pending.[676] The expert for the plaintiffs'
lawyers, Guhan Subramanian, testified that the pendency of the lawsuit was a positive factor
influencing the benefits obtained for the minority -- so that the plaintiffs' lawyers had earned
their fee. [677] The court attempted to resolve this particular question, but also the broader one of
whether early filed claims ordinarily provide leverage to minorities in freezeout negotiations.[678]
On this latter issue, it held that the filing of claims adds little or no value for minorities – that the
minority’s representatives will do just as well without the leverage of litigation having
commenced. [679] Furthermore, according to Cox, if the committee and a majority of the minority
shares approve the offer, that should be sufficient showing of its fairness to obviate judicial
review of the merits.[680] [681]
In Cox the court wrestled with contradictory econometric evidence presented by experts for
both sides. [682] In the end, it arrived at the most intelligent answer possible: that at present it is
not empirically possible to prove what portion of an improved price is attributable to litigation
having been commenced. The existing empirical evidence seems too incomplete.[683] But the
court nevertheless had to resolve the fee dispute before it – hence seemed to be called upon to
rule on whether the plaintiff lawyers had earned their fee from filing the litigation.[684] In effect,
the decision “split the difference” – awarding some fee to the plaintiff lawyers, but far less than
they’d hoped.[685]
On the general issue of the value of Entire Fairness suits filed during negotiations, the court
ruled that they are presumptively “nonmeritorious.” [686] Leaving aside the quantitative evidence,
the court pointed to the “Simultaneous Settlement” phenomenon. [687] But it’s not self evident
that this proves early filings do not benefit minorities. Many factors are probably at work in the
Simultaneous Settlement phenomenon. [688] [689] Indeed, even Cox admits that the application of
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the Entire Fairness standard -- even, perhaps, the pendency of the litigation -- gives special
committees “some” slightly increased leverage in bargaining with controllers in freezeout. [690]
Perhaps most importantly, in Cox the court contends that these lawsuits do not add value
because committees (it asserts) have the power just to say “no” to controllers.[691] However,
despite the court’s assertion, the committee's disapproval will not prevent the controller from
proceeding with a freezeout. [692] Given the terms of the merger statute and the option of
pursuing a tender offer freezeout, the controller can go around a disapproving committee and
effectuate a freezeout if it so chooses.[693] The committee's disapproval may alter the controller's
tactics or its willingness to go proceed, but this “no” is not a deal killer. [694]
Finally, Cox concludes that the commencement of Entire Fairness suits during negotiations
does not add value because “there is no litigation conflict.” [695] But even if there are no actual
hearings or other judicial proceedings, this does not mean these filings accomplish nothing. For
instance, no one disputes that poison pills are effective anti-takeover devices, despite the fact that
they are never triggered. Poison pills, like early claims in freezeouts, signal the availability of an
immediate response to an unfair acquisition. Once a claim is filed, if the controller engages in
unfair dealings, there can be an immediate judicial response: this the controller and its lawyers
know. Furthermore, if Cox is correct that there is “no actual litigation conflict,” then the
litigation agency costs that arise from these filings cannot be overwhelming.[696]
In addition, the filing of claims upon the commencement of cash-out mergers allows time for
the minorities' lawyers to resolve who will be lead counsel and lead plaintiff. [697] Since these
(federally inspired) mechanisms have been adopted by the Delaware courts to promote efficient
litigation, it makes sense to allow the plaintiff lawyers time to implement them.
In sum, neither the existing empirical evidence, nor the simultaneous settlement phenomenon
makes a persuasive case for early filings under Lynch being wasteful or unproductive.
4. The Utility of Discovery
Cox portrays discovery requests under the Lynch Doctrine as mere tools to extort settlements
from controllers. [698] Of course, discovery requests could be abused, as was recognized by the
PSLRA's stay of discovery provision. [699] However, once again, the court of chancery has the
ability to limit discovery in freezeout litigation in order to prevent abuse. [700]
In addition, the legitimacy of discovery should be acknowledged. Special committees and
minority shareholders may legitimately need additional information about the freezeout offer. As
a general matter, the Lynch Doctrine reflects the systemic informational asymmetry between
controllers and minorities. Controllers are the ultimate “insiders;” minorities and the outside
directors representing them do not have informational parity with respect to the company's
prospects. So long as there is appropriate judicial supervision, the discovery process can be
viewed as a legitimate extension of the “arms' length,” fair dealing process mandated by
Weinberger. [701] In effect, it is an alternative form of the due diligence process conducted on
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behalf of minorities in freezeouts. [702]
The peculiar situation of outside directors is also relevant to the need for discovery. Outside
directors have less information than management or the controller; and yet outside directors are
chosen to represent minorities in negotiating with controllers on the assumption that they will not
be beholden to the controller. [703] Furthermore, consistent with Lynch's concern about inherent
coercion, the special committee directors may be fearful of engaging in a full scale due diligence
process as part of their negotiations with the controller. Cox itself notes that outside directors are
likely to have limited time, expertise or face other practical impediments that hinder their
advocacy on the part of minorities.[704] The discovery process may contribute a vital
counterbalance to what the outside directors could learn on their own.
5. Suits Against Target Directors During Negotiations
Individual target company directors are commonly included as defendants in freezeout
litigation.[705] However, because the Entire Fairness standard elaborated under Weinberger and
Lynch (and their progeny) does not specifically address target director liability in freezeouts,[706]
claims against target directors would commonly be brought as pendant (supplemental) claims
under the Lynch Doctrine. To be precise, they would be plead as duty of care or potentially
breach of good faith claims in most instances. Target directors would almost never be held
personally liable in a freezeout, but the potential for financial liability is not the only stimulus
influencing their conduct. Even if the target directors are not named as defendants, they are
commonly called upon to give testimony in Entire Fairness litigation in freezeouts. Without the
Entire Fairness claims, the good faith and duty of care claims would probably be summarily
dismissed [707] But for purposes of this discussion, the important point is that the pendant claims
(filed during negotiations) are likely to catalyze the special committee directors to exert their best
efforts in negotiating against the controller. Despite the low minimal chance of financial liability,
the outside directors will wish to avoid the potential for embarrassment amongst their peer
group. Indeed, Delaware fiduciary opinions often consciously take advantage of this “shaming”
opportunity to stimulate better conduct on the part of independent directors. [708] Hence, the
existence of pendant claims against target directors in freezeouts, or the taking of their testimony
in claims filed against controllers, is a further positive attribute of the Lynch Doctrine.

D. REDUCING LITIGATION IN FREEZEOUTS
1. The Purported Problem and a Plan
Cox contends that the Lynch Doctrine invites strike suits because claims cannot be dismissed at
the pleadings phase;[709] the thin basis for this assertion was analyzed above. [710] The court also
contends that these strike suits are thwarting otherwise value-maximizing freezeouts, although
the opinion presents no evidence for this.[711]) The opinion contends that strike suits under Lynch
are undermining the integrity of class action litigation in Delaware – despite the court’s seeming
ability to control discovery abuse and excessive plaintiff attorney fees.[712] Cox’s contends that
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Lynch should be “eased,” so that business judgment deference would apply upon Dual
Ratification,[713] although this would be more like a repeal than an “easing” of the Lynch
Doctrine. Despite the fact that heightened review is more the rule than the exception in high
stakes M&A transactions, the court insists that its “modest” [714] and “sensible” [715] plan to
implement business judgment deference in freezeouts will bring this doctrine into “harmony with
the rest of Delaware corporate law,” [716] and increase investors' faith in the “integrity” of
Delaware’s corporate jurisprudence.[717] According to the court, so long as there has been Dual
Ratification,[718] allowing business judgment deference in freezeouts would not “diminish the
integrity-enforcing potential of litigation in any material way.” [719] In short, the court’s
enthusiasm for curtailing strict scrutiny in freezeouts is unqualified.
Reading between the lines, it’s apparent that the court anticipates that most freezeouts would
receive Dual Ratification.[720] If this were not true, the reforms proposed in Cox would not have
their intended effect of reducing litigation in freezeouts. On this point the court is likely correct.
The fundamental insight under Lynch – that inherent coercion operates in freezeouts – suggests
this would be true.[721] And as discussed further in Part VI, Pure affirms the continued relevance
of inherent coercion in both freezeout formats. And Cox does not disprove it, but merely
disparages it.[722] Furthermore, the likelihood of controllers obtaining Dual Ratification is
increased by the effect the Cox Reforms would have on the fair price duty. As described in Part
V, below, the Cox reforms would marginalize the operation of the fair price duty during the
pendency of negotiations. In the absence of controllers having a fair price duty, their
representatives have far less leverage to say “no” to controllers.[723]
As future courts consider whether to endorse Cox's Dual Ratification scheme, they should be
wary of many of the claims made in Cysive, Pure and Cox. Most glaringly, the Dual Ratification
proposal is not a “modest”[724] adjustment to Lynch Doctrine. [725] The court of chancery’s
proposed reforms cannot truly be reconciled with Weinberger and Lynch.[726] So the real
question is whether the court of chancery will find a way around these precedents, and whether
the supreme court would (have occasion to) intervene, and speak to the continued importance of
Entire Fairness for freezeouts, if it did.
2. Will the Quality of Consents Be Reviewable?
The goal endorsed most fervently in Cox is limiting litigation in freezeouts. However, even if
the Cox reforms are followed – so that business judgment deference applies upon Dual
Ratification -- it’s not clear that this would be the result. Much of the result would depend on the
approach the court took to the consent, i.e. Dual Ratification.
Under such a new framework, the consents (Dual Ratification) become dispositive of the
standard of review. This presents a paradox, however, as Cysive intuited. Surely the quality of
the consents must matter: whether they are fully informed, freely given and sufficiently
numerous. But once these questions are before the court, the opportunity to avoid judicial
scrutiny is limited. Aspects of “fair dealings” are already subject to review.[727] Or -- if the
quality of the consents would not be scrutinized, then we should be clear that freezeouts will
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have been deregulated. Equity will have resigned its role in this setting. Thus an easy
accommodation between the Lynch Doctrine and the Cox Reforms is illusory. As a matter of
policy, the courts may decide to apply the business judgment rule to freezeouts, but they cannot
do so, legitimately, while claiming that they have not radically diminished the role of equity in
protecting minorities in freezeouts. [728]
3. The Likelihood of Increased Appraisals
Even if equitable claims against controllers in freezeouts are reduced, this might not affect the
overall incidence of claims filed against freezeouts. Most obviously, there would be a net
increase in appraisal actions.[729] After Weinberger, the equitable cause of action became a
preferable format for aggrieved minority shareholders to contest cash-out mergers. [730] However,
if the business judgment rule becomes the base line standard for freezeouts, this would
substantially curtail the filing of equitable claims and increase the filing of appraisal actions.
The court of chancery's would still be involved in complex valuation litigation against
freezeouts.[731]
Furthermore, there is a substantial likelihood that curtailment of the equitable action would
trigger reform of the appraisal statute to make it more available to aggrieved shareholders. The
decision in Glassman certainly increased the pressure on the Delaware legislature to give further
attention to appraisal reform.[732] And there has been increased academic commentary calling for
liberalizing and rationalizing the appraisal remedy. [733] Although many academics have endorsed
the construct of deferential review upon Dual Ratification, many others have not yet awakened to
the controversy, and may not be inclined to jettison strict scrutiny.[734] Furthermore, as had been
true in the 1970s, shareholder advocates are likely to take their concerns public – particularly if
the current low stock price valuations invite a wave of freezeouts – and pressure legislatures to
expand the appraisal remedy. Hence, if the Cox Reforms are followed, the net increase in
appraisal actions may “trump” the reduction in equitable cases.
4. More Claims Against Target Directors?
In Cox the court professes that its Dual Ratification proposal would not “diminish the integrityenforcing potential of litigation in any material way.” [735] Similarly, it contends that shareholders
would still have “potent litigation weapons” would in shareholders’ “arsenal.”[736] Expanding on
this concept, the court states that:
[p]laintiffs who believed that a special committee breached its fiduciary
duties in agreeing to a merger would continue to have the practical ability
to press a claim; they would just have to allege particularized facts
demonstrating a breach of fiduciary duty. [737]
The statement is succinct, almost a “throw away,” but its implications are startling. The court
seems to be proposing that notwithstanding the Cox Reforms, dissatisfied shareholders could
bring breach of duty claims directly against the committee directors.[738] Dual Ratification would
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preclude an Entire Fairness attack on a controller's conduct in the freezeout, but minorities could
still plead breach of care and breach of good faith claims against the special committee
directors. But if this is the important of this passage from Cox, then it, too, undercuts the
decision’s goal of reducing litigation in freezeout. “Swapping” minority claims against
controllers for claims against committee directors would not reduce freezeout litigation.
Secondly, the suggestion cuts against the grain of corporate fiduciary duty, which (as stated
above) resists holding individual directors liable absent egregious circumstances. [739] Most suits
against committee directors would be plead as breaches of care: that the committee was too
passive in defending the minorities’ interests.(This was the essence of the shareholders'
complaint in Solomon, of course.) [740] And with respect to loyalty, even if the directors were
found to be dominated by or beholden to the controller, this in itself is not a breach of duty. [741]
As stated previously, a variety of legal devices limit or eliminate directors' financial exposure to
damages for breach of care. [742] Despite Cox’s assertion, it is not likely that shareholders will sue
target committee directors in freezeouts; this is not a feasible surrogate for reduced
accountability on controllers’ part.

5. Will Minorities' Approvals Be Used to Exculpate Directors?
In order to obtain the favorable burden shift under the Lynch Doctrine, controllers most often
seek special committee approvals, rather than minority shareholders.’[743] (For one reason, no
proxy solicitation is required in seeking the committee’s approval, which saves the controller
time and expense.) Cox makes hay that the Lynch Doctrine has underserved minorities' interests
in failing to require both forms of consent,[744] but the criticism is inapt since the consents under
the Lynch Doctrine are relevant only to burden shifting, and not to supplanting judicial oversight.
[745]

If Cox's Dual Ratification regime is accepted as the new transactional choreography for
freezeouts, defendants will surely seek to have such consents expanded to exculpate committee
directors from potential liability. Both controllers and target directors will urge that consent be
used as such a waiver. Indeed, this argument has already been presented to the court of chancery
in the Emerging Communications litigation. [746] In the case law expanding on Section 144 of the
DGCL,[747] valid shareholder ratification has been used as such a waiver of liability in certain
allegations of fiduciary breach.[748] This potential for exculpation via ratification is illustrated in
the litigation in Smith v. Van Gorkom, [749]Orman v. Cullman, [750] and Harbor Financial
Partners v. Huizenga, [751] for example. Such shareholder ratification has sometimes been
allowed to extend even to breach of loyalty claims, in fact. For this reason, ratification is more
useful to target directors than charter exculpation and/or indemnification. [752]
To be clear, there is no express proposal in Cox that minority shareholder consents in
freezeouts should be deployed defensively as a tool precluding liability for individual directors.
However, the Cox opinion does expressly address the consent-as-ratification case law (arising
from DGCL Section 144) with approbation.[753] More broadly, the general favor Cox exhibits
towards (seemingly) bargained for results supports this evolution of the significance of
shareholder approval in freezeouts. [754] In sum, although Cox expressly describes the majority-
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of-the-minority shareholder ratification process as an additional safeguard of minority
shareholders' interests, [755] such consent could easily be judicially expanded to preclude target
director liability in freezeouts.
6. The Evolution of Transactional Choreography for Freezeouts
The recent freezeout cases represent the suits filed against these transactions as a deadweight
loss for the judicial system, investors and the economy.[756] But the court of chancery has not
given due consideration to the positive benefits arising from Entire Fairness review in freezeouts.
In particular, such judicial has produced a detailed, current set of best practices (transactional
choreography) that benefits minorities and may helpfully guide controllers in future freezeouts.
If the Cox Reforms are followed, so that business judgment deference becomes the base line
standard for freezeouts, far fewer freezeouts would be reviewed. The court would have less
opportunity to keep this transactional choreography current. (Much would depend on the court's
interpretation of its role in reviewing motions to dismiss and the quality of the consents.).
Curtailing the transactional choreography for freezeouts would be a net loss for investors and the
economy – one which is not acknowledged in the recent cases.
V. AFTER COX: BARGAINING IN THE SHADOW OF A LIMITED FAIR PRICE DUTY
Between the duty to deal fairly and the duty to pay a fair price, the latter has been far more
controversial.[757] This is evident in the difference between the Lynch Doctrine and Solomon on
the fair price issue. The difference is absolute: Lynch says “yes,” [758] Solomon says “no.” [759]
Achieving a resolution to whether there should be a fair price duty in freezeouts represents the
greatest stumbling block to unifying this body of doctrine.
Perhaps because Lynch and Solomon are contradictory and mutually exclusive on the fair price
question – and because a stated objective of the recent cases is to unify freezeout doctrine -- the
court of chancery largely avoids the issue in its proposed reforms. This is true even in Cox.
Nowhere in Cox does the court of chancery take a clear position on what would happen to the
fair price duty in a Dual Ratification world. [760] It is clear, however, that the court favors the
Solomon approach (where no fair price duty applies) over the Lynch Doctrine. [761] In the Cox
decision – which is again the most telling recent treatment of the issue – the fair price issue is
subsumed into the discussion of Dual Ratification, as further analyzed below.
A. The Fair Price Duty and Negotiations
As a preface to analyzing what the court of chancery’s freezeout reforms would mean for the
future of the fair price duty, it’s necessary to review the role that duty plays in freezeout
negotiations. One aspect of the question can be posed as follows: is there much difference
between a fair price duty and a fair price remedy? This Article answers “yes;” and this is a major
rationale for extending Entire Fairness so that it will apply to all freezeout negotiations.
Part II of this Article described the various legal price regimes relevant to freezeouts. The
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discussion of the problems arising from Solomon's failure to apply a fair price duty to controllers'
tender offers are relevant once again here. [762] (So are appraisal’s failure to address tender
offers.) Without a fair price duty, controllers can employ their overall financial and legal power
advantages to depress the value of minorities' shares prior to making lowball tender offer
freezeout bid. Hence, they can benefit from pushing the outer limits of the fiduciary doctrine
governing controllers' self dealing prior to launching a tender offer freezeout (where no fair price
duty applies).[763] To be particular, they can push the hazy outer limits of the corporate
opportunity doctrine. They can delay the development of lucrative business ventures. [764] They
will gain from withholding dividends. [765] And there are many other “softer” forms of self
dealing in cases of controllers compelling contracts with affiliates. In many instances there may
be self-dealing by the controller which cannot be remedied through legal proceedings.
Controllers can signal to the market that they are willing to exploit their control to obtain these
benefits. For many reasons, boards of controlled companies are poorly situated to withstand
controller-sponsored, minority-unfriendly initiatives. (Even in a post-SOX world, in listed
companies where there is a true controller, it suffices to have only three independent directors on
the board.)[766] In sum, in a transactional world devoid of a fair price duty, the controller can take
steps to depress the minority stock’s trading price and then compel a freezeout to benefit from
this depressed price.
What do negotiations at a hypothetical bargaining table look like in the absence of a fair price
duty? Stated otherwise, what happens to the “arms’ length dealings” construct once there is no
fair price duty at the point of negotiations, but merely, first, an expanded prohibition against
coercion (consistent with Solomon) and, second, maybe, a chance at going concern value after
years of litigation? At this juncture, appraisal is only marginally relevant as a reference point.
(To review: the practical impediments and statutory limits discussed earlier are relevant to the
back end of a tender offer freezeout and all cash-out mergers; and appraisal isn’t even an option
in controllers’ tender offers.) Without a fair price duty, even in a cash-out merger the controller
would have no incentive to offer more than the lowest credible estimate of “fair value” (going
concern value), discounted by the impediments and general unwieldiness of appraisals. A
rationally maximizing, well advised controller would offer no more. In negotiations, the
controller would counter the special committee's request for a higher price with the truism that it
would be irrational for it to pay more than it is legally required. The controller will advise the
committee to take it (ratify the freezeout) or leave it (leaving the minority with little or no
alternative to the probably now more deeply discounted market price).
In this setting – i.e. in the absence of a fair price duty – for those negotiating on the minorities’
behalf, virtually any premium to the market price would start to look like an appealing offer.
Indeed – in what seems like a remarkable departure from modern financial theory, as well as
Delaware’s case law on valuation -- the court in Cox observed that minorities are doing “more
than tolerably” well because they are selling to controllers in freezeouts at premiums to the
public trading price of their shares. [767]) The savvy controller describes its offer as a great deal
for the minority shareholders. (“Puffery” is not the basis for a complaint under the federal
securities laws. [768]). The announcement of the offer would generate significant publicity and
attract arbitrageurs; this would stimulate trading activity, which would further drive a spike in
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the trading price (which would dissipate quickly were the committee to disapprove of the
freezeout offer, because it would be construed as a sign the deal might fail). A herding effect
operates in these settings: minority shareholders become excited by the prospect of the
transaction; the premium over the market price is salient.[769] Unless the offer to the minority is
grossly underpriced, the “bird in the hand” rationale begins to obscure the question of whether
the price is commensurate with going concern value. And appraisal might not be available, in
any event.
Without there being a definitive fair price duty protecting minorities in the negotiations, the
special committee is under tremendous pressure not to “kill the deal” by refusing the controller's
offer. The premium over the trading price reflected in the controller’s offer – indeed, almost any
plausible offer from the controller -- becomes the relevant benchmark for the merits of the deal.
Absent a fair price duty, the committee has only a very attenuated conceptual framework against
which to judge the controller’s offer. Rather than some outside shot at going concern value,
obtained after years of litigation, the (discounted) market trading price becomes the most
available benchmark for measuring the controller’s offer. Moreover, without the support of the
legal fair price duty, if the committee concludes that the controller's price is inadequate, it will
have to scramble to provide a compelling account of why it reached this conclusion. Without a
fair price duty, the committee cannot fall back on the gap between the legal “fair price” and the
price offered by the controller as the rationale for its disapproval. The legal fair price floor has
stopped supporting the committee’s negotiating leverage.
If the minority's representatives are well advised (and there’s no reason they should not be),
the negotiations look very different in the presence of a fair price duty. The fair price duty
creates a clear heuristic. It should give the committee the high ground to commence the
negotiations. The committee should open by asserting the minority's legal entitlement to a
premium to the firm’s current going concern value. This positive legal claim yields a normative
one: that the controller is legally obligated to pay no less.[770] The fair price duty allows the
committee to argue that it cannot consent (consistent with its own fiduciary duties) [771] to a price
that is less. If the fair price duty applies and the committee believes the controller's price offers
less than a premium to going concern value, the committee has a clear rationale for disapproving
of the offer, and explaining why it did so to the minority shareholders. (“The controller refused
to pay the price you were entitled to receive under the law.”) The committee directors have no
incentive to derail the deal, so there is no reason to believe they’d be biased against the
controller’s offer. The fair price duty frees the committee from the virtually untenable
predicament of having to go back to the minority and say “our instinct was that the price was too
low.” If the controller is offering what its financial advisers believe is a premium to going
concern value, the committee can approve of it; if not, they have a firmer footing to reject the
offer. And in a world where the fair price duty applies, the committee can provide the minority
with a coherent account of why it chose as it did. [772]
B. Cox on the Fair Price Question
Would a fair price duty apply under the Cox Reforms? Again, in Cox the court does not
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affirmatively address the status of the fair price duty under its unified freezeout doctrine.
Nevertheless (as stated earlier), it’s apparent that in Cox the court’s clear preference is for
Solomon over Lynch, which suggests that it does not validate a fair price duty.
Second, based on what’s express and what’s implied in Cox's Dual Ratification provision, the
best answer is that a fair price duty would not apply to freezeouts during negotiations. [773] That
is because Cox says that Entire Fairness should not apply unless the committee (or majority of
the minority shares) disapproves (i.e. has disapproved) of the offer.[774] Hence, the fair price duty
would spring to life only if negotiations had derailed.
Under Lynch, the Entire Fairness standard applies regardless of whether the committee says
“yes” or “no.” (If it says “yes,” there is a burden shift, but that is all.) Under the Entire Fairness
standard, the controller bears the risk of a court determining that the freezeout’s price was less
than “going concern value plus.” Under the Entire Fairness standard, because the fair price duty
applies whether or not the committee says “yes” or “no” (or is not consulted at all), the
committee’s participation can only benefit minority shareholders.
Inviting the committee into the negotiations cannot be used by the controller as a Sword of
Damocles to hang over the directors’ heads. This is precisely what it would become if the
committee directors lack the ammunition of a fair price duty. If the fair price duty springs to life
only after the committee (or the majority of minority shares) has said “no,” [775] then it won’t
inform the committee’s price requests. It won’t inform the controller’s opening bid. In the
negotiations, the deeply discounted trading price of the minority block would take the place of
expanded going concern value. Certainly, under the Cox Reforms, the fair price duty is not clear
enough or stable enough to be of much use to the committee or minority shareholders in their
negotiations with the controller.
Cox’s proposed shift away from the Entire Fairness standard for freezeouts raises some
additional, more technical questions. In a world where Dual Ratification triggers the business
judgment rule standard, what happens when the committee takes a position of neutrality? [776] As
stated earlier, this would probably become a common occurrence in tender offer freezeouts. And
it could become an issue even in cash-out mergers, because it’s increasingly apparent that
agreements can be written to allow mergers to go to the shareholders even where the board has
changed its mind.[777])
Finally, given the importance of independent director/special committee assent under Cox's
Dual Ratification provision, what numerical minimums should attach to such director/committee
assent? Pure had a special negotiating committee of two: should that be enough? Can it be
reasonable to allow deferential review (assuming the minority’s assent), if the committee has
remained neutral, or if the committee is composed merely of two independent directors? In a
committee of three (which may foreseeably become the norm), what if two outside directors
consent, and one disapproves?[778] The Delaware supreme court's recent decision in Krasner v.
Moffett suggests there is reason to be skeptical of such “mini” director consent. [779] (It’s
noteworthy that until recently, New York had a higher threshold than Delaware’s for
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independent director ratification to be deemed effective to cleanse self-dealing.) [780] Because
Cox makes the burden of proof hinge upon these consents, these formal, numerical issues raise
very important questions.
Based on the discussion above, Cox’s promise of reducing litigation under a Dual Ratification
standard for freezeouts looks even more unrealistic. The new regime raises too many unresolved
issues. In light of these open issues, the parties could not dependably predict, ex ante, whether
the Entire Fairness standard or the business judgment rule would apply to the freezeout under the
new reforms. That uncertainty would be worse than the formalistic, “two tracks” approach that
has been employed up to the present. Compared to this unstable state of affairs, certainly,
Lynch's clear affirmation of Entire Fairness in freezeouts is far more beneficial to investors,
planners and the markets.[781] Finally, the Dual Ratification approach is facially plausible only if
one rejects the most basic assumption underlying Weinberger and Lynch: that is, that the
operation of inherent coercion taints consents in freezeouts. But there is no reason to assume the
sudden irrelevance of inherent coercion; nothing in the recent opinions suggests this is so.
C. Empirical Evidence
There is a growing body of empirical evidence analyzing the premiums paid in freezeouts.
These studies analyze the role of legal standards in influencing freezeouts and the incidence and
nature of settlements and lawsuits in freezeouts. [782] As mentioned previously, in Cox the court
expended considerable energy considering this empirical evidence, and especially the impact
alternative freezeout structures, with their different standards of review, on the prices obtained
by minorities. [783]
In their research, Professors Thompson and Thomas concluded that suits in cash-out mergers
under the Lynch Doctrine raise the premiums offered in the “worst” transactions. [784] Professor
Subramanian's data led him to a similar conclusion about suits against cash-out mergers under
the Entire Fairness standard. (To be clear: Subramanian served as an expert on behalf of the
plaintiffs' lawyers in the Cox settlement.) [785] In contrast, Professors Weiss and White's data led
them to conclude that Lynch's Entire Fairness standard has led primarily to increased welfare for
plaintiffs' lawyers, but not minority shareholders.[786] In sum, Thompson and Thomas' and
Subramanian's conclusions point in the direction of extending the Entire Fairness standard to all
forms of freezeouts, [787] consistent with minorities' best interests – a conclusion in line with the
reform proposals endorsed herein. In contrast, Professors' Weiss and White's analysis supports
limiting the Entire Fairness standard's application, consistent with the Dual Ratification proposal
endorsed in Cox. [788] Cox's expressed displeasure with the Lynch Doctrine [789] reflects many
features of the scholarly criticisms published by Weiss and White [790] (to be clear, these
professors were the principle objectors to the fee disputed in Cox).[791] [792]. [793]
VI. FAIR DEALINGS AND THE CONSENT QUESTION
A. The Substance of Fair Dealings
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If there were a means to obtain genuine, free consent from the minority shareholders, this
would resolve the problems attendant to freezeouts – in essence there would be no “freezeout.”
The attraction of the idea of consent is apparent even in Weinberger’s discussion of fair dealings.
As stated therein, if the court found sufficient basis to believe there were vigorous, unrestrained
negotiations between the controller and the minorities' disinterested, informed representatives,
this would be a strong indicia of fairness; the defendants would likely prevail in the litigation.
[794] But Weinberger and Lynch also describe the reasons why truly free, informed consent is a
near impossibility in the freezeout context; most pertinently, that the specter of inherent coercion
undermines the likelihood of the consents being truly voluntary. Yet the attraction of the consent
“construct” is a compelling in corporate law; indeed it drives the court of chancery’s Dual
Ratification proposal for freezeout reform. The issue of voluntary consent in freezeouts thus
warrants further consideration. What motivates the intense concern about freedom of choice for
minorities in relation to freezeouts, as embodied within Entire Fairness’ fair dealings
requirement?
B. Property Law Concerns
Lynch's Entire Fairness standard represents an attempt to address a fundamental problem of
property law that arises in the context of freezeouts. As described earlier, the DGCL affords
controllers the power to eliminate shareholders, without their consent, through a cash-out
merger.[795] In effect, the controller can compel the sale of the minority’s shares. This is very odd
from the perspective of property law, even if the minority is compensated at fair value. In effect,
controllers' power in cash-out mergers is analogous to the state's power of eminent domain. Of
course, the state's power of eminent domain is subject to strict limits, including constitutional
ones, and intensive judicial oversight where challenged.[796] The Entire Fairness standard and its
oversight by the state courts can be construed as an analog of “due process” as overseen by the
federal courts.[797] If the minority truly consented to the freezeout, then there would be no
“taking;” the property law problem presented by freezeouts would be neutralized.
C. Institutional Checks and Balances in Corporate Governance
Second, freezeouts are in tension with the traditional framework of corporate governance. The
Entire Fairness standard is a response to that institutional friction. [798] Once a controller is
present, the routine allocation of decisional authority in corporate law is up-ended.[799] It is
axiomatic in corporate law that the board of directors has preeminent authority over corporate
affairs, and shareholders do not. [800] The idea is so basic and pervasive that it is stated expressly
in Cox itself: “... the central idea of Delaware's approach to corporation law is the empowerment
of centralized management, in the form of boards of directors and the subordinate officers they
choose, to make disinterested business decisions. The business judgment rule exemplifies and
animates this idea.” [801] It is the board which should set in motion basic changes in corporate
affairs, not the officers, and not the shareholders. [802] This centralization of power is defended as
maximally efficient.[803] But once there is a controller present, the board’s preeminence is
severely compromised, by definition. If the controller is an individual, he or she will normally be
on the board, and probably as its chairman. Often controllers-as-individuals also serve as senior
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executive officers of the company, most commonly as CEOs. This gives them tremendous de
facto authority over corporate affairs. [804] If the controller is a parent company, it will commonly
elect officers of the parent company to the controlled company’s board.[805] As mentioned earlier,
even the listing standards’ board independence criteria are relaxed in regard to companies with
controlling shareholders. [806]). As noted in the Introduction, the board theoretically owes duties
to all shareholders equally, [807] but in practice the controller's interests will shape management's
and the board's strategies and range of options. [808]
A freezeout proposal is effectively a corporate governance “showdown.” The freezeout
proposal originates with the controller, and would not be proposed were it not consistent with the
controller’s self interest. It does not originate with the board. Reflecting this reality, Weinberger
smartly rejected the requirement that the controller prove a corporate-oriented purpose for
eliminating the minority, which would effectively be a ruse. [809] Furthermore, while the
freezeout effects a fundamental corporate change, based on the DGCL, the minority's votes are
useless to stop it. [810] As was the case in the transactions in Pure and Cox, [811] once the
controller announces an unwillingness to sell to a third party, the market for corporate control
will not operate in the minority’s interest. Even assuming a independent negotiating committee is
established, without the full board’s assent, such a committee would lack legal authority to
approve a financial restructuring, or alternative sale transaction. [812]
As reflected in Weinberger, Lynch, and their progeny, the Entire Fairness standard invites the
controller to constitute surrogates for the checks and balances which would operate within the
system of corporate governance were no controller present. But these cases are mindful that
these are merely surrogates. A vote by the majority of the minority or ratification by a facially
independent subcommittee of the board is not the same as assent by a wholly independent board,
or a majority of all voting shares. Under the Lynch doctrine, accordingly, they constitute “strong
evidence,” but merely evidence of fairness. They do not obviate the need for judicial vigilance
where the deal is contested. The Cox Reforms would expressly change this, consistent with the
court's stated objective of facilitating controllers' ability to obtain dismissals on the pleadings.[813]
Dual Ratification would mean the parties would be left to their private agreements. The legal
institutions of corporate governance, including rules of fiduciary duty, would be supplanted
thereby. The paradigm of bargaining and private contract would supplant the paradigm of
fiduciary duty.
Nor does Cox truly allow the “market” and genuine free bargaining to reign. As was true in
Pure, in Cox the independent directors are not afforded full defensive authority -- authority to
pursue alternative transactions or restructurings. The “consent” that’s sufficient to trigger
deferential review under the Cox Reforms is highly constrained. It is not akin to true arms’
length bargaining. The concept of true arms' length dealing contemplates that the parties have
the option to deal with outsiders if the bilateral negotiations are unproductive. But this is not
offered up in the proposed equitable reforms to freezeout doctrine. Accordingly, these reforms
would leave minorities in an odd transactional limbo, with inadequate market protections and
inadequate equitable ones. Hence, Cox’s Dual Ratification proposal is an odd creature from the
perspective of corporate governance, because it employs the special committee as if it is a true
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surrogate of the board, but does not afford the committee analogous power. Consent is an
appealing idea for resolving the legal and financial conflicts presented by freezeouts, but the Cox
Reforms do not adequately address the [814] defects to “totally voluntary” consents therein.
D. Voluntary Consent and Legal Theory
Contemporary academic theory adds strong impetus to the consent/bargaining model for
fixing freezeout doctrine espoused in the Cox Reforms. [815] And Cox’s Dual Ratification
framework has been endorsed (as an adequate basis for deferential review) by several prominent
scholars who have considered the issue. [816] Indeed, consistent with the discussion above, much
of the allure of the Dual Ratification/free choice model for fixing freezeout doctrine relates to its
“fit” with contemporary corporate legal theory. Four of these theoretic frameworks are described
immediately below; they are: (i) neo-classical economic theory, (ii) agency theory, (iii) team
production theory, and (iv) civil society theory. Each of these theoretic frameworks affords
tremendous respect to the concept of free choice as a model for corporate governance and,
ideally, corporate transactions. Each adds to the allure of the Dual Ratification framework.
Over the last twenty five years, neo-classical economic theory has influenced the development
of corporate law in important respects. This school of thought has emphasized corporate law's
role in supporting strong capital markets and economic growth. [817] A basic tenet of neoclassical economic theory is that people are rational, self-interested actors who will undertake a
transaction only if they believe doing so is in their self-interest. [818] From the perspective of lawand-economics, the role of corporate law is to facilitate (presumably voluntary) transactions,
since they are presumed to increase wealth overall. Along these lines, the consent to the
freezeout by or on behalf of the minority shareholders, so long as it is freely given, suggests that
the transaction is wealth-enhancing (and thus socially beneficial). If rational, fully informed,
freely given consents could be given in freezeouts, then the proper role of the equity courts
would be to “get out of the way.” In essence, the Cox Reforms mostly dispose of the “if.”
Corporate law has also been influenced by transaction cost economics, and in particular its
concern for the effects of agency costs on the corporations' cost of capital. With Berle and
Means' famous treatise in the distant background, [819] agency theory focuses on the “separation
between ownership and control,” and its implications for managers and investors. [820] As
Professors Gilson and Gordon’s scholarship has illuminated, once a controller is present agency
costs run along two axes: controllers are better monitors of managerial misconduct, so there will
be lower managerial agency costs for the equity holders. But the controller will engage in some
degree of profiteering, which will increase the agency costs borne by the minority. [821] In this
school of thought, the role of corporate law is to effect a system of organization which will
decrease agency costs overall. Freezeouts present the potential for controllers to overreach to the
detriment of minorities. But agency costs theorists might also object that freezeout litigation
imports the potential for “litigation agency costs.” Once again, if Cox’s model of Dual
Ratification could reliably yield a consensual freezeout transaction -- while minimizing litigation
agency costs via deferential/business judgment review -- this would be a “win-win.” If truly
voluntary consent were a predicate of deferential review, the Cox Reforms would be an
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improvement in corporate law from the perspective of agency cost theory. But once again the
voluntariness of the consents to the freezeout is at the crux of the matter.
Team production theory is especially helpful as a framework for conceptualizing the role of
the board and, the role of special committees in freezeouts. [822] Team production theory focuses
on the limits of contracting over the factors of production in the corporate enterprise. From the
perspective of team production theory, the board's role is to support the fair and efficient
distribution of the surplus value produced by the corporate enterprise. In effect, the mediating
hierarch's role ensures that the parties' will have less incentive to shirk or engage in self-dealing
(because they will have more assurance of obtaining a fair return from their contributions to the
entity’s success). Here again, if the special committee could freely exercise its discretion in
responding to a freezeout, then the concern over rent-seeking by the controller would be
obviated. [823] The norms of teamwork would not be undermined by the assignment of surplus in
the freezeout. Once again, if the Cox Reforms could guarantee that the special committee would
function effectively as an unconstrained, unbiased mediating hierarch, then from the perspective
of team production theory, intensive judicial oversight would be unnecessary. The Cox Reforms
would be an improvement over current freezeout doctrine.
Civil society theory also provides interesting insights into the problem of freezeouts (and
other areas of corporate governance). From the perspective of civil society theory, corporations
could be considered part of the broader network of private institutions and nongovernmental
organizations that counterbalance government’s more absolutist authority. Civil society,
including potentially the structure of corporate governance, should be a “space” for positive, free
interchange. [824] Civil society theorists encourage the features of institutions that make them
consistent with norms of democratic organization and participation. [825] The Lynch Doctrine's
fair dealing requirement provides an example of these values in corporate governance. Hence, if
a freezeout occurred in the presence of genuinely fair dealings – including the informed, free
consent of the independent directors and minority shareholders -- then it would be an exemplar
of civil society virtues. Assuming the presence of such freely given consent, from the perspective
of civil society theory, the Cox Reforms would be an improvement over current freezeout
doctrine.[826]
These four theoretical perspectives on corporate governance help illuminate why the concept
of freely given consent from directors and a majority of the minority shareholders is so
appealing. The problem is, obviously, that nothing in the Cox Reforms improves the chances of
the consents constituting Dual Ratification would in fact be voluntarily given. The “fit” between
the above theories and the positive attributes of the recent reform proposals depends on this
voluntariness. This is the most essential problem in freezeouts, but not one which the recent
reform proposals redress.
VII. INHERENT COERCION: THE 800 POUND GORILLA THAT WON’T GO AWAY
In Pure the court affirmed that inherent coercion operates in tender offer freezeouts as well as
those based on cash-out mergers. To the contrary, in Cox the court assumes (with Vice
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Chancellor Strine again writing) that inherent coercion is no longer a serious concern.. First, it
suggests that the passage of time has made the idea outmoded; that committees and minorities
can now say “no” if they want to. [827] Second, Cox employs high pitched rhetoric to discredit,
even ridicule, the concern over inherent coercion in freezeouts. Because inherent coercion cannot
be “disproven,” in Cox the court employs various rhetorical devices to mock and “shrink” its
importance. This use of rhetoric to marginalize the inherent coercion concept is an important
aspect of the Dual Ratification proposal, because they presume that the committee's and
minorities' consents can be genuinely free given.
A. Independent Directors' Capacity to Say “No” Now?
At present, there are no empirical studies that support the conclusion that committees can
reject unfair freezeout proposals. The few existing empirical analyses of freezeouts that exist
address different issues; they do not provide evidence that would suggest the threat of inherent
coercion has been minimized.[828] Indeed, whether committees can (or under what conditions
they can) freely reject inadequate freezeout offers is a question that seems especially difficult to
resolve empirically. [829] Such a study would first need to identify which deals offered too low a
price. This question alone would involve a complex valuation exercise for each company in the
data set sampled. Using premiums over market price would not be a reliable indicator of fair
price, for the reasons discussed above. [830] It would be possible to gather data reflecting
committee disapprovals, but impossible to ascertain the number of times that committees were
pressured into acquiescing to too low a price because they feared worse for the minority if they
resisted, or because they lacked adequate authority to pursue financial or transactional
alternatives. Though individual case studies might be revealing, conducting this research with a
data set large enough to support robust conclusions would be extraordinarily difficult. Hence, it
is highly premature to conclude that we now know that committees can reject unfair proposals,
so that inherent coercion and judicial scrutiny for fairness is outmoded. There may be valid
policy reasons for wishing that committees had the resources to resist unfair freezeouts, but there
are solid reasons for skepticism.
Leaving aside empirical measures, social science evidence on group dynamics does not
present an encouraging picture of committees' capacity and propensity to reject unfair deals. [831]
To the contrary, the emerging social science data reveals that the persistent socio-demographic
homogeneity in boards (and committees as subsets thereof) tends to foster a “group cohesion”
dynamic and hence various cognitive biases that would lead directors (even outside directors) in
the direction of being relatively conformist and passive in responding to proposals from a
controller. [832] Nor are changes to the director election process that might force greater diversity
forthcoming. [833] Because at least with true majority controllers in all likelihood the controller's
representatives would occupy at least a majority of the board seats, this means that their
conformity and passivity would generally lead to the freezeout proposal being approved. The
power of controllers to influence the information that outside directors obtain would further
perpetuate the cognitive biases weighing in favor of their approving the offer. [834]
The limits that protect directors from liability for breach of care also reinforce committees'
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inclination not to “make waves.” [835] Saying “yes” would be the path of least resistance. Saying
“no,” on the other hand, requires a greater investment of time on the committee directors' part,
and the time constraints that affect outside directors are notorious. [836] The unresolved problem
of outside director compensation also aggravates this problem. If outside directors are paid “too
little” they may lack a powerful incentive to devote substantial time to their committee work.
However, if outside directors are richly rewarded in a controlled company, they may be
unwilling to show “ingratitude” for this largesse by disapproving of a freezeout offer. [837]
The many corporate scandals that came to light after December 2001 also suggest the limited
efficacy of boards in preventing self-dealing by powerful corporate insiders including controlling
shareholders. [838] In almost all of these scandals, the companies had substantial numbers of
outside directors on their boards; Enron was exemplary in this fashion. [839] In many of these
cases the independent directors approved transactions despite clear signs of self-dealing. [840]
These recent scandals and the financial losses they caused suggest that caution is warranted
before reducing the fiduciary protections afforded public investors on the rationale that
committees' oversight will be sufficient to protect them from controllers' over-reaching. The
court of chancery's careful scrutiny of the shabby work of the special committee in the Emerging
Communications tender offer freezeout provides a cautionary tale in this respect. [841]
Finally, it is worth remembering that Lynch was decided by the Delaware Supreme Court only
in 1994. Independent directors had already been “invented” as a significant institution of
corporate governance, but their ratification was not a sufficient guarantee of fairness. In this
respect Lynch's resolution that a committee's consent is insufficient indicia of a freezeout's
fairness to warrant application of the business judgment rule cannot be relegated to bygone
times, as Cox suggests.
B. Institutional Investors' Capacity to Say “No” Now?
The same caveats about the lack of evidence supporting committees' ability to say “no” to
unfair freezeout proposals applies to minority shareholders. We simply do not possess such
empirical evidence at this time regarding the ability of minority shareholders to say “no” to
controllers.
In Cox the court places significant emphasis on the increased institutionalization of the public
equity markets as a source of empowerment for minorities in freezeouts. [842] But corporate legal
scholars have consistently been disappointed by the level of coordinated action by institutional
investors, especially in relation to company specific matters. The factors that produce this effect
are well documented. [843] Even institutional investors face significant transaction costs in
evaluating and opposing a freezeout offer. Coordinated action is costly and there are still a
variety of legal regulations [844] and financial conflicts of interest [845] that discourage coordinated
action among institutional investors. In addition, institutional investors have differing financial
incentives and investment strategies, [846] and this *902 diversity undermines their incentives and
propensity to act in concert. In addition, institutional investors (especially hedge funds) are
increasingly positioning themselves to respond to short term market price changes, as intensified
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by the role of arbitrageurs in corporate transactions. [847] These factors fit uneasily with the
likelihood that institutions will band together to hold out for their fair share of going concern
value when a controller offers a premium over the market price. Indeed, the pervasively shortterm orientation of contemporary securities markets favors acquiescence to the controller's
freezeout, [848] even if it offers minorities less than their fair share of the gains from the
transaction. Since investing is subject to trends and social norms, a decision to oppose a
freezeout at a premium might even appear “irrational” read in the context of other investors'
responses. [849] In any event, the major losses suffered by such institutional investors in Enron
and other post 2001 corporate scandals [850] and also the continued granting of mega-options to
executives even at underperforming companies with significant institutional ownership [851]
suggests limits to the wisdom of relying on institutional investors to protect minorities' interests
in freezeouts.
C. Cox's Use of Rhetoric to Discredit Inherent Coercion
The Cox court uses highly charged rhetoric to undermine the legitimacy of the inherent
coercion concept and hence the need for applying Entire Fairness in freezeouts. These uses of
rhetoric are analyzed below because they are suggestive of the climate in which reforming
freezeout doctrine is being considered. That is, it appears to be safe (even for the court of
chancery) to mock not only the contribution of plaintiffs' lawyers to the system, but also the need
for meaningful judicial review in freezeouts. Cox's intense rhetoric suggests that the appeal of
contract-based norms over fiduciary norms is so powerful in corporate law that to disagree is
foolish, if not ridiculous. Because appearing foolish is painful, Cox's rhetorical attack against
inherent coercion may be quite effective in persuading future courts' or commentators' against
defending the legitimacy of inherent coercion and Entire Fairness review in freezeouts.
1. Parody -- Funny But Disturbing
The court's negative view of the inherent coercion concept-its intuition that the concept is
misplaced, mistaken and plain silly-is evident in the vehicle through which it is “explained” in
the Cox opinion. For purposes of convenience, this will be called the “Primate Parable:” [852]
All in all, it is perhaps fairest and more sensible to read Lynch as being
premised on a sincere concern that mergers with controlling stockholders
involve an extraordinary potential for the exploitation by powerful insiders of
their informational advantages and their voting clout. Facing the proverbial
800 pound gorilla who wants the rest of the bananas all for himself,
chimpanzees like independent directors and disinterested stockholders could
not be expected to make sure that the gorilla paid a fair price. Therefore the
residual protection of an unavoidable review of the financial fairness
whenever plaintiffs could raise a genuine dispute of fact about that issue was
thought to be a necessary final protection. [853]
The Primate Parable is intended to capture the reader's attention through a radical departure
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from the usual rhetorical boundaries of corporate law cases. In the above cited passage, inherent
coercion “reads” as a strange departure from the overall logic of corporate governance, which
does not usually require reference to gorillas and chimpanzees to make sense of it. By presenting
the “logic” of the inherent coercion concept (the underpinning of the Lynch Doctrine) through
the Primate Parable, the court effectively marginalizes that concept. It makes the inherent
coercion concept look bizarre-an odd digression within the otherwise rational jurisprudence of
corporate governance.
Secondly, it is only a tiny move from bizarre to silly, and the references to gorillas,
chimpanzees and bananas implicitly provide license to laugh at the concept of inherent coercion.
Most of us know gorillas and chimpanzees only from zoos and/or television cartoons, and
bananas are the notorious stock of slapstick comedy. So maybe the inherent coercion concept is
just laughable?
The more closely one considers the Primate Parable the stranger and more off-putting the
logic of inherent coercion becomes. Though the “800 pound gorilla” is a cliché, it is also a
grotesque metaphor. We don't want to look too closely at an 800 pound gorilla, maybe we should
stop thinking about this overblown inherent coercion concept too? Besides, gorillas do not pay
for bananas-this inherent coercion stuff makes no sense! That is the reaction that the Primate
Parable evokes, in a serious and yet simultaneously comic, and thus brilliant, powerful mode of
argumentation.
The analogy between independent directors, minority stockholders and chimpanzees is also
belittling. The natural response to reading it is to reject the comparison. Independent directors
and minority stockholders are not analogous to chimpanzees! If the inherent coercion concept is
based on this false analogy, then the inherent coercion concept is grounded on a major mistake.
It is worth noting that the Primate Parable is used as the vehicle to “explain” inherent
coercion not only in Cox, but also in the court's opinion in Pure, [854] and in a law review article
authored by Vice Chancellor Strine. [855] This suggests that it resonates deeply with the Vice
Chancellor and is being used to convey something highly important about the place of the
inherent coercion concept in corporate law.
Another reason that one should take the Primate Parable seriously is that discrediting the
continued legitimacy of the inherent coercion concept is critical to the law reform espoused by
the court in Cox, Pure and Cysive (i.e. eliminating Entire Fairness review of freezeouts in cases
of Dual Ratification). Because inherent coercion is not susceptible to being “disproven” at an
empirical level (as described above), the court endeavors to shrink its significance through
humorous disparagement. Poking fun at the inherent coercion concept does not diminish the
importance of what is at stake, Cox contends that the Lynch Doctrine and its concern about
inherent coercion is damaging both the litigation system and impairing economic efficiency. [856]
The Primate Parable has one other dimension worth noting. At bottom, the question the court
is grappling with is when the rule of law and resort to the courts are fruitful. In essence, the

Page 72

Primate Parable mocks reliance on complex legal doctrines and resort to the courts to resolve
disputes in freezeouts. This logic also operates through the contrast between primates and more
highly reasoning homo sapiens. If we are so much more intelligent, then why can't we resolve
our differences on our own, without resort to courts and overly complicated legal doctrines?
The Cox opinion uses a second stunning metaphor to discredit the Lynch Doctrine. This one,
too, suggests that the concern for inherent coercion is “over the top;” that Entire Fairness review
is distorting or perverting the system of litigation and corporate governance. [857] This metaphor
appears in the court's description of the triangular settlement process involving committees,
controllers and plaintiffs' lawyers in lawsuits filed under the Lynch Doctrine:
As the objectors point out and this court has often noted in settlement
hearings regarding these kinds of cases in the past, the ritualistic nature of a
process almost invariably resulting in the simultaneous bliss of three partiesthe plaintiffs' lawyers, the special committee, and the controlling
stockholders-is a jurisprudential triumph of an odd form of tantra. [858]
Like the reference to gorillas and chimpanzees, the opinion's references to “ritual,” “bliss,”
and “tantra” are so unusual in the lexicon of corporate law as to be arresting. Describing
settlement negotiations under the Lynch Doctrine through an analogy to over-the-top emotions
(bliss) and exotic spiritual or sexual practices (tantra) makes the Lynch Doctrine appear
excessive and even bizarre in its effects. Read in the context of a formal legal opinion, these
references are unsettling. The court is inviting us to be uncomfortable with the Lynch Doctrine
and its effects. In its references to “bliss” and “tantra” the court is suggesting that the Lynch
Doctrine has caused corporate law that governs freezeouts to spin out of control and become
decadent and disorderly. [859] In this fashion Cox implicitly admonishes that law reform is
overdue.
These are the opinions most potent use of rhetoric, but the rest should be noted as well
because they operate cumulatively (albeit implicitly) in service of the court's law reform agenda.

2. Inherent Coercion -- A “Sociological Inference”
A further example of the court's use of rhetoric to discredit the Lynch Doctrine is its reference
to inherent coercion as a “sociological inference.” [860] By tying implicit coercion to sociology,
rather than economics or positive law, Cox once again marginalizes it within the lexicon of
corporate law. Economics has been respected as a legitimate science and source of inspiration for
corporate law. In contrast, until quite recently, sociology and the other social sciences were not
acknowledged as legitimate sources of authority for courts to rely upon in deciding corporate
cases. [861]
Equally powerful is the court's statement that the inherent coercion core concept underlying
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the Lynch Doctrine is based merely on an “inference.”
3. A Pointed Rhetorical Question
In Cox, the court employs a pointed rhetorical question to undermine judicial concern for
inherent coercion. Rhetorical questions are not actual questions of course, but rather masked
declarations of certainty. [862] In just this discussion-ending mode, the opinion states:
If both the independent directors and the disinterested stockholders are
given the ability to say no and do not, ought we not presumptively assume
that the transaction was fair? [863]
This rhetorical question appears near the conclusion of the opinion, after the court's many
objections to the Lynch Doctrine have been presented. It is intended to evoke a positive response.
“Yes! Dual Ratification should end the inquiry into fairness in a freezeout!”
Furthermore, this rhetorical question contains a tautology. It assumes away the problem of
inherent coercion by positing that the committee and the minority shareholders were given a
genuine opportunity to reject the freezeout proposal. This doubt about the total voluntariness of
minorities' and committees' consents in freezeouts is what motivates the invocation of the Entire
Fairness standard under the Lynch Doctrine in the first place.
4. Corporate Law -- A Species of Commercial Law?
As part of its argument against continued adherence to the Entire Fairness standard for
freezeouts, the Cox opinion makes a claim about corporate law's essential nature and proper
boundaries. The statement is extremely terse, but quite powerful in its effect for this reason. The
claim is as follows: “This is corporate law, after all, a species of commercial law ...” [864]
The statement quoted above achieves its rhetorical power through two definitions: one is
“species” and the other “commercial law.” Taking the latter first, commercial law is sometimes
used broadly as a synonym for private law but it has a narrower usage. For example, the Uniform
Commercial Code governs numerous areas of commercial law including for example sales,
leases, negotiable instruments, bank deposits, fund transfers, letters of credit, bulk sales, and
warehouse receipts. [865] It is unquestionably important to businesses and consumers to have a
clear and coherent system of commercial laws. But the above list illustrates that the commercial
law is more microeconomic in comparison to the kind of macroeconomic effect that Cox
elsewhere claims are relevant to corporate law in general and the Lynch Doctrine in particular.
For example, earlier in Cox the court expressly claims that the Lynch Doctrine is inhibiting
profitable transactions that produce efficiency for the economy overall and liquidity for
minorities in particular. [866] And in Pure the court muses about whether endorsing Lynch or
Solomon would be more consistent with corporate law's objective of supporting strong capital
markets. [867] By limiting the proper concerns of corporate law to commercial law, then, the court
is implicitly narrowing its appropriate focus.
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This narrowing of the proper concerns of corporate law is accentuated by the claim that
corporate law is merely a “species” of commercial law. Within biological classification, a
species is the lowest level of taxonomic classification. By using the term species, the court is
fitting corporate law under the genus of commercial law, in effect further shrinking the
appropriate domain and concerns of corporate law. By invoking the taxonomy of biological
science, Cox makes the claim that corporate law is a sub-category of commercial law and
advances the court's rhetorical arguments that freezeout doctrine should move away from a focus
on “Entire Fairness,” and let the parties negotiate on their own.
5. Creating Urgency through Hyperbole
The Cox opinion is rife with hyperbole that creates an air of urgency around its law reform
proposals. For example, strict adherence to the Entire Fairness standard for freezeouts has
generated “perverse incentives” [868] for both defense and plaintiffs' counsel. It has “cast doubt on
the integrity of the representative litigation process.” [869] The Lynch Doctrine has made it
“impossible” [870] for controllers “ever” [871] to avoid a review of a cash-out merger's financial
fairness because “any” amended complaints that the plaintiffs file could not be dismissed. [872]
According to the opinion, it is an “undeniable reality that any merger with a controlling
shareholder is subject to review for fairness.” [873] The Cox opinion contends that minorities'
claims of unfairness in freezeouts “cannot ever be dismissed” irrespective of their merit. [874]
These are only a few examples of the court's use of hyperbole to convey the urgency of limiting
Entire Fairness review in freezeouts. [875]

V. PROPOSALS: TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY STANDARDS FOR FREEZEOUTS
A. A UNIFIED DOCTRINE FOR FREEZEOUTS
The Delaware Court of Chancery's recent opinions in Pure, Cysive, and Cox make an
important contribution to illuminating the negative effects of having two “tracks” in freezeout
doctrine. As Pure and Cox contend, the structural differences between tender offer freezeouts
and cash-out mergers do not reflect substantially different capacities for overreaching by
controllers. [876] Minorities and committees have no less reason to fear ex-post retribution from
controllers if they oppose a tender offer freezeout instead of a cash-out merger. And controllers'
informational and timing advantages persist in freezeouts based on tender offers, as in cash-out
mergers. The greater force of the prisoner's dilemma in freezeouts based on tender offers
mandates applying equivalently rigorous fiduciary safeguards to these transactions.
Just as importantly, the operation of different standards of fair price in the two freezeout
formats, in conjunction with the “hit or miss” nature of the appraisal remedy has undermined the
securities markets' capacity accurately to price controllers' capacity for overreaching in
freezeouts. The application of a fair price duty in cash-out mergers and no fair price duty in
tender offer freezeouts sends mixed signals to the capital markets about the value of the
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minorities' shares. If the markets do not fully reflect the substantial risks of opportunism
presented by tender offer freezeouts, then minorities are probably overpaying for their shares. In
the alternative, if the securities markets are accurately discounting the minorities' shares to take
account of controllers' potential for opportunism in tender offer freezeouts, then this hole in the
web of fiduciary prohibition against self dealing may be driving up the cost of raising public
equity capital. In either case, the Delaware Court of Chancery's critique that excess complexity in
freezeout doctrine is inefficient is well founded in this context. It should be redressed through
law reform that would unify the fiduciary standards applicable to freezeouts.
Furthermore, as the analysis of Solomon and Glassman herein revealed, it isn't clear that the
supreme court ever intended for there to be two tracks in freezeout doctrine. The Delaware
Supreme Court has never had the opportunity to review a genuine tender offer freezeout. The
Solomon decision exhibits striking shortcomings as landmark precedent. These shortcomings are
evidence that the Delaware Supreme Court never intended to validate a separate, looser
framework of fiduciary duties for freezeouts based on tender offers.

B. ENTIRE FAIRNESS AS THE STANDARD FOR FREEZEOUTS
The Entire Fairness standard represents the most appropriate basis for a unified doctrine for
freezeouts. The Lynch doctrine's fair price promise has facilitated minority shareholders' capacity
to command higher premiums in freezeout negotiations than they can in negotiations where no
fair price duty has applied. In the absence of a fair price duty, controllers can take a variety of
actions that will force the trading price of the minorities' shares downward, and then profit from
such actions by compelling a freezeout. The more the market fears controllers' capacity for
coercion and overreaching, the deeper the discount will become; the less the controller will have
to pay in the freezeout-unless a fair price duty applies. By extending Lynch's fair price duty to
tender offer freezeouts, corporate law can limit this kind of downward cycle and its negative
effects for minorities and corporations' cost of capital. In this respect, the application of Entire
Fairness review to controllers' cash-out mergers has provided a safeguard against freezeouts in
which controllers' gains come at the minorities' expense. This same protection should apply in
tender offer freezeouts.
The Lynch doctrine's concern about minorities' capacity for free choice in freezeouts reflects
that shareholders have a property interest in their shares which cannot be “seized” by controllers
without some meaningful due process, and the payment of full value to the minority. Second, the
fair dealing aspect of the Entire Fairness standard limits controllers' capacity to subordinate the
distinct institution that is the corporate board to their private interests. The Cox opinion itself
emphasizes that “empowerment of centralized management, in the form of boards of directors”
[877] is an axiomatic principle in corporate law, and one relevant to freezeouts. Application of the
Entire Fairness standard is further warranted on account of the fact that target directors have not
been recognized to possess inherent fiduciary authority to explore transactional alternatives to a
freezeout over the opposition of a controller. This is an especially odd result given target
directors' broad discretion to defend against a hostile tender offer proposal from a third party.
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Target directors' defensive authority in freezeouts should be expanded so it is on a par with their
authority in third-party offers, but in the end this is a matter separate and distinct from the
standard of review applicable to controllers in freezeouts.
The Cox Reforms would allow Dual Ratification to trigger deferential review in a freezeout,
and the court claims in Cox, that in doing so it would not diminish the integrity-enforcing role of
corporate law. However, the court is able to arrive at this conclusion only by assuming away the
essential concern underlying the Lynch Doctrine, i.e. the concern for inherent coercion. The
appeal of the “prochoice” solution for fixing freezeouts is powerful. But the court in Cox cannot
“disprove” the continued validity of inherent coercion and disparages it through a variety of
rhetorical devices. In an ideal world, people would freely bargain to mutually beneficial
outcomes and courts would not be involved. But minorities' and committees' consents to
freezeouts are not likely to be genuinely freely given and should not be treated as the product of
arms' length dealings. The absence of strong fiduciary protections would further erode minorities'
and committees' capacity to resist unfair freezeout proposals.
C. THE LYNCH DOCTRINE IS NOT “BROKEN”
The Cox and Cysive opinions present a series of claims intended to prove that adherence to the
Entire Fairness standard for freezeouts has serious deleterious effects on the legal system and
economy. This Article has demonstrated that these claims are exaggerated. The Lynch Doctrine
is not a free pass for plaintiffs' lawyers to proceed to discovery on mere allegations of unfairness
especially mere allegations of unfair price. The courts have the ability to dismiss claims that
appear nonmeritorious and to keep fees to plaintiffs' lawyers in settlements in check. They can
do so, moreover, without endorsing the business judgment rule as the presumptive standard for
freezeouts.
Cox's objective of limiting shareholder suits in freezeouts is problematic. First, minorities'
ability to bring class action claims against freezeouts under Lynch's Entire Fairness standard is
essential to protecting their welfare. Second, limiting equitable claims in freezeouts would not
necessarily result in net reduction in litigation against freezeouts, because there would likely be
an offsetting increase in appraisal and federal securities law actions. Finally, if claims in
freezeouts are routinely dismissed on the pleadings, then the Delaware courts will no longer be
developing the transactional choreography that has had a salutary effect on deal making and
corporate investment. The Cox court did not take this hidden cost into account in its proposal.
D. AUCTIONS AND MARKET CHECKS
The Cox opinion contends that the business judgment rule should be the presumptive standard
of review for freezeouts unless either the target directors or minority shareholders have
disapproved of the offer (or, so long as they both approve of the offer). There are many problems
with this proposal, as reviewed above. In addition, the argument in favor of the business
judgment rule in freezeouts ignores the fact that judicial deference is the exception and not the
rule in high stakes M&A transactions. For example, even the “ordinary” duty of care is applied
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by courts with heightened scrupulousness in reviewing, sales to third parties. [878] Under Revlon
the courts apply heightened scrutiny to sales of corporate control. [879] And under Blasius the
courts apply heightened scrutiny to actions interfering with shareholders' voting rights, as may
often occur in takeover battles. [880] Furthermore, freezeouts involving de facto controllers
actually involve sales of control as interpreted under Revlon's progeny. [881] On this basis, the
target's directors under present law have a duty to pursue an auction or market check to obtain
the best price reasonably available for the minorities' shares in responding to a de facto
controller's freezeouts. The new listing standards will require a majority of independent directors
on boards where there is only a de facto controller. [882]
Instead of imposing a fiduciary requirement of a market check or auction in all freezeouts
however, the courts should work from the standard-of-review orientation reflected in the Lynch
Doctrine. In pursuing a freezeout, controllers should either truly empower the committee to
negotiate at arms' length or their transaction should be subject to scrutiny for fairness in the event
of a shareholder challenge. Where there is evidence that the controller's freezeout was accepted
by an independent committee after it had been empowered to pursue an auction or market check,
and was approved by a majority of the minority shares, then the transaction should be eligible for
deferential review. However, to ensure that the market check or auction reveals evidence of the
company's going concern value, the controller would have to agree to be a seller if a bid emerged
that was higher than one it was willing to match. These circumstances would constitute
compelling evidence of arms length dealings and warrant judicial deference in a challenged
freezeouts. This strategy would give controllers the opportunity to structure their freezeouts in a
way that would provide for dismissals on the pleadings. If the controller is not willing to match a
third party's bid at a higher value, then there is no reason to presume that it is offering going
concern value for the minorities' shares, and no reason for the court to allow the freezeout
judicial deference.
E. BURDENS OF PROOF AND BURDEN SHIFTING GOING FORWARD
The Lynch Doctrine's insistence that controllers bear the initial burden of proof in freezeouts is
consistent with the basic judicial presumption in self-dealing transactions. Hence, courts should
continue to impose the burden of proof on controllers in freezeouts in both formats. However,
the Lynch Doctrine's burden-shifting device has helped to provide an incentive for controllers to
promote fair dealing in freezeouts and to invite the scrutiny of minorities and independent
directors in their freezeouts. Although this Article rejects Cox's proposal that Dual Ratification
should trigger deferential review, the Cox opinion does make a powerful case for the
“complementarity” of Dual Ratification in freezeouts. [883] Hence Dual Ratification should be
required in order for defendants to shift the burden of proof to the plaintiffs. If there was Dual
Ratification but not as auction or market check, the plaintiff would have to demonstrate the
fundamental unfairness of the freezeout in order to obtain a recovery.

CONCLUSION
Corporate academics often analogize corporate law to contract law; many envision the
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corporation as a “nexus of contracts.” The Cox Reforms would take this analogy a step further by
leaving controllers and minorities to the terms of their bargains in freezeouts. The bargaining
model is appealing, as is reducing unnecessary litigation. However, there are powerful reasons to
doubt that committees and minorities are capable of negotiating freely with controllers. On this
basis, this Article concludes that courts should apply the Entire Fairness standard to both cashout mergers and tender offer freezeouts, except where a controller has allowed a market check or
auction conducted by independent directors to proceed prior to the approval of the freezeout.
Instead of endorsing deferential review for freezeouts, consistent with the Cox Reforms, courts in
equity should continue to have a meaningful role in developing standards of conduct and
standards of review for freezeouts, unless market forces have genuinely been allowed to operate
for the benefit of minority shareholders. The costs of equity becoming more tolerant of
controllers' overreaching in freezeouts are potentially very large, surely larger than recent
freezeout cases from the Delaware court of chancery reflect.

[a1]. New York Law School, Professor of Law (1999-present); Associate Professor (1994-1999); Director, NYLS
Center on Business Law & Policy; AALS Section on Business Associations, Executive Committee Member (2004present); Sloan Visiting Professor, Georgetown University Law Center (2003-2004); Visiting Associate Professor,
Cornell Law School (Spring 2000); Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson LLP (1989-1993).
[1]. Freezeouts are a subset of the broader going private phenomenon which is sweeping the corporate landscape.
See, e.g., Kit R. Roane, The New Face of Capitalism, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 4, 2006, at 48 (“Private
buyers are gobbling up some of the premier names in Corporate America.”); Andrew Ross Sorkin, HCA Buyout
Highlights Era of Going Private, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2006, at A1. The academic commentary on going private
transactions is burgeoning. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson and Charles K. Whitehead, Deconstructing Equity: Public
Ownership, Agency Costs and Complete Capital Markets, (forthcoming Columbia Law Review), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=991352. Claims have been made that costs associated with the enactment of the Sarbanes
Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 7201-66 (Supp. IV
2004) and in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C. and 29 U.S.C.) have influenced firms to delist. For an
analysis of the influence of Sarbanes-Oxley in this regard, see, e.g., Ehud Kamar, Pinar Karaca-Mandic, & Eric L.
Talley, Going-Private Decisions and the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002: A Cross-Country Analysis, USC CLEO
Research Paper No. C06-5, USC Law Legal Studies Paper No. 06-10 (August 2006). However, broader
macroeconomic forces, and especially the availability of low cost debt capital and sophisticated securities markets
are more significant factors influencing this phenomenon.
[2]. Delaware corporate fiduciary doctrine currently includes two different definitions of controlling shareholders
and affords them equivalent treatment in freezeouts. Most obviously, a controlling shareholder is one who owns the
shares required to control the outcome of shareholder votes, including votes on director elections and fundamental
transactions including mergers (referred to herein as “true majority holders”). Secondly, the doctrine allows that
shareholders who own less than such absolute voting power may be considered controlling shareholders as a result
of their possession and exercise of direct and indirect managerial authority (referred to herein, “de facto
controllers.”) See, e.g., In reCysive, Inc. S'holders Litig., 836 A.2d 531, 551-53 (Del. Ch. 2003) (“... the analysis of
whether a controlling stockholder exists must take into account whether the stockholder, as a practical matter,
possesses a combination of stock voting power and managerial authority that enables him to control the corporation,
if he so wishes.”). For the argument that the distinction between true majority controllers and de facto controllers
should be more salient in corporate legal doctrine, see Mary Siegel, The Erosion of the Law of Controlling
Shareholders, 24 DEL. J. CORP. L. 27 (1999).
[3]. To clarify further, as used herein, the term “freezeout” refers to a transaction in which a controlling shareholder
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effectuates the buyout of the remaining publicly traded common stock of a company through (i) a combination of a
tender offer and short-form merger (the short-form merger governed by DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 253 (2007)), or (ii) a
long-form, one-step, negotiated, cash-out merger (governed by DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 251 (2007), amended by 76
Del. Laws. ch. 145 (2007)). (Citations to the Delaware Code are to the official online version at
http://www.delcode.delaware.gov/ (last accessed on August 1, 2007). For purpose of linguistic convenience, the
impersonal pronoun “it” is used herein to refer to a controlling stockholder-irrespective of whether it is a person or a
corporate entity; and “controller” is used as an abbreviated form of “controlling shareholder.”
[4]. Most commentators believe that the risks of minorities receiving too low a price in a freezeout is substantial. For
a study contending otherwise, see Thomas W. Bates, Michael L. Lemmon and James S. Linck, Shareholder Wealth
Effects and Bid Negotiation in Freeze-Out Deals: Are Minority Shareholders Left Out in the Cold? 81 J. FIN.
ECON. 681 (2006).
[5]. See infra notes 32-34. For two deferential treatments of freezeouts that also favor deferential review, i.e.
applying the business judgment rule upon minority shareholder and independent director consent to the transaction,
see Guhan Subramanian, Fixing Freezeouts, 115 YALE L. J. 2, 48-64 (2005) [hereinafter “Fixing Freezeouts”];
Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, Controlling Controlling Shareholders, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 785, 838 (2003)
[hereinafter “Gilson & Gordon”].
[6]. For discussion of the “Entire Fairness” standard for freezeouts, see infra notes 94-104 and accompanying text.
[7]. In Delaware, most corporate claims are heard as “equitable” claims brought before the court of chancery. As
used herein “equity” or “equitable review” refers to the adjudication of corporate claims by the court of chancery
consistent with principles of fiduciary duty. For further discussion of the chancery court's equity jurisdiction and the
nature of equitable standards, see William T. Quillen and Michael Hanrahan, A Short History of the Delaware Court
of Chancery, 1792-1992, 18 DEL. J. CORP. L. 819 (1993).
[8]. This Article exclusively discusses cash-out mergers by controlling shareholders. For this reason, the terms
“controllers' cash-out mergers” and “cash-out merger freezeouts” are avoided for purposes of brevity.
[9]. Alternative mechanisms for freezeouts include reverse stock splits and asset sales, but these are far more
uncommon. For further discussion of the mechanical aspects of going private, see e.g., Michael J. McGuinness &
Timo Rehbock, Going-Private Transactions: A Practitioner's Guide, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 437 (2005).
[10]. See, e.g., In rePure Res., Inc., S'holders Litig., 808 A.2d 421, 446 (Del. Ch. 2002) (“... the better rule is that
there is no duty on [the controller's] part to permit the target board to block the bid through use of the pill. Nor is
there any duty on the part of the independent directors to seek blocking power.”).
[11]. See infra notes 84-88 and accompanying text.
[12]. See, e.g., Citron v. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. 584 A.2d 490, 500-02 (Del. Ch. 1990). For further
discussion of the concept of inherent coercion, see infra text accompanying notes 121-27.
[13]. The prohibition on secret and otherwise unfair profit-taking by corporate insiders is validated as the core
concept of corporate fiduciary loyalty doctrine. See, e.g., Austin W. Scott, The Fiduciary Principle, 37 CAL. L.
REV. 539 (1949); Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DUKE L. J.
879 (1988). For discussion of the laxness in courts' enforcement of the prohibition on self-dealing outside of
transactions involving controllers, see Victor Brudney, Contract Versus Fiduciary Duty in Corporate Law, 38 B.C.
L. REV. 595 (1997).
[14]. See, e.g., Thorpe by Castleman v. CERBCO, Inc., 676 A.2d 436 (Del. 1996) (affirming controllers' right to

Page 80

vote against sale of substantially all assets consistent with their private interests); Bershad v. Curtiss-Wright Corp.,
535 A.2d 840, 845 (Del. 1987) (“clearly a stockholder is under no duty to sell its holdings in a corporation, even if it
is a majority shareholder, merely because the sale would profit the minority.”); Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280
A.2d 717, 722 (Del. 1971) (allowing controller to shape dividend policy and corporate development plans of
subsidiary in ways beneficial to it, irrespective of the minority's preference); Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E. 2d 776
(Ill. Ct. App. 1968) (applying business judgment rule broadly to accommodate controllers' view of company's best
interest).
[15]. This limit on controllers' discretion rests on the axiom that the corporate board, and not any shareholder
constituency, has authority over corporate-level transactions. As stated in the landmark case of Aronson v. Lewis, “A
cardinal precept of the General Corporate Law of the State of Delaware is that directors, rather than shareholders,
manage the business and affairs of the corporation. DEL. CODE ANN tit. 8, § 141(a).” Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d
805, 811 (Del. 1984).
[16]. SeeKahn v. Lynch Commc'n Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110 (Del. 1994); Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701
(Del. 1983). For further discussion see infra Part I. With respect to the fiduciary standards applied to self-dealing
transactions involving controllers outside of freezeouts, see, e.g., Kahn v. Tremont Corp., 694 A.2d 422, 428 (Del.
1997); Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 93 n.52 (Del. 2001). The limitation on self-dealing by controllers is
similar to but more idiosyncratic than that applied to directors and officers. On the latter, see e.g., Weinberger, 457
A.2d at 710 (“When directors of a Delaware corporation are on both sides of a transaction, they are required to
demonstrate their utmost good faith and the most scrupulous inherent fairness of the bargain. The requirement of
fairness is unflinching in its demand that where one stands on both sides of a transaction, he has the burden of
establishing its entire fairness sufficient to pass the test of careful scrutiny by the courts.” (citations omitted)). For
the lesser fiduciary standards applied to controllers' tender offers, see Solomon v. Pathe Commc'ns Corp., 672 A.2d
35 (Del. 1996), as discussed in depth infra Part ___.
[17]. Much scholarly debate is inspired by the open-ended texture of corporate fiduciary standards. See, e.g.,
William T. Allen, Jack B. Jacobs & Leo E. Strine, Jr., Function Over Form: A Reassessment of Standards of Review
in Delaware Corporation Law, 56 BUS. LAW. 1287 (2001) (suggesting ways that corporate fiduciary doctrine
should be streamlined and simplified); Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory Competition Theory of Indeterminacy in
Corporate Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1908 (1998) (describing the “network effects” that foster indeterminacy in
corporate fiduciary law); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Divergence of Standards of Conduct and Standards of Review
in Corporate Law, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 437 (1993) (suggesting ways that the duality between standards of
conduct and standards of review in corporate fiduciary law may be fruitful); Reza Dibadj, Delayering Corporate
Law, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 469 (2006) (arguing that the duality between standards of conduct and standards of
review produces unproductive complexity).
[18]. See Gilson & Gordon, supra note 5, at 834 (“... the result is likely to be dueling experts, each applying the tools
of modern finance to end up at vastly different valuations.”).
[19]. The court in Pure expressly notes this tension and responsibility. Pure, 808 A.2d at 434 (“... judges must
supplement the broadly enabling features of statutory corporation law with equitable principles sufficient to protect
against abuse and unfairness, but not so rigid as to stifle useful transactions ...”). There is no more contentious
subject in contemporary, “private” law than the definition of fairness and the role of the courts in promoting it. For a
law-and-economics inspired critique of the problem, see LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS
VERSUS WELFARE (2002); compare e.g., Martha C. Nussbaum, Flawed Foundations: The Philosophical Critique
of a (Particular Type of) Economics, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1197 (1997) (arguing that the law and economics
movement has failed adequately to account for the importance of nonpecuniary values in its consideration of
“fairness”); Faith Stevelman Kahn, Bombing Markets, Subverting the Rule of Law: Enron, Financial Fraud and
September 11, 2001, 76 TULANE L. REV. 1579 (2002) (arguing that capital market regulation fails to take account
of democratic notions of fairness at the peril of strong markets and a strong economy). The growing behavioral law
and economics literature attempts a richer account of motivation that includes concerns over fairness. See, e.g.,
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Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L.
REV. 1471 (1998).
[20]. Corporate legal scholars increasingly affirm the benefits of regulating controlling shareholders' actions through
the application of more flexible judge-made standards as opposed to more rigid statutory ones; as well as the
importance of legal limits on controllers' self-dealing as a foundation of strong capital markets. See Mark J. Roe,
Legal Origins, Politics, and Modern Stock Markets, 120 HARV. L. REV. 460, 470 (2006) (“The first link between
legal origins and financial markets is said to be how the legal system protects small investors. ‘[C]ommon law
countries protect shareholders better than do civil law countries and especially better than French civil law
countries.’ If small investors fear that insiders could rob them, they will not invest in the insiders' firms. If outsiders
do not buy, then a deep stock market does not develop, and the big owners-founding families and their successorsare locked in. Common law systems protect minority stockholders well via judge-made fiduciary duties, while civil
law systems, the theory goes, are too rigid to protect minority stockholders.” (citations omitted)). For further
refinements to this idea, see also Ronald J. Gilson, Controlling Shareholders and Corporate Governance:
Complicating the Comparative Taxonomy (August 2005) (ECGI-Law Working Paper No. 49/2005), available at
http// ssrn.com/abstract=784744 and Ronald J. Gilson, Background Paper: Corporate Governance, The Equity
Contract and the Cost of Capital: Incremental and Accretive Reform Strategies (International Corporate Governance
Meeting-Hanoi Vietnam, December 6, 2004), available at http:// www.oecd.org/dataoecd/19/58/34081304.pdf.
[21]. The SEC initiated a program of rule-making that would have regulated the substantive fairness of freezeout
transactions, but backed away from so doing in the end. For this history and discussion of the role of federal law
(mostly in regulating disclosure) in freezeouts see infra. Part I, C
[22]. The website for Delaware's Division of Corporations states that: “[m]ore than half a million business entities
have their legal home in Delaware including more than 50% of all U.S. publicly-traded companies and 60% of the
Fortune 500.” Del. Dep't of State, Div. of Corps., Why Choose Delaware as Your Corporate Home?, available at
http://www.corp.delaware.gov/default.shtml.
[23]. For evidence and analysis of Delaware law's predominant influence on freezeouts, see, e.g., Guhan
Subramanian, Post-Siliconix Freeze-Outs: Theory & Evidence (May 2005) (Harv. John M. Olin Discussion Paper
Series
No.
472),
available
at
http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_
center/papers/pdf/Subramanian_472_revised.pdf. For a broader discussion of Delaware's dominant influence on
corporate law, see, e.g., Oren Bar-Gill, Michal Barzuza & Lucian Bebchuk, The Market for Corporate Law, 162 J.
INST. & THEOR. ECON. 134 (2006). Delaware's influence on corporate law is sometimes described as a “race to
the bottom,” and sometimes as a “race to the top.” For the landmark treatment of the former claim, see William
Cary's Yale Law Journal article discussed infra note 112 and accompanying text. The locus classicus of the race to
the top literature is Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J.
LEGAL STUD. 251 (1977). For discussion of the policies that have shaped the evolution of Delaware corporate
legal doctrine, see Lawrence A. Hamermesh, The Policy Foundations of Delaware Corporate Law, 106 COLUM. L.
REV. 1749 (2006). Federal law's complex influence on this “race” is presently receiving deserved attention. See,
e.g., Mark J. Roe, Delaware's Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588 (2003); William W. Bratton & Joseph A.
McCahery, The Equilibrium Content of Corporate Federalism, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 619 (2006).
[24]. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
[25]. Kahn v. Lynch Commc'n Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110 (Del. 1994).
[26]. Solomon v. Pathe Commc'ns Corp., 672 A.2d 35 (Del. 1996).
[27]. Glassman v. Unocal Exploration Corp., 777 A.2d 242 (Del. 2001).
[28]. See infra Part II.
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[29]. The first explicit treatment of the issue by the Delaware Court of Chancery appears in In re Siliconix, Inc.
S'holders Litig., C.A. No. 18700, 2001 WL 716787 (Del. Ch. June 19, 2001).
[30]. This insight has tremendous relevance to the going private phenomenon because the private equity funds that
are purchasing formerly public companies will wish to profit from issuing minority equity stakes. Before purchasing
such minority interests, however, outside investors should demand assurance regarding courts' willingness to
scrutinize controllers' conduct in freezeouts and other self-dealing transactions.
[31]. Notably, the Pure, Cysive and Cox opinions, infra notes 32-34 were each authored by Vice-Chancellor Leo E.
Strine, Jr., who is noted for his bold efforts to reshape Delaware corporate legal doctrine. Biographical data for
Vice-Chancellor Strine is available at http:// sec.gov/spotlight/proxyprocess/bio052507/lestrine.pdf. Although this
Article is critical of the positions the Vice-Chancellor takes in Pure, Cysive and Cox, the attention it devotes to them
reflects their likely seminal importance. In addition to deciding many high profile cases in his nearly ten years as a
vice chancellor, and authoring numerable law review articles, Vice Chancellor Strine is teaching at Harvard Law
School and has taught at University of Pennsylvania School of Law. In reviewing his remarkable achievements, the
Financial Times referred to Vice-Chancellor Strine as the “Wunderkind of US Corporate Law.” John Gapper,
Capitalist Punishment, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2005, available at http://search.ft.com/ftArticle?
queryText=capitalist+punishment&y=9&aje=true&x=12&id=050129000270.
[32]. Pure, 808 A.2d 421.
[33]. In reCysive, Inc. S'holders Litig., 836 A.2d 531 (Del. Ch. 2003).
[34]. In reCox Commc'ns, Inc. S'holders Litig., 879 A.2d 604 (Del. Ch. 2005).
[35]. The business judgment rule is a protean concept in corporate law. As a presumption in favor of the challenged
transaction in shareholder litigation, the business judgment rule mirrors the statutory principle that the business
affairs of corporations should be run by or under the direction of the board. DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 141(a) (2007). So
long as the plaintiffs have not demonstrated a material conflict of interest, a noncorporate motivation for the
decision or egregious failure of attentiveness on the part of the decision-maker, the business judgment rule will
insulate a challenged transaction from any searching (indeed virtually any meaningful) substantive judicial review.
See, e.g., Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 360 (Del. 1993) (the business judgment rule “operates as
both a procedural guide for litigants and a substantive rule of law”) [hereinafter “Cede II”]. For academic discussion,
see, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57 VAND. L. REV. 83
(2004). The recent litigation involving the Disney's board's approval of Michael Ovitz's termination package
provides a fascinating, high stakes account of the application of the business judgment rule. See In reWalt Disney
Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693 (Del. Ch. 2005), aff'd, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006).
[36]. See Cox, 879 A.2d at 606.
[37]. Id. at 646-47.
[38]. Id. at 643 (“... Lynch has generated perverse incentives for both defense and plaintiffs' counsel that cast doubt
on the integrity of the representative litigation process.”).
[39]. Within the academic discussion of corporate law, the superiority of “private ordering” to formal law is an
important subject of debate. See, e.g., Gillian Hadfield & Eric Talley, On Public versus Private Provision of
Corporate Law, 22 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 414 (2006). The promulgation of new director independence criteria by the
stock exchanges and NASD are examples of this favored, “privatized” mode of governance. See, e.g., NYSE
LISTED COMPANY MANUAL §§ 303A.01-02 (2007).
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[40]. As described and discussed in the text, promoting controllers' ability to obtain dismissals on the pleadings is an
explicit objective of the Cox Reforms. See, e.g., Cox, 879 A.2d at 646 (arguing in favor of judicial deference in the
review of claims in freezeouts because “... this incentive would enable transactional planners to know that they can
structure transactions in a way that affords them the opportunity to obtain a dismissal on the complaint”); id. at 646
(“It was thought preferable in Pure Resources to keep the strands separate until there is an alteration in Lynch, lest
the less than confidence inspiring pattern of “Lynch litigation” replicate itself across-the-board in all going private
transactions, thereby deterring the procession of offers that provide valuable liquidity to minority stockholders and
efficiency for the economy in general.”). See also Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Delaware Way: How We Do Corporate
Law and Some of the New Challenges We (and Europe) Face, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 673, 678 (2005) (“Delaware
tries to respect the business judgment of disinterested directors and stockholders. How? By invoking the protection
of the business judgment rule if an interested transaction is approved by a majority of the independent directors or
by a majority of the disinterested stockholders, after full disclosure. The idea, of course, is that the investment of
ultimate power over the transaction in impartial directors or stockholders suffices to police the conflict. By this
instrumental means, Delaware law can protect the resulting business decision without any loss of integrity, because
the decision was made or ratified by persons whose interests were aligned with those of the corporation and its
stockholders.”).
[41]. On his blog, http://busmovie.typepad.com/ideoblog, Professor Larry E. Ribstein refers to the Cox opinion as a
“classic-to-be” ... “so interesting for so many reasons.”
[42]. Cox, 879 A.2d at 646 (“In this way, the alteration [of the standard of review for freezeouts] brings this area of
our law into harmony with the rest of Delaware corporate law that gives substantial deference to decisions made by
disinterested, independent directors and approved by disinterested, non-coerced stockholders. That deference is
consistent with the central notion of our law, which respects business judgments made by impartial directors and
approved by unconflicted stockholders.”). This line of reasoning fails adequately to grapple with the problem of
coerced consents, and especially the difference between a director's ratification of a controller's transaction and an
independent board's proposal of a transaction in the best interest of all shareholders.
[43]. See, e.g., Pure, 808 A.2d 443 (endorsing expanding Solomon's anti-coercion prohibitions to freezeouts because
it “provides a relatively non-litigious way to effect going private transactions ...”); Cysive, 836 A.2d at 549 (“These
realities suggest that the Lynch doctrine, if it is to be perpetuated, could be usefully simplified.”); Cox, 879 A.2d at
606 (“... it is most probable that the defendants settled simply because they had, under Lynch, no other economically
efficient option for disposal of the lawsuit.”).
[44]. Cox, 879 A.2d at 644 (“This alteration would promote the universal use of a transactional structure that is very
favorable to minority stockholders ...”); id. (“Importantly, this revised standard would not diminish the integrity
enforcing potential of litigation in any material way, in my view”).
[45]. Id. at 624 (doctrine that encourages freezeouts is favorable because it creates “more rationally organized
corporations”); id. at 646 (“Lynch litigation” and review for Entire Fairness should be limited because they inhibit
freezeouts that create “efficiency for the economy in general”).

*** footnotes 46 to 68 have been moved; they appear as notes ___ to ___.
[69]. Solomon, 672 A.2d 35, 39-40. See infra Part ___ for an in-depth analysis of Solomon.
[70]. Lynch, 638 A2d at 1116 (“Entire fairness remains the proper focus of judicial analysis in examining an
interested merger, irrespective of whether the burden of proof remains upon or is shifted away from the controlling
or dominating shareholder, because the unchanging nature of the “interested” transaction requires careful
scrutiny.”).

Page 84

[71]. The usual rule, once self-dealing or other conflict of interest has been demonstrated by the plaintiff, is that the
defendant has the burden of proof. See, e.g., Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 726 A.2d 1215, 1222 (Del. 1999) (“Once
the entire fairness standard has been implicated, as here, the defendants, at least initially, bear the burden of
demonstrating the two basic aspects of fair dealing and fair price.” (citation omitted)); Mills Acquisition Co. v.
Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1280 (Del. 1989) (“When faced with such divided loyalties, directors have the
burden of establishing the entire fairness of the transaction to survive careful scrutiny by the courts.”); Keenan v.
Eshleman, 2 A.2d 904, 909 (Del. 1938) (“In the second place, dealing as they did with another corporation of which
they were sole directors and officers, they assumed the burden of showing the entire fairness of the transaction.”).
[72]. Lynch, 638 A.2d at 1116;Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co., 493 A.2d 929 (Del. 1985) (holding that the informed
vote by a majority of minority shares shifts the burden of proving the unfairness of the conflicted merger entirely to
the plaintiffs).
[73]. It is crucial that the directors conduct an auction of the entire company; otherwise they test only the value of
the minority equity stake, rather than the company's “full value” or “going concern value.” Importantly, this Article
does not propose any new substantive regulations or limitations on freezeouts. The reforms it endorses, as described
in Part V infra, speak only to the standard of review that should apply-and hence the factors and incentives that will
affect the parties' choices in weighing either making or accepting a freezeout offer. If the controller has impeded an
independent board's evaluation and pursuit of alternatives to the controller's offer, then the residual ambiguity
surrounding the allocation of gains in the freezeout warrants imposing the burden of proving fairness on the
controller. In the alternative, the Cox opinion presumes that with Dual Ratification there is only a minimal chance of
unfairness, so that litigation is wasteful and unwarranted. See Cox, 879 A.2d at 647 (“If both the independent
directors and the disinterested stockholders are given the ability to say no and do not, ought we not presumptively
assume the transaction was fair?”). The parallel Cox draws between genuine arms'-length dealing and Dual
Ratification in freezeouts does not comport with Weinberger's tenets, however. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 709 n.7
(action taken “as if” at arms'-length will serve merely as “strong” but not dispositive evidence of fairness in a cashout merger).
[74]. Proving entire fairness in such a circumstance is certainly possible. For cases in which the sale process was
held defective but the transaction was deemed fair in its entirety, see Kahn v. Lynch Communc'n Systems, Inc., 669
A.2d 79, 87 (Del. 1995); Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1180 (Del. 1995).
[75]. At least they should not do so without scrutinizing the target board's rationale for accepting the freezeout over
competing alternatives, as the best alternative for the minority. For recent law review articles contending that
corporate law should protect minority shareholders in freezeouts, as part of its role in reducing the agency costs of
capital, see Brett A. Margolin & Samuel J. Kursh, The Economics of Delaware Fair Value, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L.
413, 414 (2004) (describing the importance of an expansive interpretation of “fair value” in appraisal actions);
Lawrence A. Hamermesh & Michael L. Wachter, The Fair Value of Cornfields in Delaware Appraisal Law, 31 J.
CORP. L. 119, 146-74 (2005) (noting the importance of the corporate opportunity doctrine as incorporated into the
fiduciary doctrine applicable to freezeouts); Gilson & Gordon, supra note 5, at 837 (“... the concern is to ensure that
the minority receives a premium that reflects a fair share of the synergy gains”).
[76]. Weinberger, supra note 24.
[77]. Lynch, supra note 25.
[78]. Solomon, supra note 26.
[79]. Glassman, supra note 27.
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[80]. As the risks of holding a minority equity stake increase, the cost of issuing minority equity stakes will increase
for companies, unless the market is unaware of the true risks. See infra text accompanying notes 169-72.
[81]. Pure, supra note 32.
[82]. Cox, supra note 34.
[83]. Cysive, supra note 33.
[84]. DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 251 (2007), amended by 76 Del. Laws ch. 145 § § 4-7 (2007).
[85]. DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 216(3) (2007) (“Directors shall be elected by a plurality of the votes of the shares in
person or represented by proxy at the meeting and entitled to vote on the election of directors....”). In any matter
submitted to the shareholders for voting, because not all shares are voted, the outcome may often be determined by a
shareholder owning less than a genuine majority of the outstanding voting stock-i.e. by a de facto controller.
[86]. DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 216(2) (2007) (“In all matters other than the election of directors, the affirmative vote of
the majority of the shares present in person or represented by proxy at the meeting and entitled to vote on the subject
matter shall be the act of the shareholders.”); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(a) (2007) (“... the power to adopt,
amend or repeal by-laws shall be in the stockholders entitled to vote....”).
[87]. DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 271(a) (2007) (“Any corporation may ...sell, lease or exchange all or substantially all of
its property or assets... as its board of directors or governing body deems expedient and for the best interests of the
corporation, when and as authorized by the holders of a majority of the outstanding stock of the corporation entitled
to vote thereon ...”).
[88]. DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 242(b)(1) (2007).
[89]. See, e.g., McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910, 919 (Del. 2000) (“The ... Board owed fiduciary duties of care,
loyalty and good faith to all ... shareholders.”); Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 710 (“There is no dilution of this obligation
where one holds dual or multiple directorships, as in a parent-subsidiary context.”); Iman Anabtawi, Some
Skepticism About Increasing Shareholder Power, 53 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 561 (2006) (suggesting that intrashareholder conflicts represent a further rationale for vesting primary decision-making authority in the board).
[90]. Consistent with the status quo bias and the overconfidence principle, most directors will rationalize that they
are doing the right thing for the company by avoiding conflict with a controller, and maximizing their chance of
remaining on the board. For scholarship applying the insights of behavioral psychology to corporate law, see, e.g.,
Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral Theories of Judgment and Decision Making in Legal Scholarship: A Literature
Review, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1499 (1998) (applying behavioral psychology to different legal fields); Marleen A.
O'Connor, The Enron Board: The Perils of Groupthink, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 1233 (2003) (documenting the
psychological pressures to squelch healthy dissent in groups); Lynne L. Dallas, A Preliminary Inquiry into the
Responsibility of Corporations and Their Officers and Directors for Corporate Climate: The Psychology of Enron's
Demise, 35 RUTGERS L.J. 1 (2003) (applying principles of behavioral psychology and human moral development
to explain Enron's demise); A. Mechele Dickerson, A Behavioral Approach to Analyzing Corporate Failures, 38
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1 (2003) (discussing the overconfidence bias). For a pathbreaking work on group
psychology, law and the dynamics of the boardroom, see James D. Cox & Harry L. Munsinger, Bias in the
Boardroom: Psychological Foundations and Legal Implications of Corporate Cohesion, 48 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 83, 99-108 (Summer 1985).
[91]. As late as 1976 and 1977, in Delaware and elsewhere, mergers intended to eliminate minorities were
presumptively wrongful. See, e.g., Kellogg v. Georgia Pac. Paper Corp., 227 F. Supp. 719 (W.D. Ark. 1964);
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Marshel v. AFW Fabric Corp., 533 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1976); Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 533 F.2d 1283 (2d Cir.
1976), rev'd, on other grounds, 430 U.S. 462 (1977); Elliott J. Weiss, Balancing Interests in Cash-Out Mergers: The
Promise of Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 8 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1 (1983) (discussing progress from early legal prohibition
on cash-out mergers to their gradual legitimization in the last several decades of the 20th century).
[92]. Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977); Tanzer v. Int'l Gen. Indus., Inc., 379 A.2d 1121 (Del.
1977); Roland Int'l Corp. v. Najjar, 407 A.2d 1032 (Del. 1979).
[93]. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 715 (“In view of the fairness test which has long been applicable to parent-subsidiary
mergers, the expanded appraisal remedy now available to shareholders, and the broad discretion of the Chancellor to
fashion such relief as the facts of a given case may dictate, we do not believe that any additional meaningful
protection is afforded minority shareholders by the business purpose requirement ... Accordingly, such requirement
shall no longer be of any force or effect.” (citation omitted)).
[94]. The landmark definitions of “fair dealings” and “fair price,” established in Weinberger, are as follows:
The concept of fairness has two basic aspects: fair dealing and fair price. The former embraces questions
of when the transaction was timed, how it was initiated, structured, negotiated, disclosed to the directors, and
how the approvals of the directors and stockholders were obtained. The latter aspect of fairness relates to the
economic and financial considerations of the proposed merger, including all relevant factors: assets, market
value, earnings, future prospects, and any other elements that affect the intrinsic or inherent value of a
company's stock.... However, the test for fairness is not a bifurcated one as between fair dealings and price.
All aspects of the issue must be examined as a whole since the question is one of entire fairness.
Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 711 (citations omitted). As the second appeal in Kahn v. Lynch clarified, courts have
interpreted “Entire Fairness” to require that a transaction be “fair in its entirety” rather than “entirely fair in every
respect.” SeeKahn v. Lynch Commc'n Sys., 669 A.2d 79, 90 (Del. 1995) (despite problems pertaining to the Special
Committee's approval process, the disputed cash-out merger was judged beneficial to the shareholders, hence fair).
See alsoCinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1180 (Del. 1995) [hereinafter “Cede III”] (despite
problems with the sale process, including the absence of a market check and a rushed review by the board, the
company's sale through the merger was fair).
[95]. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 713 (“Fair price obviously requires consideration of all relevant factors involving the
value of a company.... elements of future value, including the nature of the enterprise, which are known or
susceptible of proof as of the date of the merger and are not the product of speculation, may be considered.”). The
issue of which elements of future value should be excluded in equity and in an appraisal, are significant open
questions. For commentary, see Hamermesh & Wachter, supra note 75.
[96]. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 711-12. See, e.g., Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1134, 1153 (Del. Ch.
1994), aff'd, 663 A.2d 1156 (Del. 1995) (“Thus in assessing overall (or entire) fairness in this instance the court
must consider the process itself that the board followed, the quality of the result it achieved and the quality of the
disclosures made to the shareholders to allow them to exercise such choice as the circumstances could provide.”).
[97]. Weinberger, 457 A2d. at 711-12. In actuality, the Entire Fairness standard was first endorsed for
parent/subsidiary mergers by the Delaware Supreme Court in Sterling v. Mayflower, a case in which the parent
acquired its subsidiary in a merger using its stock as consideration. SeeSterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 93 A.2d
107, 109-10 (Del. 1952).
[98]. See, e.g., Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 710-12;id. at 710 (“Given the absence of any attempt to structure this
transaction on an arm's length basis, Signal cannot escape the effects of the conflicts it faced, particularly when its
designees on UOP's board did not totally abstain from participation in the matter. There is no ‘safe harbor’ for such
divided loyalties in Delaware.”); id. at 709 n.7 (“... the result here could have been entirely different if UOP had
appointed an independent negotiating committee of its outside directors to deal with Signal at arm's length.”).
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[99]. Id. at 711 (“Part of fair dealing is the obvious duty of candor required by Lynch I ...”); id. at 710
(“Completeness, not adequacy, is both the norm and the mandate under present circumstances.” (citing Lynch v.
Vickers Energy Corp., 383 A.2d 278, 281 (Del. 1977)). Weinberger is crucially important in the evolution of the
case law identified under the rubric of the “fiduciary duty of disclosure.” For commentary, see Lawrence A.
Hamermesh, Calling Off the Lynch Mob: The Corporate Director's Fiduciary Disclosure Duty, 49 VAND. L. REV.
1087 (1996) (arguing that future courts should exercise caution in expanding the significance of “fiduciary
disclosure duties”); Kahn, Transparency and Accountability, supra note 66 (arguing that corporate loyalty doctrine
would be incoherent if it tolerated dissembling in communications between directors and shareholders).
[100]. For a discussion of the twin life of standards of conduct (affecting behavior ex ante), and standards of review
(affecting remedies ex post), see Eisenberg, Divergence, supra note 17.
[101]. See Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 709 n.7.
[102]. See id. For data attesting to the employment of special committees in freezeouts-even in tender offer
freezeouts in many instances, see Subramanian, Theory & Evidence, supra note 23.
[103]. In Weinberger, the court scrutinized the work done by the investment banker representing UOP (the target
subsidiary), and was highly critical of its work. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 712 (“There was no disclosure of the
circumstances surrounding the rather cursory preparation of the Lehman Brothers' fairness opinion. Instead, the
impression was given UOP's minority that a careful study had been made, when in fact speed was the hallmark, and
Mr. Glanville, Lehman's partner in charge of the matter, and also a UOP director, having spent the weekend in
Vermont, brought a draft of the ‘fairness opinion letter’ to the UOP directors' meeting on March 6, 1978 with the
price left blank.”).
[104]. See, e.g., Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co., 493 A.2d 929, 938-39 (Del. 1985); Cinerama, 663 A.2d at 1174, 117677.
[105]. See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text. The following discussion benefited from the historical
information provided in ARTHUR M. BORDEN & JOEL A. YUNIS, GOING PRIVATE (1982).
[106]. Weiss, supra note 91.
[107]. A. A. Sommer, Going Private: A Lesson in Corporate Responsibility, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 84,692, at 82,695 (Nov. 14, 1974) (“I speak today of a newer and currently, at least, more
disquieting fad. That is the fad of ‘going private.”’).
[108]. Notice of Public Fact-Finding Investigation and Rulemaking Proceedings in the Matter of “Going Private”
Transactions by Public Companies and Their Affiliates, SEC Rel. No. 33-5567, 40 Fed. Reg. 7947, 7949 (Feb. 24,
1975).
[109]. Id. at 7950. The “business purpose” requirement briefly endorsed by the Delaware courts was probably a
direct outgrowth of this SEC proposal. For a discussion of the business purpose requirement, see citations in note 92,
supra.
[110]. See40 Fed. Reg. at 7951 (proposed rule 240.13e-3A(c)(1)(viii)).
[111]. BORDEN & YUNIS, supra note 105, at § 2.07.
[112]. William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections on Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974).
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[113]. See, e.g., Gilson & Gordon, supra note 5; Subramanian, Fixing Freezeouts, supra note 5; Peter V. Letsou &
Steven M. Haas, The Dilemma That Should Never Have Been: Minority Freeze Outs in Delaware, 61 BUS. LAW.
25 (2005).
[114]. Consistent with Mark Roe's insights, freezeouts provide a fascinating context in which to analyze the
interaction of federal and state legal regimes in corporate law. Roe, Delaware's Competition, supra note 23.
[115]. As a further counterpoint to the present acceptance of going private deals, see Bevis Long-streth, SEC
Commissioner, Speech to the International Bar Association, Management Buyouts: Are Public Shareholders Getting
a Fair Deal?, [1983-1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 83,436 (Oct. 6, 1983).
[116]. Going Private Transactions by Public Companies or Their Affiliates, SEC Rel. No. 33-6100, 44 Fed. Reg.
46736 (Aug. 8, 1979).
[117]. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
[118]. See supra note 92.
[119]. Compare In re Trans World Airlines, Inc. S'holders Litig., Civ. A. No. 9844, 1988 WL 111271, at *7 (Del.
Ch. Oct. 21, 1988) (advocating the business judgment rule should apply to cash-out mergers if approval was
obtained from a board with a majority of independent directors, a special committee, or a majority of the minority
shares) with Citron, 584 A.2d at 499-502 (endorsing Entire Fairness as the universal standard of review for
controllers' going private mergers on account of their implicit power to coerce such consents).
[120]. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 703 (“However, where corporate action has been approved by an informed vote of a
majority of the minority shareholders, we conclude that the burden entirely shifts to the plaintiff to show that the
transaction was unfair to the minority.”); id. at 709 n.7 (“Particularly in a parent-subsidiary context, a showing that
the action taken was as though each of the contending parties had in fact exerted its bargaining power against the
other at arms' length is strong evidence that the transaction meets the test of fairness.” (emphasis added; citations
omitted.)).
[121]. Lynch, 638 A.2d at 1116.
[122]. For an in-depth discussion of inherent coercion and the Lynch Doctrine's concern about fair dealings and free
consent in freezeouts, see infra Part IV, F. The concept of implicit coercion was first described at length in Citron,
584 A.2d 499-502. The relevant part of Citron is cited in Lynch, 638 A.2d at 1116-17 (citations omitted):
Parent subsidiary mergers ... are proposed by a party that controls and will continue to control, the
corporation, whether or not the minority stockholders vote to approve or reject the transaction. The
controlling stockholder relationship has the potential to influence, however subtly, the vote of [ratifying]
minority stockholders in a manner that is not likely to occur in a transaction with a non-controlling party.
Even where no coercion is intended, shareholders voting on a parent subsidiary merger might perceive that
their disapproval could risk retaliation of some kind by the controlling stockholder. For example, the
controlling stockholder might decide to stop dividend payments or to effect a subsequent cash out merger at a
less favorable price, for which the remedy would be time consuming and costly litigation. At the very least,
the potential for that perception, and its possible impact on a shareholder vote, could never be fully
eliminated. Consequently, in a merger between the corporation and its controlling stockholder-even one
negotiated by disinterested, independent directors-no court could be certain whether the transaction terms
fully approximate what truly independent parties would have achieved in an arm's length negotiation. Given
that uncertainty, a court might well conclude that even minority shareholders who have ratified a ... merger
need procedural protections beyond those afforded by full disclosure of all material facts. One way to provide
such protections would be to adhere to the more stringent entire fairness standard of judicial review.
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[123]. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 703.
[124]. Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co., 493 A.2d 929, 937 (Del. 1985) (holding that “approval of a merger ... by an
informed vote of a majority of the minority shareholders, while not a legal prerequisite, shifts the burden of proving
the unfairness of the merger entirely to the plaintiffs”).
[125]. See, e.g., In re Trans World Airlines, Inc. S'holders Litig., Civ. A. No. 9844, 1988 WL 111271 (Del. Ch. Oct.
21, 1988).
[126]. Delaware decisions addressing self-dealing transactions, which do not involve controllers, sometimes allow
disinterested, informed ratification by directors or shareholders to cure a fiduciary breach or at least trigger
deferential review. The Delaware Supreme Court has not entirely resolved the issue. Compare, e.g., Orman v.
Cullman, Civ. A. 18039, 2004 WL 2348395 (Del. Ch. Oct. 20, 2004) (finding that the informed, uncoerced vote of
company's disinterested public stockholders “extinguished” the plaintiffs' remaining breach of fiduciary duty claims
in the context of a sale of the company); Cooke v. Oolie, Civ. A. 11134, 1997 WL 367034, at *9 (Del. Ch. June 23,
1997) (suggesting that Delaware Supreme Court has weighed in favor of giving limited effect even to proper
ratification, so that the business judgment rule is not “reinstated” due to ratification); Marciano v. Nakash, 535 A.2d
400 (Del. 1987) (stating in dicta that proper ratification would effectuate business judgment deference so that
plaintiff could recover only upon proof of ‘waste’).
[127]. Citron v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 584 A.2d 490 (Del. 1990).
[128]. Lynch, 638 A.2d at 1117 (“... an approval of the transaction by an independent committee of directors or an
informed majority of minority shareholders shifts the burden of proof on the issue of fairness from the controlling or
dominating shareholder to the challenging shareholder-plaintiff.”). See Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 703 (“... but in all
this, the burden clearly remains on those relying on the [burden-shifting] vote [i.e. the defendants] to show that they
completely disclosed all material facts relevant to the transaction.”).
[129]. The wariness the courts show towards allowing ratification of potential fiduciary loyalty breaches reflects the
important stature of the duty of loyalty within corporate law. For a classic statement of the importance of the duty of
loyalty, see, e.g., Bayer v. Beran, 49 N.Y.S.2d 2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1944) (“The concept of loyalty, of constant,
unqualified fidelity, has a definite and precise meaning. The fiduciary must subordinate his individual and private
interests to his duty to the corporation whenever the two conflict.” (citation omitted)).
[130]. For example, no prior tender offers by controllers are cited by the Delaware Supreme Court in its landmark
opinion in Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp., 383 A.2d 278, 281 (Del. 1977) (ruling that “complete candor” was
required in the controller's disclosures in its tender offer). Moreover, short form mergers in tender offer freezeouts
(i.e. combined tender offer/short-form mergers) are nowhere evident in the myriad short form mergers reviewed by
the Delaware Supreme Court in Glassman v. Unocal Exploration Corp., 777 A.2d 242 (Del. 2001).
[131]. Solomon, 672 A.2d 35 (Del. 1996). For commentary on the absence of authoritative precedent on tender offer
freezeouts, see Letsou & Haas, supra note 113, at 45 (“... only one reported decision between 1996 and 2001
attempted to invoke Solomon in connection with a freezeout transaction structured as a tender offer followed by a
long or short-form merger, In re Life Technologies, Inc. Shareholders Litigation [Civ. A. 16513, 1998 WL 1812280
(Del. Ch. Nov. 24, 1998)].”).
[132]. Glassman, 777 A.2d 242 (Del. 2001). Solomon and Glassman are discussed at length in Part III, infra.
[133]. See, e.g., Kahn v. Tremont Corp., 694 A.2d 422, 428 (Del 1997).
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[134]. Solomon, 672 A.2d at 40.
[135]. In re Siliconix Inc. S'holders Litig., Civ. A. 18700, 2001 WL 716787 (Del. Ch. June 21, 2001).
[136]. In rePure Res., Inc. S'holders Litig., 808 A.2d 421 (Del. Ch. 2002).
[137]. In reCox Commc'ns, Inc. S'holders Litig., 879 A.2d 604 (Del. 2005).
[138]. For detailed discussion of the early short-form merger statutes and case law, see Weiss, supra note 91. The
evolution of the case law is also explored in Glassman, 777 A.2d at 244-48 (attesting to the enactment of the shortform merger statute in Delaware by 1937, with its modern version appearing by 1957).
[139]. The Williams Act, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968) (codified as amended in 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e),
78n(d)-(f) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004)) [hereinafter “Williams Act”] governs tender offers for securities registered
under the Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, Title 1, § 12, 48 Stat. 881, 892 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 781
(2000 & Supp. IV 2004)) [hereinafter “Exchange Act”]. See also infra notes 141-49.
[140]. For a survey of federal tender offer law and regulation, see THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF
SECURITIES REGULATION ch. 11 (5th ed. 2005); id. at § 11.1 (“The securities laws contained a regulatory gap.
By and large, there were no disclosure provisions applicable to tender offers.”).
[141]. Section 14(d) of the Exchange Act (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (2000)) requires that any person planning a
tender offer subject to the Exchange Act's registration and reporting requirements must file all solicitations,
advertisements, and any other materials used in connection with the offer with the SEC prior to the distribution of
the tender offer material. The tender offeror must file a long form Schedule TO, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-100 (2007).
[142]. See Section 14(e) of the Exchange Act (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (2000)) and 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-1
(2007).
[143]. See15 U.S.C. § 78m(e) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004). The disclosure called for by SEC Rule 13e-3, 17 C.F.R. §
240.13e-3 (2007), applies to going private deals irrespective of whether they are structured as cash-out mergers
(where proxies or information statements are required to be filed) or tender offer freezeouts (where tender offer
filings must be made, consistent with 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-3 (2007)). Under Rule 13e-3, the bidder must file, update,
and finalize a Schedule 13E-3 with the SEC. In both instances the Rule 13e-3 disclosures are adjunctive to the proxy
or tender offer statement disclosures.
[144]. See Section 14(d)(4) of the Exchange Act (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(4) (2000)); Schedule 14D-9, 17
C.F.R. § 240.14d-101 (2007). Schedule 14D-9 is the disclosure document that must be filed in connection with any
recommendation for or against tender offers. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-9 (2007).
[145]. See15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(6) (2000); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-8 (2007).
[146]. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-1(a) (2007).
[147]. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5) (2000); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-7 (2007).
[148]. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(7) (2000).
[149]. For analysis and citation to the legislative history of the Williams Act, see Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc.,
430 U.S. 1, 30-31,reh'g denied, 430 U.S. 976 (1977) (“The sponsors of this legislation were plainly sensitive to the
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suggestion that the measure would favor one side or the other in control contests; however, they made it clear that
the legislation was designed solely to get needed information to the investor, the constant focal point of the
committee hearings. Senator Williams articulated this singleness of purpose, even while advocating neutrality: ‘We
have taken extreme care to avoid tipping the scales either in favor of management or in favor of the person making
the takeover bids. S. 510 is designed solely to require full and fair disclosure for the benefit of investors.’ 113 Cong.
Rec. 24664 (1967).”).
[150]. See id.
[151]. DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 253(a) (2007).
[152]. This matter was resolved in the Delaware Supreme Court's holding in Glassman, 777 A.2d 242, described
infra Part III.A.2.
[153]. Glassman, 777 A.2d 242.
[154]. See Subramanian, Theory and Evidence, supra note 23, at 1 (indicating that as of 2005, at least 2/3 of
freezeouts proceeded through cash-out mergers).
[155]. See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 874 (Del. 1985) (in evaluating a proposed merger the
directors must inform themselves of all information reasonably available to them).
[156]. Unitrin, Inc. v. American Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1387 (Del. 1995) (defenses that are neither preclusive
nor coercive fall within the permissible range of defenses available to target directors); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa
Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985) (directors can respond to threat to corporation by adopting reasonable
takeover defenses).
[157]. For example, in the landmark case of Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc., 430 U.S. 1 (1977), the Supreme
Court refused to afford a private remedy to the tender offeror who lost to the winning bidder.
[158]. See Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954 (“Finally, the board's power to act derives from its fundamental duty and
obligation to protect the corporate enterprise, which includes stockholders, from harm reasonably perceived,
irrespective of its source.”); Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1355 (Del. 1985) (approving target
board's use of poison pill to defend against coercive or inadequate tender offers).
[159]. Solomon, 672 A.2d at 39-40;see alsoEisenberg v. Chicago Milwaukee Corp. 537 A.2d 1051, 1056 (Del. Ch.
1987) (enumerating conduct that would be deemed coercive in controllers' tender offers for preferred shares).
[160]. In re Pure, 808 A.2d at 437 (“Tender offers are not addressed by the Delaware General Corporation Law
(“DGCL”), a factor that has been of great importance in shaping the line of decisions addressing tender offers by
controlling stockholders....”); id. at 437-38 (“Because no consent or involvement of the target board is statutorily
mandated for tender offers, our courts have recognized that “[i]n the case of totally voluntary tender offers ... courts
do not impose a right of the shareholders to receive a particular price.”). From a statutory perspective, an activist
role for the target board can be grounded in the board's plenary authority under Section 141 of the DGCL. SeeDEL.
CODE tit. 8, § 141 (2007), amended by 76 Del. Laws ch. 145, § 1 (2007). Moreover, in tender offers from third
parties, the Delaware courts have established a rich and nuanced set of equitable principles that affirm target
directors' duties to defend the company and the shareholders from inadequate or coercive bids. No such equivalent
equitable authority is recognized in the case law in relation to controllers' bids, although they create an even greater
risk of coercion and unfairness than tender offers from third parties do. The paradox is explored in Pure, 808 A.2d at
429-31. Furthermore, consistent with the landmark Schnell decision, courts have extended fiduciary principles based
on the exigencies of the context in the interest of protecting the parties and reducing the agency costs of capital.
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They have very rarely been constrained by the statutory architecture. See id. at 434 (citing Schnell v. Chris-Craft
Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437, 440 (Del 1971) (“[I]nequitable action does not become permissible simply because it is
legally possible.”)).
[161]. SeeDEL. CODE tit. 8, § 251(b) (2007).
[162]. See Pure, 808 A.2d at 441.
[163]. For further discussion of controllers' ability to act coercively in a tender offer freezeout, see Part III.B., infra.
[i]. See, e.g., Roane, supra note 1, at 48 (“Time was, America's largest corporations would fight tooth and nail (and
with poison pills) to remain public companies. No longer.”); A Growing Aversion to Ticker Symbols, in
DEALBOOK (Andrew Ross Sorkin, ed., N.Y. TIMES Jan. 29, 2007), available at
http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/01/29/a-growing-aversion-to-ticker-symbols/ (“‘Everyone, it seems, is
hopping on the buyout bandwagon these days. Even the big public companies once thought untouchable are now
wistfully talking about the success of firms like the Blackstone Group.”); Serena Ng, Gregory Zuckerman &
Michael Hudson, Ready to Deal: $60 Billion in Two Days; A Spate of Mergers, Buyouts Announced Across the
Globe; Borrowing Stretches Targets, WALL ST. J, NOV. 21, 2006, at C1.
[ii]. See, e.g., Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 28 U.S.C.); Alison Frankel, It's Over-Tort Reformers, Business Interests, and Plaintiffs Lawyers
Themselves Have Helped Kill the Mass Tort Bonanza and It's Not Coming Back, AM. LAWYER, Dec. 2006, at 78;
Michael Orey, How Business Trounced the Trial Lawyers, BUS. WK., Jan. 8, 2007, at 44. The proper scope of
private litigation and its effect on the economy are huge issues in contemporary American law and public policy.
See, e.g., Manhattan Institute for Policy Research, Trial Lawyers, Inc.; A Report on the Lawsuit Industry in America,
2003, available at http://www.triallawyersinc.com; cf. THOMAS F. BURKE, LAWYERS, LAWSUITS AND
LEGAL RIGHTS, THE BATTLE OVER LITIGATION IN AMERICAN SOCIETY (2002); James D. Cox, The
Social Meaning of Shareholder Suits, 65 BROOK. L. REV. 3 (1999); Anita Bernstein, The Enterprise of Liability,
39 VAL. U. L. REV. 27 (2004). On the federal courts' receptiveness to class action claims by individuals against
national corporations, see EDWARD A. PURCELL, LITIGATION AND INEQUALITY: FEDERAL DIVERSITY
JURISDICTION IN INDUSTRIAL AMERICA, 1870-1958 (Oxford University Press 1992) (studying changing
litigation patterns and particular features of the federal courts' resolution of individuals' claims against national
corporations). For recent empirical data documenting a nearly 100% decrease in securities class action filings over
the past two years, see reports of the Stanford Law School Securities Class Action Clearinghouse, available at
http://securities.stanford.edu (evidence shows that class action lawsuits filed for securities fraud reached an all time
low in 2006).
[iii]. Cox, 879 A.2d at 624 (praising reliance on Solomon standards rather than Lynch in recent court of chancery
cases because this approach offers “the utility of providing a non-litigious route to effecting transactions that often
were economically efficient both for the minority who received a premium and in a sense of creating more rationally
organized corporations”).
[iv]. Cox, 879 A.2d at 607 (proposing that its reforms would allow plaintiffs' lawyers to earn fees only by “actually
prosecuting meritorious claims, and not by free riding on a special committee's work”). This negative view of the
plaintiffs' bar was reinforced the summer after Cox was decided when the law firm Milberg Weiss Bershad &
Shulman was indicted, along with two of its partners, for allegedly making payments to plaintiffs in class action
suits. See, e.g., Anthony Lin, Milberg Weiss, Two Partners Indicted in Kickback Probe, 235 N.Y.L.J., May 19,
2006, at 1. That summer (2006) Congress also considered a bill that would have imposed increased sanctions in
cases where plaintiffs' lawyers' conduct in class actions had been adjudged too aggressive. See Securities Litigation
Attorney Accountability and Transparency Act, H.R. 5491, 109th Cong. (2006).
[v]. This general issue was present in Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 127 S.Ct. 2499, 2510 (2007)
decided by the Supreme Court on June 21, 2007 (To qualify as “strong,” as required by the Private Securities
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Litigation Reform Act of 1995, an inference of scienter must be more than merely plausible or reasonable-it must be
“cogent and at least as compelling as any opposing inference of nonfraudulent intent.”). With respect to litigation
touching on minorities' interests, there is substantial empirical evidence supporting a link between strong securities
markets and robust legal protections for minorities. See, e.g., Michael S. Weisbach & Willam A. Reese, Jr.,
Protection of Minority Shareholder Interests, Cross Listings in the United States and Subsequent Equity Offerings,
66 J. FIN. ECON. 65 (2002); Bernard S. Black, The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong Securities
Markets, 48 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 781 (2001); Rafael LaPorta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert
W. Vishny, Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113 (1998) (finding least developed capital markets in countries
providing the weakest protection to investors and minority owners).
[vi]. Both federal legislation and the Supreme Court's decisions have increasingly limited the scope of litigable
claims by investors. See, e.g., Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 201 (1994)
(holding that no aiding and abetting liability applies under Rule 10b-5); Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561
(1995) (affirming a very limited understanding of the term “prospectus” and thus substantially limiting the scope of
the cause of action under Section 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act); Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336 (2005)
(holding that plaintiffs' purchase of securities at inflated price is insufficient to demonstrate loss causation).
According to Professors Thompson and Thomas, the “focus of policy debate” shifted to limiting federal securities
litigation once efforts to limit derivative litigation had proven largely successful. See Robert B. Thompson &
Randall S. Thomas, The New Look of Shareholder Litigation: Acquisition-Oriented Class Actions, 57 VAND. L.
REV. 133, 136 (2004) [hereinafter “Thompson & Thomas II”].
[vii]. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended at
scattered sections in 15 U.S.C.) [hereinafter “PSLRA”]. For recent research on the role of lawyers and law firms in
securities class actions, see Stephen J. Choi & Robert B. Thompson, Securities Litigation and Its Lawyers: Changes
during the First Decade After the PSLRA, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1489 (2006).
[viii]. For analysis of these hurdles, see, e.g., James D. Cox, Making Securities Fraud Class Actions Virtuous, 39
ARIZ. L. REV. 497, 519-20 (1997) ( “The Reform Act's tightened pleading requirements and narrowed discovery
rights more than any other feature probably account for any decline in the number of class action securities suits
initiated since its enactment. As an effort to prevent the filing of a complaint from becoming the attorney's ticket to
“flesh out” her pleadings through discovery, the Reform Act stays any discovery during the pendency of any motion
to dismiss. The bar to discovery compounds the class action attorney's task in satisfying the Reform Act's heightened
pleading standard.” (citations omitted)).
[ix]. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227 (codified as
amended at scattered sections in 15 U.S.C.) [hereinafter “SLUSA”].
[x]. See, e.g., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71 (2006) (held that SLUSA bars class
actions brought under state law even by persons claiming to have been misled into holding securities, as opposed to
purchasing or selling them). For a thoughtful analysis of SLUSA's effects and the rationales invoked for its
enactment, see Richard W. Painter, Responding to a False Alarm: Federal Preemption of State Securities Fraud
Causes of Action, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1998).
[xi]. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 720166 (Supp. IV 2004) and in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., and 29 U.S.C.) [hereinafter “SOX”].
[xii]. The exception is that in SOX, Congress restored the former, slightly longer statute of limitations for class
actions alleging securities fraud. See SOX, supra note 56, § 804, 116 Stat. at 801 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1658
(Supp. IV 2004)).
[xiii]. The so-called “Delaware carve-out” preserves state jurisdiction over corporate fiduciary misrepresentation
claims where plaintiffs allege that disclosure was presented to them in connection with a shareholder vote, in
response to a tender or exchange offer, or in a context where appraisal rights were available. See SLUSA, supra note
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54, § 101(a)(1), 112 Stat. at 327-29 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77p (2000)) (amending section 16(d) of the 1933 Act).
If Congress had not allowed for that safe harbor from preemption, then fiduciary suits against controllers for
misrepresentation in freezeouts would not be litigable in equity.
[xiv]. For a thoughtful analysis of this mainstream, largely disapproving view of shareholder derivative actions, see
Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The Public and Private Faces of Derivative Lawsuits, 57 VAND. L.
REV. 1747 (2004) [hereinafter “Thompson & Thomas I”]. For consideration of the relative paucity of traditional
derivative claims as a portion of the docket of the Delaware court of chancery, and comparatively greater number of
class action claims contesting acquisitions, see Thompson & Thomas II, supra note 51.
[xv]. See, e.g., Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Norms & Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1607 (2001)
(providing an overview of scholarly work in the area of corporate law and norms); Edward B. Rock & Michael L.
Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power: Law, Norms and the Self-Governing Corporation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1619
(2001) (emphasizing the secondary role of law in corporate governance); but see Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate
Law and Social Norms, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1253 (1999) (providing a “thicker” account of the interplay between
corporate law and corporate governance norms); Renee M. Jones, Law, Norms, and the Breakdown of the Board:
Promoting Accountability in Corporate Governance, 92 IOWA L. REV. 105 (2006) (arguing that norms governance
is less effective than scholars suggested pre-Enron, and proposing a scheme of proportionate liability to give
corporate governance norms more traction). For a seminal, early analysis of norms governance in commercial
communities, see Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond
Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992).
[xvi]. DEBORAH DEMOTT, SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE ACTIONS: LAW AND PRACTICE (West 1999 &
Supp. 2007). See also Thompson & Thomas I, supra note 59; Beam ex rel. Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc.
v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 1049-52 (Del. 2004) (pre-suit demand on board not excused on account of mere
existence of personal or business relationships among directors); Orman v. Cullman, 794 A.2d 5 (Del. Ch. 2002)
(allowing application of business judgment rule instead of Entire Fairness standard in the context of a merger with
an unaffiliated third party notwithstanding the presence of a controlling shareholder at the seller and the controller's
continued involvement in the post-merger firm); Harbor Fin. Partners v. Huizenga, 751 A.2d 879 (Del. Ch. 1999)
(granting motion to dismiss in claim against corporation's acquisition through merger, notwithstanding that four of
seven directors had a conflict of interest, on the rationale that disinterested shareholders had ratified the transaction
and the complaint failed to allege facts that would constitute “waste”); In reAquila, Inc. S'Holders Litig., 805 A.2d
184 (Del. Ch. 2002) (allowing business judgment deference to apply to the tender offer freezeout because the
shareholders could freely choose whether or not to tender to the controller, notwithstanding that they had no
independent advocate negotiate on their behalf in the offer); In reStaples, Inc. S'Holders Litig., 792 A.2d 934, 952
(Del. Ch. 2001) (denying permanent injunction against reclassification transaction involving conflicted directors,
and affirming relevance of business judgment rule standard, but granting preliminary injunction to afford
shareholders better disclosure).
[xvii]. The backlash against SOX is an expression of this policy perspective. See, e.g., Commission on the
Regulation of U.S. Capital Markets in the 21st Century, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 27-28 (March
2007) (produced by a Commission established by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce). For an account of the unfolding
policy debate over amending or repealing portions of SOX, see Greg Ip, Kara Scannell & Deborah Solomon, In Call
to Deregulate Business, A Global Twist, WALL ST. J., Jan. 25, 2007, at A1. Even the Wall Street Journal noted the
ambiguous evidence behind the claim that SOX is to blame for decreasing foreign listings on U.S. exchanges; the
maturation of those foreign markets being a more plausible explanation.
[xviii]. Cox, 879 A.2d at 607 (proposed reforms would give “defendants the real option to get rid of cases on the
pleadings ...”).
[xix]. The reforms proposed in the trilogy of freezeout cases analyzed herein are consonant with the themes
addressed in many of Vice Chancellor Strine's other judicial and academic writings, in which he appeals for
streamlining corporate legal doctrine under the business judgment rule. See, e.g., Allen, Jacobs & Strine, supra note
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17; Leo E. Strine, Jr., If Corporate Action is Lawful, Presumably There Are Circumstances in Which it is Equitable
To Take That Action: The Implicit Corollary to the Rule of Schnell v. Chris-Craft, 60 BUS. LAW. 877 (2005); Leo
E. Strine, Jr., The Inescapably Empirical Foundations of the Common Law of Corporations, 27 DEL. J. CORP. L.
499 (2002).
[xx]. For an account of this favorable view of corporate fiduciary doctrine-and the positive contribution of equitable
adjudication, see, e.g., E. Norman Veasey & Christine T. Di Guglielmo, What Happened in Delaware Corporate
Law and Governance from 1992-2004? A Retrospective on Some Key Legal Developments, 153 U. PA. L. REV.
1399 (2005).
[xxi]. For a discussion of corporate fiduciary law's important role in supporting investors' capacity to trust in the
legitimacy of the system of corporate governance see, e.g., Faith Stevelman Kahn, Transparency and
Accountability: Rethinking Corporate Fiduciary Law's Relevance to Corporate Disclosure, 34 GA. L. REV. 505
(2000); Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral Foundations of Corporate
Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735 (2001); William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic Conception of the Business
Corporation, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 261 (1992).
[xxii]. The term and concept are the author's.
[xxiii]. As defined in WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & ALAN S. BLINDER, ECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES & POLICY 169 (7th ed.
1997), a public good is “a commodity or service whose benefits are not depleted by an additional user and for which
it is generally difficult or impossible to exclude people from its benefits, even if the people are unwilling to pay for
them.”
[XXIV]. For discussion of choice of forum as a factor influencing substantive Delaware corporate legal doctrine, see
Faith Stevelman, Regulatory Competition, Choice of Forum and Delaware’s Stake in Corporate Law, 34 Del. J.
Corp. L.57 (2009).

[164]. Solomon, 672 A.2d at 39.
[165]. Pure, 808 A.2d at 438 (“To begin with, the controlling stockholder is said to have no duty to pay a fair price,
irrespective of its power over the subsidiary.”).
[166]. DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 262 (2007), amended by 76 Del. Laws ch. 145, §§ 11-16 (2007). For an analysis of the
fair value standard relevant to appraisal actions, see Lawrence A. Hamermesh and Michael L. Wachter, The Fair
Value of Cornfields in Delaware Appraisal Law, 31 J. CORP. L. 119 (2005); Brett A. Margolin and Samuel J.
Kursh, The Economics of Delaware Fair Value, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 413 (2005); Barry M. Wertheimer, The
Shareholder's Appraisal Remedy and How Courts Determine Fair Value, 47 DUKE L. J. 613 (1998); John C.
Coffee, Jr., Transfers of Control and the Quest for Efficiency: Can Delaware Law Encourage Efficient Transactions
While Chilling Inefficient Ones?, 21 DEL. J. CORP. L. 359 (1996).
[167]. Lynch, 638 A.2d at 1115 (citation omitted).
[168]. See generally Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Private Ordering Through Negotiation: Dispute Settlement and
Rulemaking, 89 HARV. L. REV. 637 (1976).
[169]. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 146 (1991). For a discussion of investors' rational expectations regarding the trade-off of risk
and return and their connection to appraisals standard of fair value, see Margolin & Kursh, supra note 166, at 42627.
[170]. Margolin & Kursh, supra note 166, at 426-27.
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[171]. For further explanation, see Gilson & Gordon, supra note 5, at 787-88.
[172]. The academic literature has failed to address the increased risks for minorities arising from the three distinct
legal schemes relevant to pricing in freezeouts. On the need for clarity in the appraisal standard itself-in the interest
of protecting minorities' interests, reducing agency costs and hence reducing firms' cost of raising outside equity
capital-see e.g. Margolin & Kursh, supra note 166, at 415 (“Hence, corporate law's economic function is to reduce
the firm's cost of equity capital through the governance of managerial malfeasance. Appraisal rights serve this
purpose by preventing management from forcing the minority to tender its shares at less than Fair Value.”).
[173]. Solomon, 672 A.2d at 39.
[174]. See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985).
[175]. See Pure, 808 A.2d at 446.
[176]. For a discussion of recent innovations in takeover defenses and their legal regulation, see David A. Katz,
Takeover Law and Practice, 2006 (Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz) (describing developments through November
8,
2006),
available
at
http://www.ipba.org/calendar/documents/4d_David_katz_
Takeover_Law_and_Practice_2006-Asis_M&A_Forum.PDF.
[177]. Id. This assumes a true majority controller. Where there is a de facto controller who owns less than absolute
voting control, as was true in Cysive for example, then the freezeout would involve a “change in control,” and
Revlon duties should apply to the target board. For further discussion see Part V, intra. This issue has not been
meaningfully discussed in the cases or the literature.
[178]. Hamermesh & Wachter, supra note 166, at 120. See also Coffee, supra note 166, at 416 (proposing rule to
protect minorities from controllers' exploitation of confidential information of target).
[179]. For the general point, see FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1991). For corporate fiduciary law's role in this regard, see Gilson &
Gordon, supra note 5, at 786-87. For appraisal's role in relation to controlling controller opportunism, see, e.g.,
Margolin & Kursh, supra note 166, at 414-16. For an argument that pending but undisclosed alterations in the
target's business model that prove profitable should be included in the fair value calculus in appraisals see
Hamermesh & Wachter, supra note 166, at 145-48. The contemporary analysis of agency costs reflects into the
seminal work of Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency
Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976) (observing that agency costs arise once outside equity
capital is used).
[180]. Professors Gilson and Gordon analyze the web of legal safeguards relevant to controllers' dealings affecting
minorities as trading off the benefits of reduced managerial agency costs and controller's siphoning private benefits
of control in their own interest. See Gilson & Gordon, supra note 5, at 785-87, 843.
[181]. For further discussion of the myriad ways that controllers can obtain private profits from corporate controlmany of them legal or at least not remediable at law, see John C. Coates, “Fair Value” as an Avoidable Rule of
Corporate Law: Minority Discounts in Conflict Transactions, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 1251, 1274 (1999).
[182]. See, e.g., Margolin & Kursh, supra note 166, at 414-15.
[183]. DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 262 (2007), amended by 76 Del. Laws. ch. 145, §§ 11-16 (2007).
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[184]. For an excellent analysis of fair value in Delaware appraisals see, Hamermesh & Wachter, supra note 166
(exploring the alternative notions of valuation in the case law on fair value in appraisals). For discussion of the
appraisal statute and its role in corporate law, see Robert B. Thompson, Exit, Liquidity, and Majority Rule:
Appraisal's Role in Corporate Law, 84 GEO. L. J. 1 (1995); see also Randall S. Thomas, Revising the Delaware
Appraisal Statute, 3 DEL. L. REV. 1, 16-17 (2000) (describing narrow scope of appraisal and situations where
appraisal rights should exist).
[185]. DEL. CODE. tit. 8, § 262(b) (2007), amended by 76 Del. Laws. ch. 145, §§ 11-12 (2007).
[186]. Ordinarily, the consideration in the short form merger would be cash; but this is not necessarily the case.
Appraisal is unavailable where the consideration in the merger is shares in the acquire. Id. It is not uncommon for a
tender offer freezeout to offer shares of the acquirer as consideration, as was true in Pure. Pure, 808 A.2d at 421.
[187]. DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 262(h) (2007), amended by 76 Del. Laws ch. 145 § 14 (2007). Cf. ABA MODEL BUS.
CORP. ACT. § 13.02(a) (2005); Wertheimer, supra note 166, at 626-27 (“The statutory command in an appraisal
proceeding is to find the ‘fair value’ of the dissenting shares, or sometimes the ‘fair market value’ or ‘fair cash
value.’ Fair value is typically defined by statute as ‘the value of the shares immediately before the effectuation of the
corporate action to which the dissenter objects, excluding any appreciation or depreciation in anticipation of the
corporate action.”’ (citations omitted)).
[188]. DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 262(h) (2007), amended by 76 Del. Laws ch. 145 § 14 (2007).
[189]. These ambiguities reflect the changing nature of the appraisal remedy. At first appraisal seems to have been
intended to facilitate the law's abandonment of the universal consent requirement for fundamental corporate
changes, which had allowed minorities the ability to hold up value-enhancing mergers with third parties. The
appraisal remedy eliminated such hold-up potential, while compensating the dissenting shareholders for what they
lost, and providing them liquidity. Over time, appraisal has become more important in preventing oppression by
controllers in cash-out mergers. For discussion of the changing nature of the appraisal remedy and its impact on the
development of the fair value concept, see Wertheimer, supra, note 166.
[190]. This issue was litigated most notoriously in Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc. 684 A.2d 289 (Del. 1996). For
discussion, see Jesse A. Finkelstein and Russell C. Silberglied, Technicolor IV: Appraisal Valuation in a Two-Step
Merger, 52 BUS. LAW. 801 (1997).
[191]. For treatment of this issue, see Harmermesh and Wachter, supra note 166, at 138 (presenting the argument in
favor of employing a definition of fair value that encompasses not only “the current asset stock and the return on
those assets” but also the value arising from “reinvestment in new assets”).
[192]. See, e.g., Paskill Corp. v. Alcoma Corp., 747 A.2d 549, 553 (Del. 2000) (affirming that appraisal's fair value
concept presumes that the cashed-out shareholders would have maintained their investment had the merger not
occurred).
[193]. For analysis and citation to the cases, see Hamermesh & Wachter, supra note 166, at 137-39. For citation to
extensive Delaware precedent employing going concern value as the benchmark for fair value, see id. at 132 n.56.
[194]. Tri-Continental Corp. v. Battye, 74 A.2d 71, 72 (Del. 1950) (“The basic concept of value under the appraisal
statute is that the stockholder is entitled to be paid for that which has been taken from him, viz., his proportionate
interest in a going concern.”).
[195]. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 712-13.
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[196]. Id. at 713.
[197]. For cases dissecting the components of discounted cash flow (“DCF”) see, e.g. In re Emerging
Communications, Inc. Shareholders Litig., Cons. Civ. A. No. 16415, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 70, at *43 (Del. Ch. May
3, 2004) (“... the parties focus almost exclusively upon DCF valuation issues ... Accordingly this Opinion addresses
only the valuation issues presented by the parties' competing DCF approaches.”); ONTI, Inc. v. Integra Bank, 751
A.2d 904, 917 (Del. Ch. 1999); and Grimes v. Vitalink Commc'ns Corp., Civ. A. No. 12334, 1997 Del Ch. LEXIS
124, at *3 (Del. Ch. Aug. 26, 1997) (observing that the DCF approach is “increasingly the model of choice for
valuations in this Court”), clarified by 1997 Del. Ch. LEXIS 159 (Del. Ch. Sept. 17, 1997), aff'd, 1998 Del. LEXIS
127 (Del. Apr. 1, 1998). The DCF approach to defining going concern value was first endorsed by the court of
chancery in Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., Civ. A. No. 7129, 1990 Del. Ch. LEXIS 259 (Del. Ch. Oct. 19, 1990).
[198]. The court stated:
In determining what figure represents this true or intrinsic value, the appraiser and the courts must take
into consideration all factors and elements which reasonably might enter into the fixing of value. Thus,
market value, asset value, dividends, earnings prospects, the nature of the enterprise and any other facts which
were known or which could be ascertained as of the date of merger and which throw any light on future
prospects of the merged corporation are not only pertinent to an inquiry as to the value of the dissenting
stockholders' interest, but must be considered by the agency fixing the value.
Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 713 (emphasis in original).
[199]. Glassman, 777 A.2d at 248 (emphasis in original).
[200]. See Emerging Commc'ns, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 70, at *83-84 (“... the market price of shares is not always
indicative of fair value. Our appraisal cases so confirm.... Moreover, because Prosser always owned the majority
interest, the market price of ECM stock always reflected a minority discount.”); Hamermesh & Wachter, supra note
166, at 132 (“If the shares' current market price were used to value the firm, the controller would be encouraged to
under-manage, since the more it did so, the less it would have to pay for the minority interest in a squeeze out
merger.”).
[201]. For a discussion of corporate valuation in which going concern value approximates financial economists'
understanding of “fundamental value,” see Michael L. Wachter, Takeover Defense When Financial Markets Are
(Only) Relatively Efficient, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 787, 798 (2003) (“[T]he corporation's fundamental value is the sum
of the free cash flows generated by the company's assets.”). For further discussion of going concern value and DCF
as a basis for valuation, see, e.g., RICHARD A. BREALEY, ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE,
at 509-511 (8th ed. 2006).
[202]. For a discussion of Pareto efficiency versus Kaldor Hicks efficiency and their relevance to corporate fiduciary
law, see, e.g. Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., A Positive Analysis of the Common Law of Corporate Fiduciary Duties,
84 KY. L. J. 455, 469-71 (1995-96) (proposing that corporate fiduciary law mandates managers to take all actions
that “move corporate shareholders to Pareto superior states”).
[203]. Id. This logic is distinct from that which bars a corporate fiduciary from profiting at a beneficiary's expense,
as a mode of encouraging investment in the corporate form.
[204]. Observing the hurdles attendant to pursuing appraisal actions, commentators have noted the comparative
paucity of appraisal actions since Weinberger affirmed the equitable cause of action arising under the Entire
Fairness standard. See Gilson & Gordon, supra note 5, at 789-99; Pure, 808 A.2d at 436 n.20 (“Another
underpinning of the Lynch line of cases is an implicit perception that the statutory remedy of appraisal is a less than
fully adequate protection for stockholders facing Inherent Coercion from a proposed squeeze out merger.”).
[205]. SeeDEL. CODE tit. 8, § 262(b) (2007), amended by 76 Del. Laws ch. 145, §§ 11, 12 (2007).
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[206]. SeeDEL. CODE tit. 8, § 262(b)(3) (2007). This limitation falls away if the controller compels a short-form
merger under DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 253 (2007), however.
[207]. SeeDEL. CODE tit. 8, § 262(d) (2007).
[208]. SeeDEL. CODE tit. 8, § 262(a) (2007).
[209]. SeeDEL. CODE tit. 8, § 262(e) (2007), amended by 76 Del. Laws ch. 145, § 13 (2007).
[210]. SeeDEL. CODE tit. 8, § 262(g) (2007).
[211]. See Hamermesh & Wachter, supra note 166, at 144 n.102 (“... the average appraisal proceeding lasts nearly
four years.”).
[212]. SeeDEL. CODE tit. 8, § 262(a), (k) (2007), amended by 76 Del. Laws ch. 145, § 16 (2007).
[213]. SeeDEL. CODE tit. 8, § 262(a), (j) (2007).
[214]. Gilson & Gordon, supra note 5, at 831-32.
[215]. Lynch, 638 A.2d at 1111 (noting that the plaintiff brought a class action on behalf of all shareholders of the
acquired company whose stock had been procured through the merger).
[216]. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 711;Lynch, 638 A.2d at 1115 (citing Weinberger).
[217]. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 714.
[218]. The Delaware Supreme Court stated:
To summarize, in a section 262 appraisal action [under the DGCL] the only litigable issue is the
determination of the value of the appraisal petitioners' shares on the date of the merger, the only party
defendant is the surviving corporation and the only relief available is a judgment against the surviving
corporation for the fair value of the dissenters' shares. In contrast, a fraud action asserting fair dealing and fair
price claims affords an expansive remedy and is brought against the alleged wrongdoers to provide whatever
relief the facts of a particular case may require. In evaluating claims involving violations of entire fairness,
the trial court may include in its relief any damages sustained by the shareholders. See Rabkin, 498 A.2d at
1107; Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 713. In a fraud claim, the approach to determining relief may be the same as
that employed in determining fair value under 8 Del. C. § 262. However, an appraisal action may not provide
a complete remedy for unfair dealing or fraud because a damage award in a fraud action may include
“rescissory damages if the [trier of fact] considers them susceptible of proof and a remedy appropriate to all
issues of fairness before him.” Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 714. Weinberger and Rabkin make this clear
distinction in terms of the relief available in a section 262 action as opposed to a fraud in the merger suit.
Cede, 542. A.2d at 1187-88 (citations in the original). Compare Emerging Commc'ns, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 70, at
*94-95 (noting that in an appraisal the court may compute a prejudgment interest award to effect disgorgement by
the acquirer of any benefit obtained from the use of the funds, as well as the lost time value of the money; citing
Cede & Co. JRC Acquisitions Corp., No. 18648, 2004 WL 286963, at *12 (Del. Ch. Feb. 10, 2004)).
[219]. SeeDEL. CODE tit. 8, § 262(i) (2007).
[220]. SeeDEL. CODE tit. 8, § 262(j) (2007).
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[221]. See Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 714.
[222]. See e.g. Guth v. Loft, 5 A.2d 503, 510-11 (Del. 1939) (“[I]f, in such circumstances, the interests of the
corporation are betrayed, the corporation may elect to claim all of the benefits of the transaction for itself, and the
law will impress a trust in favor of the corporation upon the property, interests and profits so acquired; ... a
constructive trust is the remedial device through which precedence of self is compelled to give way to the stern
demands of loyalty.”); see also Eric G. Orlinsky, Corporate Opportunity Doctrine and Interested Director
Transactions: A Framework for Analysis in an Attempt to Restore Predictability, 24 DEL. J. CORP. L. 451, 524-25
(1999).
[223]. SeeOberly v. Kirby, 592 A.2d 445, 463 (Del. 1991) (“It is an act of disloyalty for a fiduciary to profit
personally from the use of information secured in a confidential relationship, even if such profit or advantage is not
gained at the expense of the fiduciary. The result is nonetheless one of unjust enrichment which will not be
countenanced by a Court of Equity.”); see alsoBrophy v. Cities Service Co., 70 A.2d 5, 7-8 (Del. Ch. 1949).
[224]. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 714 (“... a plaintiff's monetary remedy ordinarily should be confined to the more
liberalized appraisal proceeding herein established, we do not intend any limitation on the historic powers of the
Chancellor to grant such relief as the facts of a particular case may dictate.”).
[225]. See, e.g., Fleigler v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218, 221 (Del. 1976) (requiring controller/director to establish that
sale of assets to corporation was beneficial to the minority/corporation, in order to meet the fair price criteria of the
Entire Fairness standard).
[226]. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 709 n.7.
[227]. Id. at 711.
[228]. In the terminology employed by Professors Gordon and Gilson, the fair price element of the Entire Fairness
standard ensures the minority a price that reflects the outcome of bargaining in a bilateral monopoly, where a deal
doesn't happen unless the welfare of each party is improved. Gilson & Gordon, supra note 5, at 804.
[229]. SeeDEL. CODE tit. 8, § 262(h) (2007), amended by 76 Del. Laws ch. 145, § 14 (2007).
[230]. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 713. To emphasize the narrowness of this exclusion the opinion provides: “We take
this to be a very narrow exception to the appraisal [valuation] process, designed to eliminate the use of pro forma
data and projections of a speculative variety relating to the completion of a merger.” Id. Again, as Professors
Hamermesh and Wachter have illuminated in their discussion of “fair value” valuation, going concern value in an
appraisal should not allocate any synergy-specific gains from the merger to the minority. Hamermesh & Wachter,
supra note 166, at 148-50.
[231]. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 713.
[232]. Gilson & Gordon, supra note 5, at 785 (arguing that an equivalent degree of rigor should apply in the
fiduciary standards that shape controllers' receipt of private benefits in operating decisions, sales of control and
freezeouts).
[233]. The reforms proposed to cash-out mergers are analyzed in Part IV, infra.
[234]. Pure, 808 A.2d at 445. The accommodation proposed in Pure, as supplemented by Cox, essentially mirrors
the approach proposed by Subramanian, Fixing Freezeouts, supra note 5, at 8 (“Translating the arms-length standard
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to the freezeout arena requires, first, meaningful approval by [a special committee] of independent directors; and
second, approval by a majority of the minority shareholders. When both of these procedural protections are
provided, this Article proposes that courts should apply deferential business judgment review to assess the
transaction.”). See also Gilson & Gordon, supra note 5, at 786, 838-39.
[235]. Pure, 808 A.2d at 445;Cox, 879 A.2d at 606.
[236]. Pure, 808 A.2d at 445;Cox, 879 A.2d at 606.
[237]. Pure, 808 A.2d at 445;Cox, 879 A.2d at 606.
[238]. See Cox, 879 A.2d at 623.
[239]. Solomon, 672 A.2d at 36-37.
[240]. Id. at 38-39.
[241]. Id. at 39.
[242]. Id. at 37. Given the factual circumstances noted in the opinion, it is likely that the bank's tender offer was
intended to push its ownership over the 90% threshold, so that it would be able to obtain a higher price in the sale of
Pathe's stock by conveying to a third party the right to execute a short-form merger-but that, like other important
features of the case, is not discussed in the Delaware Supreme Court's opinion.
[243]. Id. at 39.
[244]. Id. at 39. Earlier in the opinion the complaint is described as alleging a breach of loyalty against the
controller, based on the “coercive” tender offer price. Id. at 37.
[245]. Id. at 39. For a discussion of the standards relevant to dismissal of a shareholder complaint in a class action
against a controller, see Rabkin v. Philip A. Hunt Chem. Corp., 498 A.2d 1099, 1104 (Del. 1985) (in order to sustain
a motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim, the court must conclude, with reasonable certainty, that
the plaintiff cannot prevail and would not be entitled to the relief sought under any set of facts that could be proven
to support the claims).
[246]. Solomon, 672 A.2d at 39.
[247]. See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 877 (Del. 1985) (“Here, the issue is whether the directors
informed themselves as to all the information that was reasonably available to them.”).
[248]. Solomon, 672 A.2d at 39.
[249]. See infra notes 314-32 and accompanying text.
[250]. Solomon, 672 A.2d at 39.
[251]. For court of chancery opinions addressing the fair price issue, see In re Ocean Drilling & Exploration
Company S'holders Litig., Civ. A. No. 11898, 1991 WL 70028, at *3 (Del. Ch. Apr. 30, 1991) (concluding that “as a
general principle our law holds that a controlling shareholder extending an offer for minority-held shares in the
controlled corporation is under no obligation, absent evidence that material information about the offer has been
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withheld or misrepresented or that the offer is coercive in some significant way, to offer any particular price for the
minority-held stock”); Joseph v. Shell Oil Co., 482 A.2d 335, 341 (Del. Ch. 1984) (holding that in the absence of
fraud minorities are generally allowed to decide for themselves whether to tender to a controller). An earlier
Delaware Supreme Court decision, Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp., 383 A.2d 278, 279 (Del. 1978), ruled on the
adequacy of a controller's disclosures in a tender offer but did not address whether a fair price duty applied in the
transaction.
[252]. 672 A.2d at 39 (citing Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp. 351 A.2d 570, 576 (Del. Ch. 1976), rev'd on other
grounds, 383 A.2d 278 (Del. 1977); Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 703 (Del. 1983)).
[253]. Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp., 351 A.2d 570 (Del. Ch. 1976), rev'd, 383 A.2d 278 (Del. 1977). The decision
to which the Solomon court refers is the earlier Delaware Court of Chancery case. Solomon, 672 A.2d at 39. The
precise language in Vickers Energy which the Solomon court relies upon is as follows:
There is no provision in the Delaware Corporation Law and it would not be appropriate under equitable
principles, in my opinion, to bind an offeror in a situation such as the one at bar to an implied commitment to
pay an additional consideration for tendered shares in an amount made up of the difference between the price
offered and what might ultimately be found to be the intrinsic value of the shares in question.
Vickers Energy, 351 A.2d at 576 (cited in Solomon, 672 A.2d at 39). The additional consideration was precisely the
award made by the Delaware Supreme Court in the second appeal once the plaintiffs had proven lack of candor on
the controller's part. SeeLynch v. Vickers Energy Corp., 429 A.2d 497, 503 (Del. 1981).
[254]. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 711.
[255]. Id.; Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp., 383 A.2d 278, 281 (Del. 1977) (holding controllers to a standard of
“complete candor” rather than mere adequacy in their tender offer disclosures, in light of their opportunity to exploit
‘special knowledge’ they gained as insiders, to the offerees' detriment).
[256]. See Solomon, 672 A.2d at 39.
[257]. Id.
[258]. Id. (citing Eisenberg v. Chicago Milwaukee Corp., 537 A.2d 1051, 1056 (Del. Ch. 1987) (providing a rare
treatment of the features which would constitute coercion in this setting)). For further discussion of the Delaware
case law on inequitable coercion, see, e.g., Dennis J. Block and Jonathan M. Hoff, The Doctrine of Inequitable
Coercion under Delaware Law, 221 N.Y.L.J. 5 (Apr. 22, 1999).
[259]. Pure, 808 A.2d at 445-46.
[260]. Solomon, 672 A.2d 39-40.
[261]. See In reUnocal Exploration Corp. S'holders Litig., 793 A.2d 329, 338 n.26 (Del. Ch. 2000), aff'd sub nom.,
Glassman v. Unocal Exploration Corp., 777 A.2d 242 (Del. 2001).
[262]. Schnell v. Chris Craft Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437, 439 (Del. 1971) (“Inequitable conduct does not become
permissible simply because it is legally possible.”).
[263]. See, e.g., Blasius v. Atlas Indus. Inc., 564 A.2d 651 (Del. Ch. 1988) (actions by board after consent
solicitation had begun, designed for purpose of thwarting a shareholder vote, held to violate fiduciary duties despite
their conformity with statutory provisions, consistent with Schnell).
[264]. DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 253 (2007).
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[265]. Lynch, 638 A.2d at 1118 (“Once again, this Court holds that the exclusive standard of judicial review in
examining the propriety of an interested cash-out merger transaction by a controlling or dominating shareholder is
entire fairness.”). The Lynch decision nowhere expressly discussed short-form mergers, however.
[266]. Stauffer v. Standard Brands Inc., 187 A.2d 78 (Del. 1962), overruled in part byRoland Intern. Corp. v. Najjar,
407 A.2d 1032 (Del. 1979).
[267]. Id. at 80.
[268]. Glassman v. Unocal Exploration Corp., 777 A.2d 242, 247-48 (Del. 2001).
[269]. Glassman, 777 A.2d at 247-48 (“The equitable claim plainly conflicts with the statute. If a corporate fiduciary
follows the truncated process authorized by § 253, it will not be able to establish the fair dealing prong of entire
fairness. If, instead, the corporate fiduciary sets up negotiating committees, hired independent financial and legal
experts, etc., then it will have lost the very benefit provided by the statute.”).
[270]. Id. at 248.
[271]. Id.
[272]. DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 253 (2007).
[273]. Glassman, 777 A.2d at 247-48.
[274]. For a discussion of the residual ambiguity in the opinion, see Marc I. Steinberg, Short-Form Mergers in
Delaware, 27 DEL. J. CORP. L. 489 (2002).
[275]. See In re Unocal, 793 A.2d at 338 n.26.
[276]. But see In re Life Tech., Inc. S'holders Litig., No. C.A. 16513, 1998 WL 1812280 (Del Ch. Nov. 24, 1998).
The case is noted and discussed in Letsou & Haas, supra note 113, at 45.
[277]. In fact, the controller remained somewhat indecisive about its intention to complete the short-form merger.
The effect of that, however, was to make the target stockholders' decision to refuse to tender more perilous, because
appraisal rights would not be triggered without a short-form merger. In re Siliconix, Inc. S'holders Litig., C.A. No.
18700, 2001 WL 716787, at *2 (Del. Ch. June 19, 2001).
[278]. Id. at *15 (“I now turn to the instances alleged by Fitzgerald to constitute actionable coercion.”). Prior to
Siliconix, the most telling case on the question of what “pressure” from controllers constituted “coercion” in equity
was Eisenberg v. Chicago Milwaukee Corp., 537 A.2d 1051, 1056 (Del. Ch. 1987).
[279]. Siliconix, 2001 WL 716787, at *2, *4-5. Siliconix's stock price and product performance were showing signs
of a rebound at the time of the buyout offer; however, the stock's price had advanced only slightly from its recent
historic low.
[280]. Id. at *1.
[281]. Id. at *2.
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[282]. Id.
[283]. Id.
[284]. Id. at *16 (finding that this declaration, too, was not coercive).
[285]. Id. at *12.
[286]. Id.
[287]. For the discussion of the fiduciary disclosure requirement, see id. at *9-14.
[288]. Id. at *2.
[289]. Id.
[290]. Id.
[291]. Id.
[292]. Id.
[293]. Id.
[294]. Id.
[295]. Id. at *2 n.4.
[296]. Id. at *3.
[297]. Id. at *3 & n.7 (the court called attention to the $1.75 million fee to be paid to Lehman, the special
committee's advisers, upon the closing of the transaction).
[298]. Id. at *3.
[299]. Id. at *6 (“However, this Court will intervene to protect the rights of the shareholders to make a voluntary
choice.”). Compare Solomon, 672 A.2d at 39 (“In the case of totally voluntary tender offers, as here, courts do not
impose any right of the shareholders to receive a particular price.” (citations omitted)), with Siliconix, 2001 WL
716787, at *15 (“A tender offer is coercive if the tendering shareholders are ‘wrongfully induced by some act of the
defendant to sell their shares for reasons unrelated to the economic merit of the sale.’ The wrongful acts must
‘influence in some material way’ the shareholder's decision to tender. I now turn to the instances alleged by
Fitzgerald to constitute actionable coercion.” (citations omitted)).
[300]. Siliconix, 2001 WL 716787, at *12.
[301]. Id. at *5 (“... [The Schedule 14D-9] reported that the Special Committee has determined to remain neutral and
make no recommendation with respect to the tender offer. The special committee never requested Lehman to
prepare a fairness opinion as to the exchange offer.”).
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[302]. Id.
[303]. Id. at *2. The controller set its opening cash bid at a 10% cash premium over the market trading price of
Siliconix stock-a relatively low premium which was, moreover, twenty percent below the average trading price of
the stock in the six months prior to the bid. The court states that Vishay made “no effort to value Siliconix.” Id. For
facts relating to the switch to stock, see id. at *4.
[304]. Id. at *4 (“Unlike the February 22 cash tender announcement, the share exchange carried no market premium
for the Siliconix shareholder.”).
[305]. See id. at *4.
[306]. Id. at *4.
[307]. Id. at *17.
[308]. Id. at *6 (“The issue of voluntariness of the tender depends on the absence of improper coercion and the
absence of disclosure violations.... Accordingly, Vishay was under no duty to offer any particular price, or a ‘fair’
price to the minority shareholders of Siliconix unless actual coercion or disclosure violations are shown by
Fitzgerald.” (emphasis added)).
[309]. See, e.g., id. at *2 n.4 (“It is not disputed that all Siliconix directors, because of their deep involvement with
Vishay suffered serious conflicts of interest (except for those directors Segall and Talbert, about whose
independence there is debate).”).
[310]. Id. at *7 (“[i]t may seem strange that the scrutiny given to tender offer transactions is less than the scrutiny
given to, for example, a merger....”).
[311]. See Vickers Energy, 383 A.2d at 279;Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 11 (Del. 1998). For an analysis of the
evolution of Delaware's fiduciary disclosure doctrine, see Hamermesh, Calling Off the Lynch Mob, supra note 99.
For further commentary, see Kahn, Transparency and Accountability, supra note 66; Jennifer O'Hare, Director
Communications and the Uneasy Relationship Between the Fiduciary Duty of Disclosure and the Anti-Fraud
Provisions of the Federal Securities Laws, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 475 (2002).
[312]. Siliconix, 2001 WL 716787, at *14 (“In conclusion, I have not found that, on this preliminary record,
Fitzgerald had made the necessary showing to establish any disclosure violation.”); id. at *9 (“In the context of a
preliminary injunction proceeding regarding a tender offer, the issue becomes whether there is a reasonable
probability that a material omission or misstatement has been made ‘that would make a reasonable shareholder more
likely to tender his shares.”’ (Citations omitted.)).
[313]. Id. at *12.
[314]. Id. at *7 (“Indeed, the board of the tender target is not asking its shareholders to approve any corporate action
by the tender target. That, however, does not mean that the board of the company to be acquired in a tender has no
duties to the shareholders.”).
[315]. Id. at *1.
[316]. Id. at *2-3, *5.
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[317]. Id. at *8-9.
[318]. Id. at *6.
[319]. Id. at *6.
[320]. Id. at *7-8.
[321]. Siliconix, 2001 WL 716787, at *8 (distinguishing the Delaware Supreme Court's expansive view of directors'
duties in McMullin on the basis that those duties “were statutory duties imposed by 8 Del. C. § 251”). SeeMcMullin
v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910 (Del. 2000).
[322]. See, e.g., Pure, 808 A.2d at 434.
[323]. Siliconix, 2001 WL 716787, at *7 (“... the target company in the tender context does not confront a
comparable corporate decision [to a merger].”).
[324]. See supra note 158.
[325]. Siliconix, 2001 WL 716787, at *8 (citing McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910 (Del. 2000)).
[326]. McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910, 920 (Del. 2000) (motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim reversed and
remanded).
[327]. Siliconix, 2001 WL 716787, at * 8.
[328]. Id.
[329]. McMullin, 765 A2d. at 921.
[330]. This same principle is enunciated earlier in Smith v. Van Gorkom, in relation to directors' duties in a sale by
merger to a third party. SeeSmith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
[331]. 2001 WL 716787, at *7 (“Indeed, the board of the tender target is not asking its shareholders to approve any
corporate action by the tender target. That, however, does not mean that the board of the company to be acquired in
a tender has no duties to the shareholders.”).
[332]. Id. at *8. In Siliconix, the court expressed the view that it would have to endorse “a new approach to assessing
the conduct of directors of a tender target” if it were to rule in plaintiffs' favor. The court said that it would have to
overrule cases such as Solomon to validate an active defensive role for target directors. Id.
[333]. Pure, 808 A.2d at 446-332.
[334]. See supra text accompanying notes 276-332.
[335]. In reAquila, Inc. S'holders Litig., 805 A.2d 184, 190-91 (Del. Ch. 2002).
[336]. See infra notes 350-84 and accompanying text.
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[337]. Pure, 808 A.2d at 450.
[338]. Id. at 430.
[339]. Id. at 424-25.
[340]. Id. at 425.
[341]. See id. at 449-51.
[342]. Id. at 446.
[343]. 808 A.2d at 452 (“... an injunction can be issued that can be lifted in short order if Unocal and the Pure board
respond to the concerns addressed in this opinion.”).
[344]. Id.
[345]. On October 30, 2002 (one month after the court of chancery's decision in Pure) Unocal closed its short-form
merger finalizing its acquisition of Pure. The exchange offer had closed the previous night at midnight. See Unocal
Press Release archives, Unocal completes acquisition of Pure Resources (Oct. 30, 2003), available at http://
www.chevron.com/news/archive/unocal_press/release.aspx?id=2002-10-30a.
[346]. Pure, 808 A.2d at 425-26.
[347]. Id.
[348]. Id. at 426-27.
[349]. Id. at 426-28.
[350]. Id. at 427.
[351]. Id.
[352]. Id. at 428-29.
[353]. Id. at 427.
[354]. Id.
[355]. Id. at 426.
[356]. Id.
[357]. Id. at 428.
[358]. See id. at 425-26. On the indeterminate effect of a conflicted board's approval of a merger agreement, see
Krasner v. Moffett, 826 A.2d 277, 285 (Del. 2003) (noting the dilemma posed by statute's prohibition on assent to a
merger by a committee where nearly the entire board was affected by material conflicts of interest in a merger).
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[359]. See supra Part II, D.
[360]. For the conditions Unocal agreed to abide by in its offer, see Pure, 808 A.2d at 430. By the time of its opinion
in Pure, the court of chancery was able to refer to a “line of cases” under which a controller's observance of certain
terms would demonstrate that the freezeout tender offer was noncoercive. Id. at 438.
[361]. Id. at 429, 431.
[362]. Id.
[363]. Id. at 426.
[364]. For the denial of the waiver, see id. at 432 n.9; for previous grants of the waiver, see id. at 427 (“Unocal
granted these waivers in each case.”).
[365]. Id. at 429 (noting that Unocal affiliated directors “Maxwell and Laughbaum did not recuse themselves
generally from the Pure board's process of reacting to the Offer”).
[366]. Id. at 430-31.
[367]. See id.
[368]. Id.
[369]. This becomes evident principally in relation to the court's discussion of the disclosure deficiencies relating to
the Schedule 14D-9, id. at 450-51.
[370]. Id. at 431.
[371]. Id.
[372]. Pure, 808 A.2d at 432 (“... on September 17, 2002 the Special Committee voted not to recommend the Offer,
based on its analysis and the advice of its financial advisors”).
[373]. Id. at 438-39.
[374]. Id. at 430.
[375]. Id. at 446-47.
[376]. Id. at 430.
[377]. It is not clear how withdrawal rights would or would not protect minorities in this case. For the regulation
affording minorities withdrawal rights in tender offers, see supra note 147 and accompanying text.
[378]. Pure, 808 A.2d at 430, 432.
[379]. Id. at 432.
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[380]. See infra Part III, C.
[381]. Pure, 808 A.2d at 429 (“... we are not interested in selling our shares in Pure”).
[382]. Id. at 450.
[383]. Id. The court requires amendments to these disclosures, but they may have influenced the course of the
transaction nevertheless.
[384]. Id. at 432.
[385]. Id. at 430.
[386]. Id. at 429.
[387]. Id. at 445.
[388]. Id. at 444 (“To the extent that my decision to adhere to Solomon causes some discordance between the
treatment of similar transactions to persist, that lack of harmony is better addressed in the Lynch line, by affording
greater liability-immunizing effect to protective devices such as majority of the minority approval conditions and
special committee negotiation and approval.”). For discussion of Cox's broad based plan to overhaul freezeout
doctrine, see infra Part IV.
[389]. See, e.g., Subramanian, Fixing Freezeouts, supra note 5, at 8 (concluding that where a special committee and
majority of the minority shares have ratified a freezeout, deferential review rather than the Entire Fairness standard
is warranted); Letsou & Haas, supra note 113, at 29 (adopting analogous approach though with greater emphasis on
the controller's disclosure duties).
[390]. See, e.g., Gilson & Gordon, supra note 5, at 838.
[391]. Pure, 808 A.2d at 444 (“... the preferable policy choice is to continue to adhere to the more flexible and less
constraining Solomon approach ...”).
[392]. Id.
[393]. Id. at 445. Apart from these equitable requirements, controllers have extensive disclosure obligations,
consistent with established fiduciary requirements and federal securities' law mandates, of course. These are
addressed in a separate portion of the Pure opinion. Id. at 447-52.
[394]. Id. at 437-39.
[395]. Id. at 435-37.
[396]. Id. at 439-41.
[397]. See, e.g., Gilson & Gordon, supra note 5, at 826 (“Properly understood, the Pure resolution is an important,
yet still incomplete, step toward restoring a desirable coherence in this area.”).
[398]. See, e.g., Gilson & Gordon, supra note 5, at 817 (critique of the improper loosening of standards effectuated
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by Siliconix and Aquila for tender offer freezeouts).
[399]. Pure, 808 A.2d at 437-39.
[400]. In re Siliconix Inc. S'holders Litig., No. 18700, 2001 WL 716787, at *8 (Del. Ch. June 19, 2001) (citing as a
rationale for its holding the belief that an alternative finding would have required it to “overrule” Solomon).
[401]. In reAquila, Inc., 805 A.2d 184, 190 (Del. Ch. 2002).
[402]. See supra Part III, A.1 and 2.
[403]. Pure, 808 A.2d at 438 (“The inherent coercion that Lynch found to exists when controlling stockholders seek
to acquire the minority's stake is not even a cognizable concern for the common law of corporations if the tender
offer method is employed.”).
[404]. Id. at 441 (“The problem is that nothing in the tender offer method of corporate acquisition makes the 800pound gorilla's retributive capabilities less daunting to minority stockholders. Indeed, many commentators would
argue that the tender offer form is more coercive than a merger vote.”)
[405]. There reforms address informational, organizational and timing issues, but not inherent coercion. Pure, 808
A.2d at 445.
[406]. Id.
[407]. Solomon, 672 A.2d at 39.
[408]. See Pure, 808 A.2d at 441.
[409]. See infra Part III, C.
[410]. Pure, 808 A.2d at 441-42.
[411]. Id. at 443 (“The [Solomon] approach also minimizes the potential for the minority to get the best price, by
arguably giving them only enough protection to keep them from being structurally coerced into accepting grossly
insufficient bids but not necessarily merely inadequate ones.”). See also id. at 444 (“The preferable policy choice is
to continue to adhere to the more flexible and less constraining Solomon approach...”); id. at 437 (“The policy
balance struck in Lynchcontinues to govern negotiated mergers between controlling stockholders and subsidiaries.”)
[412]. Id. at 443. Pure expressly owns this “policy” basis for its reforms at certain points, for example in its
observation that the two lines of freezeout doctrine reflect “a difference in policy emphasis that is far greater than
can be explained by the technical differences between tender offers and negotiated mergers ....” Id.
[413]. Id. at 434 (stating that judges inevitably make normative choices in conditions of imperfect information).
[414]. See id.
[415]. Id. at 443-44.
[416]. Id. at 435-36, 441-44.

Page 111

[417]. Id. at 442.
[418]. Id. at 442-44.
[419]. Id. at 444-45.
[420]. 493 A.2d 946, 949 (Del. 1985).
[421]. 500 A.2d 1346, 1355 (Del. 1985).
[422]. See Pure, 808 A.2d at 439. For further discussion of this issue, see Gilson & Gordon, supra note 5, at 820-22.
[423]. Pure, 808 A.2d at 446.
[424]. Id. at 430-31.
[425]. SeeDEL. CODE tit. 8, § 141(c)(2) (2007).
[426]. See supra note 89 and accompanying text; Freedman v. Restaurant Assocs. Indus., Inc., Civ. A. No. 9212,
1990 WL 135923, at *6 (Del. Ch. Sept. 21, 1990).
[427]. See Freedman, 1990 WL 135923, at *6-7.
[428]. Pure, 808 A.2d at 431.
[429]. Id. at 446.
[430]. Id. See, e.g., Moran, 500 A.2d at 1355.
[431]. Pure, 808 A.2d at 445.
[432]. Id.
[433]. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 709.
[434]. See Gilson & Gordon, supra note 5, at 838.
[435]. 808 A.2d at 445.
[436]. Lynch, 638 A.2d at 1113. In Lynch the committee's choices were further constrained by the controller's power
to block third party offers that received approval by less than 80% of the voting shares. The subsidiary's law firm
had proposed and explored adoption of a poison pill or the search for a “white knight” bidder but found both
“unfeasible” in light of the controller's blocking power. See id. at 1113 n.3.
[437]. Pure, 808 A.2d at 445.
[438]. Id.
[439]. It is important to note that neither the recent cases nor this Article propose new requirement for controllers to
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proceed in freezeouts. What is at stake is the standard of review.
[440]. SeeDEL. CODE tit. 8, § 251(c) (2007), amended by 76 Del. Laws ch. 145 §§ 4-5 (2007).
[441]. In re Emerging Commc'ns, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 70, at *114-15 (“Nor should a tender offer be treated as the
equivalent of an informed vote.”).
[442]. Pure, 808 A.2d at 442-43.
[443]. See supra note 146.
[444]. On the phenomenon of “salience,” as it may affect investor psychology, see, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, What's
Available? Social Influences and Behavioral Economics, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1295 (2003) (analyzing social
influences that make certain forms of risk salient or “cognitively available” and their relevance to law).
[445]. In addition, brokers earn commissions on shareholders' decisions to tender (these are stock sales), but no
commissions are earned by brokers if minorities retain their shares.
[446]. See supra notes 204-13 and accompanying text.
[447]. 777 A.2d at 248.
[448]. DEL. CODE tit. 8 § 253 (2007).
[449]. Pure, 808 A.2d at 445.
[450]. Id.
[451]. Id. The Delaware Supreme Court declined to hear an appeal filed in the case. See Pure, 808 A.2d 421 (Del.
Ch. 2002), appeal refused, 2002 Del. LEXIS 630 (Del. Oct. 10, 2002).
[452]. In Pure itself there were mixed signals sent to the minority shareholders about the 90% minimum tender
condition. Unocal initially announced that its offer was “conditioned on the tender of a sufficient number of shares
of Pure common stock such that, after the offer is completed, we will own at least 90% of the outstanding shares of
Pure common stock....” Pure, 808 A.2d at 429. However, in describing the key terms of the Unocal offer as
presented to the special committee, the court noted the inclusion of “a waivable condition that a sufficient number of
tenders be received to enable Unocal to own 90%....” Id. at 430 (emphasis added).
[453]. See Pure, 808 A.2d at 444.
[454]. See, e.g., Rabkin v. Olin Corp., C.A. No. 7547, 1990 WL 47648, at *12 (Del. Ch. Apr. 17, 1990), aff'd, 586
A.2d 1202 (Del. 1990) (Where the controller waited until immediately after a price agreement had expired to
eliminate the minority, the court of chancery held, consistent with Lynch's Entire Fairness standard, that such precise
tactical maneuvering was incompatible with the duty of fair dealings.).
[455]. See, e.g., Emerging Commc'ns, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 70, at *111 (ruling that tender offer freezeout was a
self-dealing transaction because the controller was at both sides, so that Entire Fairness was the proper standard of
review). The self-dealing nature of the transaction would be mitigated if there were truly a majority of independent
directors, i.e. if there was only a de facto controller. But then Revlon duties would apply. See infra note 501 and
accompanying text.
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[456]. See, e.g., Weinberger, 457 A.2d. at 703 (“But in all this, the burden clearly remains on those relying on the
vote to show that they completely disclosed all material facts relevant to the transaction.”).
[457]. 383 A.2d at 280 (“The court's duty was to examine what information defendants had and to measure it against
what they gave to the minority stockholders, in a context in which “complete candor” is required.”).
[458]. Cox, 879 A.2d at 607 (“That is, in the context of going-private transactions implemented by tender offers by
controlling stockholders-so called Siliconix transactions-the protections of Pure Resources should be supplemented
by subjecting the controlling stockholder to the entire fairness standard if a special committee recommended that the
minority not tender.” (citations omitted)); compare id. at 645 (“In the case of a tender offer by a controlling
stockholder, the controlling stockholder could be relieved of the burden of proving entire fairness if: 1) the tender
offer was recommended by an independent special committee; 2) the tender offer was structurally non-coercive in
the manner articulated by Pure Resources; and 3) there was disclosure of all material facts.”).
[459]. Pure, 808 A.2d at 445.
[460]. See Cox, 879 A.2d at 607.
[461]. Pure, 808 A.2d at 426, 429.
[462]. Id. at 431.
[463]. Id. at 445.
[464]. Id. at 446.
[465]. Id. at 432.
[466]. Id. at 445.
[467]. Cox, 879 A.2d at 607, 645.
[468]. Id.
[469]. Whether read as an approval requirement or a requirement of nondisapproval, it is clear that Cox is proposing
that a special committee's disapproval would trigger the Entire Fairness standard for the tender offer freezeout. Id. at
607 (the “nondisapproval” requirement) and 645 (the approval requirement).
[470]. Id.
[471]. At times Cox describes the special committee's role in negotiating the freezeout, in addition to approving of it,
as a condition to deferential review. Id. at 643-44. However, as part of this negotiating power Cox nowhere proposes
that the special committee be allowed defensive authority to block the bid while it considers alternatives. In the
absence of such plenary defensive power and the attendant capacity to consider alternative proposals, it is difficult to
make sense of what genuine negotiating authority means.
[472]. Id. at 607, 645 (this is evident from Cox's failure to address a committee's defensive authority or even
negotiating role in a tender offer freezeout).
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[473]. Id. at 607 (the “nondisapproval” requirement) and 645 (the approval requirement).
[474]. Id. at 607.
[475]. Id. at 645.
[476]. This is illustrated by the conduct of the committees in Siliconix and Aquila. See Siliconix, 2001 WL 716787,
at *5;Aquila, 805 A.2d at 191.
[477]. See17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-101 (2007).
[478]. Pure, 808 A.2d at 445;Cox, 879 at 607 and 645.
[479]. Pure, 808 A.2d at 446;Cox, 879 at 607 and 645.
[480]. Solomon, 672 A.2d at 39.
[481]. For discussion of Cox's emphasis on reducing litigation in freezeouts and unifying freezeout doctrine, see
infra Part IV, B and D.
[482]. Pure, 808 A.2d at 445 (“The potential for coercion and unfairness posed by controlling stockholders who
seek to acquire the balance of the company's shares by acquisition requires some equitable reinforcement, in order to
give proper effect to the concerns undergirding Lynch.”).
[483]. Cox, 879 A.2d at 646 (“The jarring doctrinal inconsistency between the equitable principles of fiduciary duty
that apply to Lynch and Siliconix deals has been noted by this court before in Pure Resources and Cysive.”).
[484]. Id. (“It was thought preferable in Pure Resources to keep the strands of the doctrine separate until there is an
alteration of Lynch, lest the less than confidence inspiring pattern of “Lynch litigation” replicate itself across-theboard in all going private transactions, thereby deterring the procession of offers that provide valuable liquidity to
minority stockholders and efficiency for the economy in general.”).
[485]. In reCysive, Inc. S'holders Litig., 836 A.2d 531 (Del. Ch. 2003).
[486]. Cox, 879 A.2d 604.
[487]. Cysive, 836 A.2d at 534.
[488]. Id. at 535.
[489]. It had intended to switch from being fundamentally a services provider to a technology product developer, but
its timing was unfortunate. Id. at 533-36.
[490]. Id. at 538.
[491]. Id. at 533-34.
[492]. Id. at 540.
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[493]. Id. at 534, 541-44.
[494]. Id. at 542. Because of the company's problems, the stock price plummeted. As stated therein: “When the
market's infatuation with technology stocks ended, Cysive's formerly lofty stock price dropped precipitously. From
its NASDAQ trading high of $63 per share in March 2000, Cysive's stock price dropped drastically, eventually
reaching a low of $1.93 per share in August 2001.” Id. at 536-37.
[495]. Id. at 557.
[496]. Id. at 546-47.
[497]. Id. at 546.
[498]. Id. at 547.
[499]. Id. at 551-52 (“Carbonell holds a large enough block of stock to be the dominant force in any contested
Cysive election.”). For another example of a case in which it was questionable whether a shareholder was a
controller, see In re Western Nat'l Corp. S'holders Litig., No. 15927, 2000 WL 710192 (Del. Ch. May 22, 2000)
(finding, under the Lynch doctrine, that a 46% shareholder was not a controller based on the factual circumstances).
[500]. See, e.g., Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1987).
[501]. Cysive, 836 A.2d at 552-53. As defined in the introduction, Carbonell was a de facto controller. For this
reason, as the court in Cysive recognized, the sale of the company represented a change of control and implicated
Revlon duties. See id. at 557 n.40 (“Whether Revlon duties pertain in a cash deal involving a controlling stockholder
is an interesting question the answer to which has little practical effect. Because entire fairness is the most exacting
form of review, and because the Snowbird Agreement passes muster under that test, it is difficult to see how the
intermediate Revlon standard could be violated.”). Nevertheless, if the Cox Reforms allow Dual Ratification to
trigger deferential review, at least where there is a de facto controller, the freezeout will involve a change of controlhence Revlon duties would apply and the target directors would be required to take action consistent with obtaining
the best price available for the shareholders. Hence, the Cox Reforms, and the commentary that endorses business
judgment deference upon Dual Ratification, have failed to grapple with the relevance of Revlon duties in freezeouts
by de facto controllers. See Cox, 879 A.2d at 606; Allen, Jacobs, & Strine, supra note 17, at 1317; Gilson & Gordon,
supra note 5, at 786, 838-39.
[502]. Cysive, 836 A.2d at 549 (“These realities suggest that the Lynch doctrine if it is to be perpetuated could be
usefully simplified.”).
[503]. Id. at 549-50.
[504]. Id. at 550. The court further contends that even the determination over whether a controller is present has
consumed “disproportionate energy” and generally cannot be resolved on the pleadings. Id. at 550-51.
[505]. Id. at 547.
[506]. Id. at 547-49.
[507]. Id. at 549.
[508]. See, e.g., Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 44 UCLA L.
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REV. 1009 (1997) (arguing that Delaware fiduciary law operates through normatively saturated, factually intensive
narratives that provide guidance to corporate actors about proper and improper conduct in complex transactions).
[509]. Allen, Jacobs & Strine, supra note 17, at 1292 (“Moreover, new standards of review proliferated when a
smaller number of functionally-thought-out standards would have provided a more coherent analytical
framework.”).
[510]. Id. at 1317 (“In contrast to current practice, however, we would apply the business judgment review standard
to self-interested mergers, in cases where the merger: (1) was expressly conditioned on an informed and uncoerced
majority of the minority vote; or (ii) was approved as fair by an effective and uncoerced special committee of
independent directors.”); id. (“We would also rid the corporate law of the ‘waste’ exception to the ratification effect
currently accorded to informed, uncoerced stockholder votes.”); id. at 1321 (“These modest incremental changes
should better position the Delaware corporation law to tackle the new doctrinal challenges that will undoubtedly
emerge during this new century.”) (emphasis added).
[511]. See, e.g., E. Norman Veasey & Christine T. Di Gugliemo, What Happened in Delaware Corporate Law and
Governance from 1992-2004?, A Retrospective on Some Key Developments, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1399, 1486 (2005)
( “Having two applicable standards of review available, rather than applying entire fairness review to all transactions
involving controlling stockholders, leaves room for the fact-specific, contextual inquiries at which the Delaware
courts are adept.”).
[512]. See supra note 126. For further analysis and citation to the case law under section DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 144,
see Cox, 879 A.2d at 614-15.
[513]. See, e.g., Cox, 879 A.2d at 609 (“... any amended complaint the plaintiffs might file against an ultimate
merger agreement could not be dismissed, per the teachings of Kahn v. Lynch Communication Systems, Inc., if the
plaintiffs could plausibly allege unfairness.”).
[514]. Id.
[515]. Cysive, 836 A.2d at 547-48.
[516]. See id. at 549.
[517]. See infra Part IV, C, 2.
[518]. Cysive, 836 A.2d at 547. The court suggests that controllers are so intent on avoiding the costly, duplicative
presentation of evidence as part of the proceedings that they prefer to endure full trials in situations where the
allocation of the burdens of proof and the relevant standard of review are not resolved prior to trial-that is, in a state
of nearly intolerable uncertainty. Id. at 549.
[519]. Id. at 547 (“Although the trial in this matter has already been held, a major aspect of the parties' post-trial
briefs focuses on the standard of review I am to apply to decide the case.”).
[520]. Id. at 534 (“Because the pendency of this suit was hampering Carbonell's financing efforts, the defendants
sought an expedited trial. That request was granted...”).
[521]. Id. at 547-49.
[522]. Id. at 534.

Page 117

[523]. Id. at 549 (“Thus, because of the factually intensive nature of the burden-shifting inquiry and the modest
benefit obtained by the defendants from the shift, it is unsurprising that few defendants have sought a pre-trial
hearing to determine who bears the burden of persuasion on fairness.”).
[524]. Id. at 548.
[525]. Id. at 549-50.
[526]. Id. at 549 (“These realities suggest that the Lynch doctrine, if it is to be perpetuated, could be usefully
simplified. When the Lynch doctrine governs, it would be simpler to take one of two approaches. If it is thought that
giving the plaintiff the opportunity to litigate a case under a favorable fairness standard is sufficient... then the
burden of proving unfairness could be placed on, and remain with, the plaintiff from the beginning.”).
[527]. Id. at 550.
[528]. Id. at 548.
[529]. Id.
[530]. For a discussion of “framing effects,” see Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and
the Psychology of Choice, 211 SCI. 453 (1981) (explaining framing effects and their significance to rational choice
theory).
[531]. See, e.g., Tamar Frankel, Presumptions and Burdens of Proof as Tools for Legal Stability and Change, 17
HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 759, 765 (1994) (“If plaintiff-shareholders fail to prove that the board's decision was
flawed by lack of care or tainted with conflicts of interest, their actions will be unsuccessful. If plaintiffs prove either
flaw, the burden of proof then shifts to the defendants. At this point the gate opens up, allowing judicial scrutiny of
the merits of the decision.”).
[532]. Id.
[533]. For a discussion in the academic literature, see, e.g., STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, MERGERS AND
ACQUISITIONS 211 (2003) (“As is often the case, the party bearing the burden of proof on a given dispute lost.”);
Frankel, supra note 531.
[534]. For the court's treatment of the burden of proof issue in a tender offer freezeout, see Emerging Commc'ns,
2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 70, at *111 (“Both sides agree that because the Privatization is a self-dealing transaction of
which the majority stockholder stands on both sides, entire fairness is the standard of review ab initio. The only
question is whether the burden of proof, which normally falls on the defendants, has shifted to the plaintiffs in this
particular case.” (citations omitted)).
[535]. See, e.g., Cox, 879 A.2d at 618 (“Initially it cannot be ignored that Lynch created a strong incentive for the
use of special negotiating committees in addressing mergers with controlling stockholders. This is a very useful
incentive.”).
[536]. For a recent application of the principle that informed ratification by disinterested directors or stockholders
shifts the burden of proof to plaintiffs and makes the business judgment rule applicable, see, e.g., Orman v. Cullman,
No. Civ. A. 18039, 2004 WL 2348395 (Del. Ch. Oct. 20, 2004) (finding that stockholder ratification of the merger,
notwithstanding the presence of conflicted directors, shifts the burden to plaintiffs, resolving claims in controller's
favor). In Orman, because the court did not interpret the sale as a freezeout, it allowed the business judgment rule to
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apply.
[537]. See, e.g., Cahall v. Lofland, 114 A. 224 (Del. Ch. 1921), aff'd, 118 A. 224 (Del. 1922) (discerning
circumstances in which courts should give effect to a burden shift); Fleigler v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218 (Del. 1976).
[538]. See, e.g., Gottlieb v. Heyden Chem. Corp., 91 A.2d 57 (Del. 1952). There is no basis to believe that the
allocation of the burden of proof is of less importance in self-dealing transactions involving controllers, as opposed
to other cases involving self-dealing by corporate fiduciaries.
[539]. For data indicating prevalent employment of special committees in cash-out mergers, see Subramanian,
Theory & Evidence, supra note 23, at 18-19.
[540]. See supra notes, 70-72.
[541]. Veasey & DiGugliemo, supra note 511, at 1435.
[542]. See, e.g., Cox, 879 A.2d at 606 (arguing that the directors' and minorities' consents are properly understood as
complements, not substitutes).
[543]. To bolster its argument that the disinterested, informed nature of the consent of the directors (as a condition to
burden shifting) is too complex to be resolved absent a full trial, Cysive cites to the Delaware Supreme Court's
nearly contemporaneous decision in Krasner v. Moffett, 826 A.2d 277 (Del. 2003) as authority. Cysive, 836 A.2d at
549. However, there were matters of first impression at issue in Krasner. One was the effect to be given to special
committee approval of a merger where a majority of the board had material conflicts of interest in the outcome,
because a committee cannot give valid consent to a merger in Delaware. Krasner, 826 A.2d at 286. Krasner does not
support a broad reading that the supreme court has determined that the allocation of the burden of proof is too
complex to be determined on the pleadings, i.e. without or prior to a trial. In Krasner, furthermore, the Delaware
Supreme Court affirmed that defendants have a high burden to win dismissal of a conflicted transaction. As stated
therein, it is the defendants “not the plaintiffs [who] bear the burden of proving that the [challenged, interested]
merger was approved by a committee of disinterested directors, acting independently, with real bargaining power to
negotiate the terms of the merger.” Id. at 284-85. Thus Krasner provides another example of a court allocating
importance to the burden of proof in a situation involving a controller, and construing ambiguity in favor of the
minority shareholder plaintiffs. On this point, see Kahn v. Tremont Corp., Civ. A. No. 12339, 1992 WL 205637, at
*3 (Del. Ch. Aug. 21, 1992), rev'd on other grounds, 694 A.2d 422 (Del. 1997) (finding that the independence of the
committee is a question of fact that must turn on the particular realities of the situation). But see Veasey &
DiGuglielmo, supra note 511, at 1471 (suggesting that process determination regarding efficacy of special
committees in conflicted transactions is a challenge to legitimate dismissals on the pleadings).
[544]. See SEC Rule 13e-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3 (2007). There are many self dealing cases where the Entire
Fairness standard applied where the court resolves issues pertaining to the adequacy of disclosures (as they are
relevant to the efficacy of minority shareholders' approvals) on motions to dismiss. See, e.g., Orman v. Cullman, No.
Civ. A. 18039, 2004 WL 2348395 (Del. Ch. Oct. 20, 2004). Furthermore, if the court was not satisfied that the
complaint and the disclosures appended thereto were sufficient, it could order limited discovery and then hear the
defendant's motion to dismiss. The point is, the court can control litigation agency costs.
[545]. This is evident from perusing these SEC filings, but also from the judicial analysis of controllers' disclosure in
the freezeout cases. See, e.g., Pure, 808 A.2d at 447-52.
[546]. Cysive, 836 A.2d at 536, 542.
[547]. The committee's composition and hiring of its financial advisor are described in Cysive, 836 A.2d at 541-42.
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[548]. Id. at 546 (“After the Snowbird Agreement was signed, the special committee continued to entertain inquiries
from interested buyers and to seek diligently a higher price.”).
[549]. Id. at 545 and 546.
[550]. Id. at 543.
[551]. See SEC Rule 13e-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3 (2007); Schedule 13e-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-100 (2007).
[552]. See NYSE, INC., LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 303A.02 (defining “independent director” for NYSE
listing purposes), available at http:// www.nyse.com/lcm/lcm-section.html; NASD MANUAL, Marketplace Rule
4200(a)(15) (defining “independent director” for NASDAQ listing purposes), available at
http://nasd.complinet.com/nasd/display/index.html.
[553]. Cysive is nearly a textbook example of when the courts should allow the controller business judgment
deference in litigation.
[554]. The article by Allen, Jacobs and Strine comes to mind. If one accepts that the role of law is to increase
economic efficiency defined as growth overall (a contestable assumption), and if one accepts that shareholder
litigation inhibits some number of profitable transactions (also contestable- depending on the definition of
“profitable”), then the function of Delaware doctrine is to err on the side of facilitating more deals-hence looser
standards are preferable. This is the working analytical framework of that law review article, and its relevance to
Cysive and Cox (opinions written by one of the article's co-authors) is obvious. See Allen, Jacobs & Strine, supra
note 17, at 1287-88 (describing corporate law's role in relation to economic efficiency).
[555]. See, e.g., Paramount Commc'ns, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994); Mills Acquisition Co.
v. MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261 (Del. 1989). For further discussion of the heightened fiduciary standards that
apply in other acquisition transactions, see infra Part V, D.
[556]. See, e.g., Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075 (Del. 2001) (affirming Delaware Court of Chancery's
granting of motion to dismiss where plaintiffs alleged breach of due care, loyalty, and disclosure); Harbor Fin.
Partners v. Huizenga, 751 A.2d 879 (Del. Ch. 1999) (affirming application of business judgment rule and dismissal
of disclosure claims in a shareholder challenge to a merger involving conflicted directors); Freedman v. Restaurant
Assocs. Indus., Inc., No. Civ. A. 9212, 1990 WL 135923 (Del Ch. Sept. 21, 1990) (granting in part and denying in
part defendants' motion to dismiss as part of complex management lead buyout). For a notable summary judgment
decision (in favor of defendants) resolving issues relating to the definition of who is a controller, disclosure claims,
and the potential presence of deal-stopping lock-ups, see Orman v. Cullman, No. Civ. A. 18039, 2004 WL 2348395
(Del. Ch. Oct. 20, 2004).
[557]. One would think that at this point in the evolution of the transactional choreography for freezeouts and other
M&A transactions that most buyers, and especially controllers, would avoid patent overreaching, however this does
not seem to be the true. For a case demonstrating remarkable facts in this regard, see Emerging Commc'ns, 2004
Del. Ch. LEXIS 70, at *119-33 (individual director defendants on special committee were conflicted and exhibited
shockingly bad judgment in representing minorities' interests, so that certain of them were found individually to
have breached their fiduciary duties).
[558]. Cox's changes to tender offer freezeout doctrine were analyzed in Part III, supra. In many respects, the Cox
decision deepens and expands on the Cysive's criticisms of the effects of applying Entire Fairness standard to
Freezeouts under the Lynch Doctrine.
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[559]. Cox, 879 A.2d at 607 (“At various times, the Family has found it convenient to take Cox public, in order to
raise money from the public capital markets. At other times, the Family has found it preferable to run Cox as a
private company.”).
[560]. Id.
[561]. Id. at 605.
[562]. Id.
[563]. Id.
[564]. Id. at 608. The family was quoted as saying that “it would not sell its Cox shares or support a sale of Cox to a
third party.” Id.
[565]. Id. at 609.
[566]. Id. at 612.
[567]. Id. at 612-13 (“The Stipulation of Settlement was presented to the Court on November 10, 2004. Notice was
promptly issued to the public stockholders on November 24, 2004. By that time, the Family had already commenced
their tender offer at $34.75 per share.... On December 2, 2004 the tender offer expired ... giving the family over 90%
of the Cox shares. On December 8, 2004 a back end, short-form merger was executed taking Cox private.”).
[568]. Id.
[569]. This issue was resolved in the earlier Stipulation of Settlement presented to the Delaware Court of Chancery
on November 10, 2004. See id. at 612-13.
[570]. Id. at 605.
[571]. Id.
[572]. For example, describing the firm that obtained lead counsel status, the Cox court states, “that firm is no
ingénue to the lead counsel sweepstakes.” Id. at 608. The court describes the plaintiffs' lawyers as engaging in a
“food fight” over who would be lead counsel. Id. at 609.
[573]. Id. at 620 (“... plaintiffs sue as soon as there is a public announcement of the controller's intention to propose
a merger.... In this regard, this case is paradigmatic.”).
[574]. The interaction of the special committee representing the minority shareholders in negotiations with the Cox
family's lawyers and the lawyers for the minority shareholder plaintiffs is described in Cox, 879 A.2d at 608-13. For
a discussion of triangulation as a general problem, see id. at 620-21.
[575]. Id. at 645.
[576]. Id. at 605-06 (“For their part, plaintiffs' lawyers can get sizable fees by ‘contributing’ to the successful work
of a special committee and by settling at the same level that the special committee achieved.”)
[577]. Id. at 607.
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[578]. Id. at 605 (“... each Lynch case has settlement value, not necessarily because of its merits, but because it
cannot be dismissed.”).
[579]. There is some confusion with respect to the precise nature of the consent/nondisapproval required, as
previously noted, supra at notes 473-80 and accompanying text. Although the court is motivated to unify freezeout
doctrine, an interesting disconnect appears. In cash-out mergers, Dual Ratification is proposed as the prerequisite to
the business judgment rule. Cox, 879 A.2d at 606, 643-44. Hence, neutrality would not be sufficient, which is
consistent with DGCL § 251. In the first statement of the proposal for tender offer freezeouts, the absence of
disapproval seems to be sufficient. In a later treatment of this question, however, Cox proposes Dual Ratification for
tender offer freezeouts to obtain business judgment deference as well. Cox 879 A.2d at 645.
[580]. Id. at 643-44 (“Put simply, if a controller proposed a merger, subject from inception to negotiation and
approval of the merger by an independent special committee and a Minority Approval Condition, the business
judgment rule should presumptively apply.” (emphasis in original)).
[581]. See id. at 606-07, 643, 647.
[582]. The Cox court affirmatively avoids proposing the repeal of Lynch, as Cysive had delicately suggested. Cysive
836 A.2d at 549. Cox contends that the Delaware Supreme Court has never precluded the application of the business
judgment rule upon Dual Ratification. See Cox, 879 A.2d at 617. Furthermore, Cox deemphasizes the radicalness of
its proposal to apply the business judgment rule to freezeouts upon Dual Ratification as merely “a relatively modest
alteration of Lynch.” Id. at 643. In this way the court of chancery is endeavoring to avoid a direct conflict with
respected supreme court precedent.
[583]. Cox, 879 A.2d at 620. (“[P]laintiffs sue as soon as there is a public announcement of the controller's intention
to propose a merger.”).
[584]. Id. at 628 (“When a controller has already had to complete negotiations with a special committee or launched
a tender offer, it cannot provide more consideration without implicitly criticizing the special committee (or itself)
and without incurring more out of pocket acquisition costs.”).
[585]. Id. at 627. Interestingly, in Cox's lexicon there are only “premature” claims and “tardy” claims. The former
are filed against cash-out mergers which are still advertised as negotiable, so that the receipt of a fee by plaintiffs'
lawyers is presumed. The latter “tardy” claims are filed against cash-out mergers after terms have been agreed to by
controllers and committees-controllers generally refuse to settle those claims according to Cox. See id. at 627.
[586]. Id. at 628.
[587]. Id. at 605 (“Because [the Lynch] standard makes it impossible for a controlling stockholder ever to structure a
transaction in a manner that will enable it to obtain a dismissal of a complaint in a challenged transaction, each
Lynch case has settlement value, not necessarily because of its merits but because it cannot be dismissed.”).
[588]. See id. at 607, 646.
[589]. 516 U.S. 367 (1996).
[590]. In general, the opinion proposes that controllers settle in order to avoid having to pay the inevitable costs
associated with discovery because, the court claims suits under Lynch cannot ever be dismissed, and to avoid the
waste of executive time. See, e.g., Cox, 879 A.2d at 606.
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[591]. See, e.g., id. at 619 (“The incentive system that Lynch created for plaintiffs' lawyers is its most problematic
feature.”).
[592]. Id. at 646.
[593]. Id.
[594]. This is a hallmark of Vice Chancellor Strine's decisions, about which he is not shy. To his credit, his opinions
are extraordinarily comprehensive he allows no sacred cows in corporate governance; and does not hide his agenda.
For commentary on Vice Chancellor Strine's style of deciding cases, see Gapper, supra note 31.
[595]. See, e.g., In reCaremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
[596]. See Cox, 879 A.2d at 605. Cox's assertion of nondismissability is an updated version of the Cysive court's
entanglement critique of Lynch. That is, the view that the doctrine is simply so dysfunctional in its complexity that it
precludes meaningful determinations without prolonged litigation. Thus, this Article's objections to the Cysive's
“entanglement” critique are relevant here as well. See supra notes 503-22 and accompanying text.
[597]. For example, the opinion states that “unlike any other transaction one can imagine ... it [is] impossible after
Lynch to structure a merger with a controlling shareholder in a way that permitted the defendants to obtain a
dismissal of the case on the pleadings.” Cox, 879 A.2d at 619.
[598]. Id. at 605.
[599]. Id. at 617. What appears to be an equally undeniable reality is that the Delaware Court of Chancery is
frustrated by the substantial demands imposed on the court valuation-based litigation under the Lynch Doctrine and
other types of corporate fiduciary cases. But the burdens imposed on courts by valuation litigation would not
radically be reduced if the Cox Reforms are adopted because, for example, the Delaware Court of Chancery also
hears appraisal actions. Furthermore, valuation analyses are also relevant in claims of breach of fiduciary duty
against directors in going private transactions. Getting rid of Entire Fairness in freezeouts is not a solution to the
court's methodological problems with valuation therefore.
[600]. Id. at 620.
[601]. Id. at 620-22.
[602]. Id. at 605.
[603]. Id.
[604]. See id. at 606. See also id. at 643 (“The judicial process should be invoked when a party has a genuine claim
of injury. Particularly in the representative litigation context, where there are deep concerns about the agency costs
imposed by plaintiffs' attorneys, our judiciary must be vigilant to make sure that the incentives we create promote
integrity and that we do not, by judicial doctrine, generate the need for defendants to settle simply because they have
no viable alternative, even when they have done nothing wrong.”).
[605]. Id. at 606 (“Moreover, I cannot give credence to the notion that the litigation had a substantially important
impact on the pricing of the transaction because the plaintiffs' claims were not meritorious when filed and it is most
probable that the defendants settled simply because they had, under Lynch, no other economically efficient option
for disposal of the lawsuit.”).
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[606]. The Cox court attributes virtually all the increases obtained by special committees in negotiations with
controllers to their savvy and organizational stature (in comparison to disaggregated minority shareholders), with
only the slightest advantage being conferred by the added leverage of claims filed by plaintiffs under the Entire
Fairness standard. As a basis for the conclusion that committees are the driving engines of minorities' receipt of
meaningfully high premiums, the Cox court cites the absence of a situation in which “the controller's lawyer told the
plaintiffs' lawyer this is my best and final offer and received the answer, ‘sign up your deal with the special
committee, and we'll meet you in the Chancellor's office for the scheduling conference on our motion to expedite.”’
Id. at 621. The Cox court proposes that “in every instance, the plaintiffs' lawyers have concluded that the price
obtained by the special committee was sufficiently attractive, that the acceptance of the settlement at that price was
warranted.” Id.
[607]. Id. at 622, 633.
[608]. Id. at 645.
[609]. Id. at 646.
[610]. See supra Part IV, A.2.
[611]. See id.
[612]. Cox, 879 A.2d at 620.
[613]. Id. at 617 (“Although it is an undeniable reality that Lynch stated that any merger with controlling
stockholder, however, structured, was subject to a fairness review...”).
[614]. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 715 (citing Stauffer v. Standard Brands, Inc., 187 A.2d 78 (Del. 1962) and David J.
Greene & Co. v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 281 A.2d 30 (Del. Ch. 1971)). The Weinberger court continued to explain
that “... the provisions of 8 Del. C. § 262, as herein construed, respecting the scope of an appraisal and the means for
perfecting the same, shall govern the financial remedy available to minority shareholders in a cash-out merger.” Id.
(emphasis added).
[615]. 498 A.2d 1099, 1107-08 (Del. 1985) (finding that plaintiffs had made out a credible claim that the controller
had manipulated the timing of the freezeout in a way that constituted unfair dealing-a cognizable issue under the
entire fairness standard-rather than merely disputing the price of the cash-out merger, so that the claim should not
have been dismissed).
[616]. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 714-15.
[617]. Rabkin, 498 A.2d at 1107.
[618]. Id. at 1104-05 (“Weinberger's mandate of fair dealing does not turn solely on issues of deception.”); id. at
1105 (“In Weinberger we observed that the timing, structure, negotiation and disclosure of a cash-out merger all had
a bearing on the issue of procedural fairness.”). In Rabkin, the supreme court reversed the chancery court's
conclusion that fair dealing was limited to allegations of misrepresentation. See Rabkin, 480 A.2d 655, 660 (Del. Ch.
1984), rev'd, 498 A.2d 1099, 1104-05 (Del. 1985).
[619]. Rabkin, 498 A.2d at 1107.

Page 124

[620]. Id. at 1107-08.
[621]. Id. at 1107.
[622]. Cox, 879 A.2d at 605-06 (“For their part, plaintiffs' lawyers can get sizable fees by ‘contributing’ to the
successful work of a special committee and by settling at the same level that the special committee achieved.”).
[623]. In fairness, Cox does make brief mention of the fact that controllers may enjoy a benefit as the result of a
“broad release” of claims relating to the freezeout, but without fleshing out the significance of the reference. See id.
at 631.
[624]. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367 (1996).
[625]. Id. at 387. For commentary, see Richard W. Painter, Responding to a False Alarm: Federal Preemption of
State Securities Fraud Causes of Action, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 95-98 (1998).
[626]. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, § 27, 48 Stat. 881, 902 (codified as amended in 15 U.S.C. §
78aa (2000)).
[627]. See15 U.S.C. § 78n (2000 & Supp. IV 2004); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (2007).
[628]. See15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004) (prohibiting fraud, deceit, and material misrepresentation or
omissions “in connection with any tender offer or request or invitation for tenders”).
[629]. See Matsushita, 516 U.S. at 369;see also William T. Allen, Finality of Judgments in Class Actions: A
Comment on Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1149 (1998).
[630]. Painter, supra note 625, at 95.
[631]. State fiduciary claims may be heard in federal court as part of federal securities law actions by way of
supplemental jurisdiction. See28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
[632]. Thompson & Thomas II, supra note 51, at 189-94.
[633]. The plaintiffs would have the burden of proof in the federal securities law claims as well, but the presence of
ratification in state case law, as suggested by Weinberger, is “strong evidence” of fairness. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at
709 n.7. For further discussion of incentives that favor settling in state court, see Thompson and Thomas II, supra
note 51, at 191.
[634]. For the relevance of charter exculpation clauses to claims of fiduciary breach against individual director
defendants in freezeouts, see, e.g., Emerging Commc'ns, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 70, at *138.
[635]. These arise by contract but are provided for by Delaware statutory law. SeeDEL. CODE tit. 8, § 145(a)
(2007).
[636]. By the express terms of the statute, Delaware charter exculpatory clauses are relevant only to breach of
fiduciary duty claims. DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2007). As a general matter, the federal courts support the
SEC's position that corporations may not indemnify their executives against liability for securities fraud. See, e.g.,
Globus v. Law Research Service, Inc., 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970).
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[637]. See supra notes 596-601 and accompanying text.
[638]. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
[639]. Cox, 879 A.2d at 619.
[640]. Id.
[641]. This is clearly the suggestion made by the objectors to the fee in Cox. Id. at 605. See also Elliott J. Weiss and
Lawrence J. White, File Early, Then Free Ride: How Delaware Law (Mis)shapes Shareholder Class Actions, 57
VAND. L. REV. 1797, 1820 (2004). Professor Weiss was among the objectors to the fee in Cox. Cox, 879 A.2d at
604.
[642]. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182.
[643]. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182 (holding that board could not play favorites among bidders once company had been
put up for sale and directors' choice of bid that presented certain liability immunizing benefits for themselves was
unlawful).
[644]. See, e.g., Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc. 637 A.2d 34, 46 n.17 (Del. 1994); Mills
Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, 559 A.2d 1261, 1287-88 (Del. 1989); City Capital Assocs. Ltd. Partnership v.
Interco, Inc. 551 A.2d 787, 802 (Del. Ch. 1988), appeal dismissed, 556 A.2d 1070 (Del. 1988) (holding that a
disinterested board maintains the right and continues to have the duty to exercise its business judgment in seeking to
maximize shareholder value).
[645]. This is reflected, for example, in the fact that duty of care breaches may be exculpated but breach of loyalty
claims or other claims involving bad faith or express wrongdoing by fiduciaries cannot be. DEL. CODE tit. 8, §
102(b)(7) (2007).
[646]. See, e.g., Barkan v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 567 A.2d 1279, 1288 (Del. 1989) (where sale of control is
implicated, a deal that does not involve a realistic market check may be difficult to sustain).
[647]. See, e.g., In re The MONY Group Inc. S'holder Litig., 852 A.2d 9 (Del. Ch. 2004) (directors did not breach
duty, having put the company up for sale, and entered into a merger agreement, which nevertheless allowed for a
post signing market check-notwithstanding that they had eschewed an auction).
[648]. The most famous exception in the acquisitions area is Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). As
relevant to freezeouts, however, see Justice Jacobs decision in In re Emerging Commc'ns, Inc. S'holders Litig., No.
Civ. A. 16415, 2004 WL 1305745 (Del. Ch. May 3, 2004). Nevertheless, the independent directors in that
transaction used extraordinarily bad judgment.
[649]. This is the core complaint presented by Professors Weiss and White in their Vanderbilt Law Review article.
See supra note 641.
[650]. Cox, 879 A.2d at 619. The court employs colorful metaphors to ridicule the conduct of the plaintiffs' lawyers
in the Cox transaction-for example it describes the process of their selecting lead counsel as resembling a “food
fight.” Id. at 609. As an aside, it is difficult to believe that controllers' lawyers are less concerned about their fees
and status among their peers than are plaintiffs' lawyers, but their battles over status and fees are less visible.
[651]. See id. at 622. See also id. at 639 (“As the objectors point out, this court has never yielded to plaintiffs and
defendants the right to set the level of fees that are awarded in representative actions. Even when defendants agree to
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pay the requested fee fully, the settlement benefits to the class are concededly adequate, and there has been no
objection, this court has often reduced the requested fee to a smaller number.”).
[652]. Delaware Chancery Court Rule 23.1(c) provides that “the [derivative] action shall not be dismissed or
compromised without the approval of the Court.” DEL. CH. CT. R. 23.1(c).
[653]. Cox, 879 A.2d at 606 (“For reasons I detail, I therefore award a substantially smaller fee than the plaintiffs
have requested.”); id. at 642 (awarding fees and expenses totaling $1.275 million).
[654]. Id. at 638 (finding that the Chrysler standard governs the payment of fees where plaintiffs' suit has become
moot on account of voluntary action by the defendant (citing Chrysler Corp. v. Dann, 223 A.2d 384, 386-87 (Del.
1966)).
[655]. Cox, 879 A.2d at 640 (considering under Sugarland: “1) the benefits achieved in the action; 2) the efforts of
counsel and the time spent in connection with the case; 3) the contingent nature of the case; 4) the difficulty of the
litigation; and 5) the standing and ability of counsel.” (citing Sugarland Industries, Inc. v. Thomas, 420 A.2d 142,
147-50 (Del. 1980)). In Cox, the Delaware Court of Chancery validates the more “traditional” and conservative
Sugarland standards as being appropriate for freezeouts. Cox, 879 A.2d at 640-42.
[656]. Cox, 879 A.2d at 605.
[657]. Id. at 606.
[658]. Id.
[659]. Id. at 642.
[660]. Id. at 612.
[661]. See Hilary Sale, Judges as Gatekeepers in Settlements (forthcoming article, on file with The Business
Lawyer). The court's unilateral decision to reduce the agreed fee is more interesting in light of its tremendous
emphasis on the legitimacy of outcomes reached through private bargaining.
[662]. Chrysler Corp. v. Dann, 223 A.2d 384, 386-87 (Del. 1966).
[663]. Sugarland Indus., Inc. v. Thomas, 420 A.2d 142, 147-50 (Del. 1980).
[664]. Cox, 879 A.2d at 634-43.
[665]. See Thompson & Thomas II, supra note 51, at 192-93 (citing data demonstrating that the median attorneys'
fee award in federal securities cases from 1991 to 1996 was about 32 percent of the settlement value). In
comparison, the median percentage of attorneys' fees in control shareholder acquisition cases was five percent of the
additional consideration. Id. at 192. For a discussion of fees computed on an hourly basis, see id. at 193.
[666]. Professors Thompson and Thomas were able to study the figures presented by the plaintiffs' law firms in the
briefs they are required to file with the Delaware court of chancery to accompany their fee petitions. As they note,
calculating hourly fees on this basis does not take account of the work done by plaintiffs' lawyers in claims that are
dismissed without settlement- where no fees are recovered and no figures are extant. Thompson and Thomas II,
supra note 51, at 193-94.
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[667]. Id. at 193.
[668]. Id. at 192-93.
[669]. Id. at 192
[670]. See id. at 193.
[671]. Id. at 193 n.222.
[672]. See id. at 200 (“We find that in 20 of 65 of the controlling shareholder cases, additional consideration was
paid to the minority shareholders, and in another five cases there were attorneys' fees paid in a settlement.”). The
authors note “the contingent nature of these cases.” Id. at 193. More particularly, in cases dismissed without
settlement (40 out of 65), no fees were paid to plaintiffs' counsel. Id. at 193.
[673]. Cox, 879 A.2d at 605-06.
[674]. See Thompson & Thomas II, supra note 51, at 199, Table 17; id. at 192 (“If we look at attorneys' fee awards,
we see some evidence supporting the claim that Delaware class action litigation has lower litigation agency costs....
In the 20 control shareholder transactions settled in the Delaware courts [in the two year sample studied], the median
amount of additional consideration paid to shareholders was about $15 million. The median percentage of attorney's
fees for these cases was 5 percent of the additional consideration (with a range extending up to 37 percent). In dollar
terms, the median attorneys' fees awarded by the court were $875,000 (with a range extending up to $4.4 million).”).
[675]. See Cox, 879 A.2d at 622 (“In seeking fees in these cases, the plaintiffs' lawyers have been pragmatic.
Recognizing that they, at best, can claim “shared credit” with the special committee, the plaintiffs' lawyers have
tempered their fee requests and have asked for relatively small percentage of the “benefit”-i.e., the difference
between the price of the controller's opening bid and the final merger price agreed to by the special committee. But,
at the same time, the rewards they reap are substantial....”).
[676]. See Cox, 879 A.2d at 621-23.
[677]. See id. at 625-29.
[678]. See id. at 605-06.
[679]. See id. at 607 (“At the same time, by giving defendants the real option to get rid of cases on the pleadings, the
integrity of the representative litigation process would be improved, as those cases that would be filed would involve
plaintiffs and plaintiffs' lawyers who knew they could succeed only by filing and actually prosecuting meritorious
cases, and not by free riding on a special committee's work.”).
[680]. For statements of Cox's Dual Ratification proposal for reforming freezeout doctrine, see id. at 606, 607, 64344, 645, 647.
[681]. Id.
[682]. See supra notes 676-77 and accompanying text.
[683]. See Cox, 879 A.2d at 629 n.57 (“... the relative contributions of the Special Committee and the plaintiffs'
counsel have not been, and perhaps cannot be, empirically isolated”); id. at 631 (“One cannot tell, of course, how
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important each of them is as a factor ...”).
[684]. See id. at 647 (“By now, experience has proven that special committees ... are willing to say no to
controllers.”).
[685]. See id. at 641-42.
[686]. See id. at 638-40.
[687]. See id. at 621-22 (“... one awkward fact strongly suggests that the threat of bare knuckles litigation over
fairness is not as important as the special committee's role as an negotiating force. That awkward fact is the absence
of evidence that “traditional” plaintiffs' lawyers, who attacked going private proposals by controllers, have ever
refused to settle once they have received the signal that the defendants have put on the table their best and final
offer, i.e. an offer that is acceptable to the special committee.”).
[688]. For example, it might be possible to argue that the plaintiffs' lawyers' resolution to follow the lead of special
committees in this regard is evidence of the operation of salutary checks and balances in this litigation context,
since, after all, the committee has a fiduciary duty to the minority and there is some chance that continued litigation
would “kill the deal.” It is also possible that the suit added value, by operationalizing the fair duty and fair dealings'
promises in the negotiations, but that the plaintiffs' lawyers are giving up too soon because the costs and risks of the
lawsuit will radically increase for them once the committee settles. This might suggest that the courts should not
routinely approve the settlements but instead encourage the plaintiffs' lawyers to litigate further. It does not provide
evidence suggesting that the litigation had no effect to date.
[689]. See Cox, 879 A.2d at 631 (“The plaintiffs' bar would say, of course, this is because they did such a good job
in each case that the price concessions they helped the special committee extract was of such inarguable fairness that
it would be silly to fight on.”).
[690]. See id. (“Perhaps what can be most charitably said is that the pendency of litigation and the theoretical threat
that the plaintiffs will press on provides special committees members with additional clout that they wield to get
good results...”).
[691]. See id. at 647.
[692]. DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 251 (2007), amended by 76 Del. Laws ch. 145 §§ 4-7 (2007).
[693]. See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
[694]. See Cox, 879 A.2d at 625.
[695]. See id. at 631 (“Third, litigation under Lynch never seems to involve actual litigation conflict if the lawsuit
begins with a suit attacking a negotiable proposal.”).
[696]. Id.
[697]. See id. at 608 (“That complaint was even less meaty than the first filed complaint. It is exemplary of hastilyfiled, first-day complaints that serve no purpose other than for a particular law firm and its client to get into the
medal round of the filing speed (also formerly known as the lead counsel selection) Olympics.”).
[698]. See Cox, 879 A.2d at 606, 620 and 622;id. at 622 (“... the plaintiffs' claims always have settlement value
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because of the costs of discovery and time to defendants.”).
[699]. The stay of discovery provisions are codified as amended in 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1(b), 78u-4(b)(3) (2000).
[700]. SeeH.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-369, at 37 (1995), as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 736 (calling
discovery in securities class actions “fishing expeditions,” and noting that some testimony estimated that discovery
costs accounted for 80% of total litigation costs in securities fraud cases).
[701]. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 709 n.7.
[702]. Not only the buyer but also the seller in a merger transaction will need to do a due diligence analysis of the
inherent value of the company. This was another point illustrated in the sale-through-merger in Smith v. Van
Gorkom. In that case the “independent” directors were cowed by the company's chief executive officer; as a
consequence they failed to undertake the kind of intensive analysis of their firm that would have furnished an
appropriate valuation basis for approving its sale. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 876-77 (Del. 1985).
[703]. See Cox, 879 A.2d at 618.
[704]. See id. at 619 (“...history shows that [independent directors] are sometimes timid, inept, or ... well, let's just
say worse”).
[705]. See Cox, 879 A.2d at 620 (“... directors involved in the transactions all ... become defendants in lawsuits
attacking those transactions”).
[706]. The Lynch doctrine itself only addresses controllers' duties in freezeouts, and not the fiduciary obligations of
the target directors themselves. See, e.g., In re Emerging Commc'ns, Inc. S'holders Litig., No. Civ. A. 16415, 2004
WL 1305745 (Del. Ch. May 3, 2004); Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 874 (finding that directors breached their duty in
approving a sale of the company through a merger by failing to inform themselves of all information reasonably
available); McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910 (Del. 2000) (finding that directors breached their duty to the minority
shareholders by turning merger process over to controller, consistent with controller's best interests). In 1995, in the
now notorious Technicolor litigation, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed that the rushed approach of the selling
company directors to the approval process, and their failure to conduct a market check of the value of the company
prior to approving the deal, constituted a breach of the directors' duty of care. That breach mandated the application
of the Entire Fairness standard-the court ultimately concluded that the acquisition of Technicolor met that standard.
Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1175 (Del. 1995) (“The Court of Chancery properly considered
that the Technicolor board's now undisputed lack of care in [failing to make] a market check was a flaw in its
approval process.”).
[707]. Directors' fiduciary care liability will often be abridged by charter exculpation, indemnification agreements
and insurance. See Bernard Black, Brian Cheffins & Michael Klausner, Outside Director Liability, 58 STAN. L.
REV. 1055 (2006) (distinguishing nominal director liability from actual director liability, noting that directors have
virtually never been required to pay damages from personal resources given insurance, indemnification, and
exculpation).
[708]. For commentary and citations illustrating the Delaware courts' use of shaming sanctions, see Edward B.
Rock, Saints & Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1009 (1997). The court's
“morality tales” also provide instruction for future directors about what is and is not acceptable, consistent with the
transactional choreography of freezeouts.
[709]. See, e.g., Cox, 879 A.2d at 647 (proposing that allowing deferential review so long as there is Dual
Ratification will “encourage the consistent use of the transaction structure that best protects minority stockholders
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while simultaneously discouraging the filing of premature lawsuits of dubious integrity and social utility”).
[710]. See supra notes 603-21 and accompanying text. The Cox court claims that Rule 11 sanctions are ineffective in
this context because “financial fairness is a debatable issue.” Cox, 879 A.2d at 620. As discussed supra notes 612-21
and accompanying text, however, financial fairness alone is not a basis to go forward with an Entire Fairness
complaint.
[711]. Cox, 879 A.2d at 646. Transactions that appear unfair, even if profitable for one party, may decrease
investment and growth over the longer term.
[712]. Id. at 607, 643. The basis of the integrity of a legal system is a complex matter, of course. For further
discussion of the social freight carried by the system of shareholder litigation under Delaware corporate law, see
James D. Cox, The Social Meaning of Shareholder Suits, 65 BROOK. L. REV. 3 (1999).
[713]. See supra note 680.
[714]. Cox, 879 A.2d at 606, 643.
[715]. Id. at 607.
[716]. Id. at 646;see also id. at 607 (the Cox Reforms would “provide even greater coherence to our law...”).
[717]. For Cox's express appeal to increasing the “integrity” of Delaware corporate law and investors' faith in it via
adoption of its proposed reforms, see Cox, 879 A.2d at 606, 607, 613, 643.
[718]. Id. at 606.
[719]. Id. at 644.
[720]. Again, this is an express objective of the proposed reforms. See, e.g., Cox, 879 A.2d at 607, 643, 644.
[721]. For analysis of Cox's disparagement of the legitimacy and continued relevance of the inherent coercion
concept, see infra notes 852-75 and accompanying text.
[722]. See Pure, 808 A.2d at 441.
[723]. See discussion infra at notes 722-76 and accompanying text.
[724]. For “modest,” see Cox, 879 A.2d at 606, 643.
[725]. For the claim that the Cox Reforms would “extend” rather than repeal the Lynch Doctrine, see Cox, 879 A.2d
at 606 and 607. See also Pure, 808 A.2d at 444 n. 43.
[726]. For this claim, see Cox, 879 A.2d at 617 (“For this reason, it is important not to assume that the Supreme
Court has already rejected this more precisely focused contention.”). The court contradicts this assertion earlier in
the opinion however. Id. at 616 (“Even if the transaction was 1) negotiated and approved by a special committee of
independent directors; and 2) subject to approval by a majority of the disinterested shares ..., the best that could be
achieved [under Lynch] was a shift of the burden of persuasion on the issue of fairness from the defendants to the
plaintiffs.”).
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[727]. In administering these claims, courts could delay the fair price inquiry until after they addressed fair dealings,
but the “burden” of the fair dealings inquiry would remain if the Cox Reforms are to be interpreted as anything other
than a total abdication of equity's role in freezeouts.
[728]. For this suggestion in the Cox opinion, see 879 A.2d at 644.
[729]. At present these actions are commonly combined. See, e.g., In re Emerging Commc'ns, Inc. S'holders Litig.,
No. Civ. A. 16415, 2004 WL 1305745 (Del. Ch. May 3, 2004).
[730]. As the data collected by Professors Thompson and Thomas indicate, appraisals are presently used
infrequently by aggrieved minorities in cash-out merger, in comparison to class action Entire Fairness suits. See
Thompson & Thomas 11, supra note 51, at 170 (“Appraisal proceedings make up a very small portion of the
Chancery Court docket ...”); see also Gilson and Gordon, supra note 5, at 799 (“... the economics of the litigation
process mean that, if a fight about price is limited to appraisal, the controlling shareholder is exposed as to price
only with respect to the number of shares for which appraisal rights are perfected, typically a quite small number.”).
For further statistical information about the incidence of appraisal actions see Thomas, Delaware Appraisal, supra
note 184, at 22 (finding fewer than 14 cases per year since 1977 and analyzing ways that appraisal falls short of
meeting the needs of investors and the express goals of the statute); compare Wertheimer, supra note 166, at 626
(noting that “the number of reported appraisal decisions has expanded greatly” despite the notable shortcomings in
the appraisal statute).
[731]. For discussion of the Pure court's expressed frustration and dissatisfaction with assessing value in freezeouts
and its relative preference for a “process based” solution, see Gilson & Gordon, supra note 5, at 834 (“We are
sympathetic to the Pure court's preference for a resolution to the treatment of freeze-outs that focuses on the court's
assessing process, rather than determining value.”).
[732]. See supra notes 261-71 and accompanying text. For decades there have been calls to reform the appraisal
process. See infra note 733. Those reform proposals have never succeeded-but that lack of success may be
attributable to the fact that the equitable cause of action for Entire Fairness under the Lynch Doctrine has remained
an attractive option for minority investors to challenge cash-out mergers. If the Cox Reforms are adopted, however,
the legal landscape will have changed substantially, and the Delaware Legislature will be under greater pressure to
defend minorities' interests in freezeouts through modifications to the appraisal remedy.
[733]. See, e.g., Thomas, Delaware Appraisal, supra note 184, at 1 (“Modern appraisal statutes are a mess.”);
Wertheimer, supra note 166; Thompson, Exit, supra note 184.
[734]. See, e.g., Subramanian, Fixing Freezeouts, supra note 5, at 8; Gilson & Gordon, supra note 5, at 839-40;
Letsou & Haas, supra note 113, at 94.
[735]. Cox, 879 A.2d at 644.
[736]. Id. at 647. It is noteworthy that in adopting this metaphor the court implicitly affirms that shareholder
litigation is viewed as a form of warfare. Id.
[737]. Id. at 644.
[738]. This issue of director personal liability in freezeouts relates back to Weinberger. It is striking in that case that
while the court expresses horror at the conduct of Signal's directors on UOP's board it never even implies that they
might be held personally liable for fiduciary breach. See Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 708 (“A primary issue mandating
reversal is the preparation by two UOP directors, Arledge and Chitea, of their feasibility study for the exclusive use
and benefit of Signal.”).
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[739]. See, e.g., In reWalt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693 (Del. Ch. 2005), aff'd, 906 A.2d 27 (Del.
2006); but see In re Emerging Commc'ns, Inc. S'holders Litig., No. Civ. A. 16415, 2004 WL 1305745 (Del. Ch.
May 3, 2004); Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp., 383 A.2d 278, 282 (Del. 1977) (finding liability against controller
and holding individual directors harmless).
[740]. See supra notes 243-49.
[741]. Cf. In re Emerging Commc'ns, Inc. S'holders Litig., No. Civ. A. 16415, 2004 WL 1305745 (Del. Ch. May 3,
2004).
[742]. See supra notes 707.
[743]. Controllers' preference for obtaining directors' consents is noted in Cox, 879 A.2d at 618 (“... the absence of
any additional standard of review-affecting benefit for a Minority [Shareholder] Approval Condition, has made the
use of that independent, and functionally distinct, mechanism less prevalent”).
[744]. Cox, 879 A.2d at 618 (“But Lynch also created other unintended and unanticipated effects.... For starters, the
absence of any additional standard of review-affecting benefit for a Minority Approval Condition, has made the use
of that independent and functionally distinct, mechanism less prevalent....As a result, Lynch did not tend to make
prevalent the transactional structure that most clearly mirrors an arms' length merger.”).
[745]. For further discussion, see supra notes 121-29 and accompanying text.
[746]. In the Emerging Communications litigation the defendants made the novel argument that the majority of the
minority's tendering their shares operated as consent to the transaction which waived their right to bring suit for
fiduciary breach. Justice Jacobs (sitting by designation) did not have to resolve what legal effect could be given to
such a waiver, because he had ruled that the disclosure to the shareholders was deficient. He did observe, however,
that no Delaware court has approved that shareholders' sales in tender offers should be considered the equivalent of
an affirmative shareholder vote. This admonition aside, there will be considerable pressure on the Delaware
Supreme Court to move in this direction. See Emerging Commc'n, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 70. at *110.
[747]. DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (2007).
[748]. This jurisprudence is described in Cox, 879 A.2d at 614-15, so there is no doubt that Vice-Chancellor Strine
was mindful of the issue.
[749]. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985) (finding shareholder ratification void and hence insufficient to protect the directors
from financial liability on account of their demonstrated breach of fiduciary care because the disclosures in the
proxy statement were deficient).
[750]. No. Civ. A. 18039, 2004 WL 2348395 (Del. Ch. Oct. 20, 2004) (ruling that the disclosure to the shareholders
was acceptable so that their vote triggered the waste standard and nullified the duty of loyalty claims against the
board).
[751]. 751 A.2d 879, 900-01 (Del. Ch. 1999).
[752]. See Orman, 2004 WL 2348395, at *5 (finding that the fully informed vote of a majority of company's
disinterested shareholders would be effective to trigger business judgment rule so that the special committee
directors would not be liable in approving the sale of the company). See also, e.g., J. Robert Brown, Jr., Speaking
with Complete Candor: Shareholder Ratification and the Elimination of the Duty of Loyalty, 54 HASTINGS L. J.
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641 (2003); Victor Brudney, Revisiting the Import of Shareholder Consent for Corporate Fiduciary Loyalty
Obligations, 25 J. CORP. L. 209 (2000).
[753]. Cox, 879 A.2d at 614-15.
[754]. For a decision where the court found that informed, uncoerced minority shareholder ratification precluded a
finding of liability against defendant directors, and granted summary judgment on that basis, see Orman, 2004 WL
2348395;see also Harbor Fin. Partners, 751 A.2d at 900-01 (discussing the exculpatory effect of disinterested
shareholder ratification on a duty of loyalty claim, outside of a freezeout). There is controversy regarding whether
shareholder ratification can expunge a duty of loyalty claim against controllers in a freezeout. Shareholder
ratification of directors' fiduciary breaches is frequently invalidated on the basis of shareholders being inadequately
informed. See, e.g., Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 858 (invalidating shareholder ratification of directors' breach of their
duty of care because shareholders were inadequately informed). For a discussion of this issue, see In re JCC
Holdings Co., Inc., 843 A.2d 713, 722-23 (Del. Ch. 2003) (holding that the voting of plaintiff minority shareholders
in favor of accepting consideration in a merger effectuated by a controlling stockholder does not bar them, on the
basis of acquiescence, or any other related doctrine of waiver, from challenging the fairness of the merger in an
equitable action).
[755]. Cox, 879 A.2d at 618-19.
[756]. See id. at 646 (“It was thought preferable in Pure Resources to keep the strands [of freezeout doctrine]
separate until there is an alteration in Lynch, lest the less than confidence inspiring pattern of ‘Lynch litigation’
replicate itself across the board in all going private transactions, thereby deterring the procession of offers that
provide valuable liquidity to minority stockholders and efficiency for the economy in general.”).
[757]. Lynch and Solomon are less radically far apart in their treatment of fair process in freezeouts. They both
prohibit coercion and fraud by controllers. However, while the Lynch Doctrine takes an “affirmative” approach,
making controllers accountable for “fair dealings,” the Solomon standards merely prohibit misconduct by
controllers. But this is essentially a difference in degree or approach. Both doctrines affirm that there are legally
enforceable limits on the process through which controllers can effectuate a freezeout.
[758]. See supra notes 214-31 and accompanying text.
[759]. See supra notes 173-82 and accompanying text.
[760]. See Cox, 879 A.2d at 642-48 (“A Coda on the Jurisprudential Elephant in the Corner”).
[761]. See id. at 646. In this respect, the Cox Reforms should not be seen as a middle ground between the two.
Rather, the Lynch Doctrine is being folded into Solomon's more lenient framework-with a consequent “yielding” of
the fair price duty as it would apply to negotiations.
[762]. See supra notes 173-82 and accompanying text.
[763]. For excellent discussion of the not easily enforceable and sometimes loose limits applicable to controllers'
obtaining private benefits from the corporation during its ongoing operations, see Gilson & Gordon, supra note 5, at
789-93. See alsoSinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971) (applying very different equitable standards
to (i) the parent's preferred dividend policy, (ii) the parent's general oversight of the subsidiary's management
consistent with its overall interests, (iii) whether the company had taken a particular business opportunity that
belonged to the subsidiary and (iv) the enforcement of another wholly owned subsidiary's contract with the first
subsidiary).
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[764]. See Sinclair Oil, 280 A.2d at 722-23.
[765]. See id. at 721-22.
[766]. As noted by Professors Gilson and Gordon, supra note 5, at 835-36, controlled companies are exempt from
the NYSE and NASD listing standards requiring an absolute majority of directors on the board, but must still have a
minimum of three independent directors to compose an audit committee that complies with SOX's requirements.
See15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m)(3)(B) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004); Self-Regulatory Organizations; Notice of Filing of
Proposed Rule Change and Amendment No. 1 Thereto by the New York Stock Exchange, Inc. Relating to Corporate
Governance, 68 Fed. Reg. 19051, 19052 (Apr. 17, 2003). The NYSE proposal and the comparable NASD proposal
were approved. Self-Regulatory Organizations; New York Stock Exchange. Inc. and National Association of
Securities Dealers, Inc.; Order Approving Proposed Rule Changes and Amendments No. 1 Thereto and Notice of
Filing and Order Granting Accelerated Approval of Amendments Relating to Corporate Governance, 68 Fed. Reg.
64154 (Nov. 12, 2003).
[767]. See, e.g., Cox, 879 A.2d at 632 (“Fourth, minority stockholders seem to be doing more than tolerably well
under both the Lynch and Siliconix regimes. Even if premiums to market are lower in Siliconix transactions, the
premiums paid are large in comparison to the routine day-to-day trading prices in which minority and liquidity
discounts will be suffered.”). On the limited significance of the market trading price, and hence a premium to the
market price, as an indicia of a company's value see also Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 875-76 (concluding where no
controller was present that “[u]sing market price as a basis for concluding that the premium adequately reflected the
true value of the Company was a clearly faulty, indeed fallacious premise...”); Emerging Commc'n, 2004 WL
1305745, at *23; Hamermesh & Wachter, supra note 166, at 132 (noting that market price is inherently unreliable as
an indicia of the value of minority shares, if they are assumed to represent a pro rata share of the residual value).
[768]. See, e.g., David A. Hoffman, The Best Puffery Article Ever, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1395 (2006); Jennifer O'Hare,
The Resurrection of the Dodo: The Unfortunate Re-Emergence of the Puffery Defense in Private Securities Fraud
Actions, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1697 (1998).
[769]. See, e.g., HERSH SHEFREN, BEYOND GREED AND FEAR: UNDERSTANDING BEHAVIORAL
FINANCE AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INVESTING 184-89 (2000).
[770]. The law serves an “expressive function,” indicating to people what is right and wrong which is distinct from
what is legally sanctionable. Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1649,
1650-51 (2000); Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 6472 (1995).
[771]. In effect this Article's proposals assert that the controller is inhibiting the board from fulfilling its duty of care
if it blocks the committee's investigation of alternatives, e.g. prevents it from conducting an auction or market check.
See Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 872 (“The determination of whether a business judgment is an informed one turns on
whether the directors have informed themselves ‘prior to making a business decision, of all material information
reasonably available to them.”’ (citations omitted)).
[772]. In addition, if the Entire Fairness standard and its fair price duty apply to all freezeouts, then as these deals
are litigated, there will be a record of the valuation methodologies which are acceptable for the committee to
consider in analyzing the merits of a controller's offer, as was the case in Emerging Commc'n, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS
70, at *43-101.
[773]. Controllers will surely threaten to pull the offer if the committee does not approve. That many would do so is
attested to in the Cox opinion. See Cox, 879 A.2d at 625. Once this happens in enough freezeouts, committees will
anticipate being blamed in the media for killing the deal if they disapprove of it. Given the court of chancery's
fervently expressed preferences for freezeouts going forward, at least as evidenced in Siliconix, Pure and Cox, it will
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be very hard for committees to risk terminating the transaction by disapproving it.
[774]. Cox, 879 A.2d at 643-44.
[775]. Id. at 607.
[776]. Id. at 606.
[777]. See Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 873 (“A director may not abdicate his duty by leaving to the shareholder alone
the decision to approve or disapprove the agreement [of merger].”); McMullin 765 A.2d at 919 (“... when the
proposal to merge with a third party is negotiated by the majority shareholder, the board cannot abdicate that duty
[to make an informed judgment on the merger] by leaving it to the shareholders alone to approve or disapprove the
merger agreement because the majority shareholder's voting power makes the outcome a preordained conclusion.
[778]. As stated above, controlled companies will need to have a minimum of three directors to conform to the
exchanges' listing standards for audit committees. See supra note 766 and accompanying text.
[779]. 826 A.2d 277, 286 (Del. 2003).
[780]. SeeN.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 713 (McKinney 2003).
[781]. See Cox at 879 A.2d at 646 (describing its Dual Ratification proposal for freezeouts as a “principled
reconciliation of the two lines” of freezeout doctrine, and citing Gilson and Gordon's work as a model solution in
this regard).
[782]. See Cox, 879 A.2d at 621-31.
[783]. Id.
[784]. See Thompson & Thomas II, supra note 51, at 202; Cox, 879 A.2d at 626.
[785]. Subramanian, Theory & Evidence, supra note 23; see Cox, 879 A.2d at 625-31;id. at 625 (“Subramanian
makes two major arguments. First Subramanian cites to his own recent scholarly studies to support his view that the
Lynch form of transaction results, on average, in going private transactions that pay the minority a higher premium
in comparison to the preannouncement market price than do Siliconix deals. Second, Subramanian attempts to show
that the filing of lawsuits under Lynch challenging going private merger proposals by controlling stockholders are a
material factor in producing these more favorable results. I will now explain in summary form Subramanian's
arguments and explain why I conclude that the first of his arguments is his strongest, and that his other point is less
convincing.”).
[786]. See Weiss & White, supra note 641, at 1804 (“Thus, in most mergers involving conflicts of interest and
especially in mergers involving sales of control, the combination of corporate practice and Delaware law appears to
have provided plaintiffs' attorneys with substantial incentives to file class actions, regardless of whether it appeared
that fiduciary duties had been or would be breached.”).
[787]. A significant caveat is required: Notwithstanding his conclusions about the beneficial effects of claims filed
under the Entire Fairness standard, Professor Subramanian endorses the kind of “hybrid,” dual consent-based
solution to unifying freezeout doctrine put forward by the court in Cox-i.e. that Entire Fairness should not apply in
cases where a special committee and a majority of the minority approve of the transaction. It would seem then that
Professor Subramanian believes that committees will be able to push controllers to pay fair prices through
negotiations even if the Entire Fairness standard is substantially relaxed. See Subramanian, Fixing Freezeouts, supra

Page 136

note 5, at 8.
[788]. See Cox, 879 A.2d at 613 (“... Weiss has recently turned his attention to the class action settlement process in
corporate law cases, most particularly in the courts of Delaware. Aside from objecting in two cases himself, Weiss,
along with Professor Lawrence J. White, an economist at New York University, has published an article called File
Early, then Free Ride: How Delaware Law (Mis)Shapes Shareholder Class Actions that argues that certain features
of Delaware's common law of corporations have permitted the plaintiffs' bar to reap windfall profits by filing cases
that have no benefit to stockholders.”) (emphasis added).
[789]. See, e.g., Cox, 879 A.2d at 646.
[790]. The Cox court cites the objectors' view that “litigation of this kind is of no material benefit to minority
stockholders,” id. at 624, but it does not present their evidence for that assertion, and thus the evidence never comes
under scrutiny.
[791]. Id. at 613.
[792]. The court concludes that the Entire Fairness standard precludes timely dismissals, hence invites
nonmeritorious cases which, in turn, are settled by controllers in order to avoid costly discovery and other
inefficiencies associated with further litigation. Id. at 631.
[793]. Rabkin, 498 A.2d at 1107.
[794]. See supra notes 94-104 and accompanying text.
[795]. See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
[796]. For the most recent jurisprudence on eminent domain, see Kelo v. City of New London, Conn., 545 U.S. 469
(2005) (affirming local government's power to seize land for financial redevelopment purposes consistent with the
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution).
[797]. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. V.
[798]. See, e.g., McMullin, 765 A.2d at 920 (“When a majority of a corporation's voting shares are owned by a
single entity, there is a significant diminution in the voting power of the minority stockholders. Consequently,
minority stockholders must rely for protection on the fiduciary duties owed to them by the board of directors.”).
[799]. See infra notes 800-03 and accompanying text.
[800]. SeeDEL. CODE tit. 8, § 141(a) (2007); McMullin, 765 A.2d at 916-17.
[801]. Cox, 879 A.2d at 614.
[802]. DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 142(b) (2007).
[803]. For an economics-oriented description of corporate governance arrangements, see, e.g., Margolin and Kursh,
supra note 166, at 414 (“The corporate form, characterized by the introduction of outside equity investors, evolved
to transfer the risk of firm operations from high-cost risk bearers (management), to low-cost risk bearers
(stockholders), but accomplishes this only at the expense of relaxing hierarchical constraints on managerial
malfeasance.”).
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[804]. See, e.g., Cysive, 836 A.2d at 533 (“This post trial opinion addresses stockholder-plaintiffs' challenge to a
management buy-out proposed by defendant Nelson Carbonell, the Chairman, Chief Executive Officer, director, and
largest stockholder of Cysive, Inc....”).
[805]. In Pure, Unocal was limited by a shareholder agreement to five representatives on Pure's board of eight. Of
these, one was Unocal's treasurer; a second was Unocal's President and COO and a director of Unocal; a third was a
retired executive who had worked at Unocal for 34 years and still provided consulting services to it; a fourth was
“an executive for many years at Unocal before 1992;” a fifth was “a close personal friend of Unocal's President and
COO.” The latter director was on Pure's special committee in fact. See Pure, 808 A.2d at 425-26.
[806]. See supra note 766.
[807]. See McMullin, 765 A.2d at 920 (noting board's responsibility in considering a merger to judge whether the
“transaction maximized value for all shareholders”); id. at 918 (“The Chemical Board owed fiduciary duties of care,
loyalty and good faith to all Chemical shareholders in recommending a sale of the entire corporation.”).
[808]. Id. at 921-22 (describing the basis for overturning the court of chancery's dismissal of the complaint allowing
breach of fiduciary duty in a situation where the controller effectively pushed through the sale of the company
against the minority's best interests).
[809]. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 715.
[810]. This conclusion is reflected, for example, in McMullin, 765 A.2d at 920 and Paramount Commc'n, 637 A.2d
at 42.
[811]. Pure, 808 A.2d at 429 (In its announcement of the tender offer freezeout, Unocal stated: “... we are not
interested in selling our shares in Pure.”); Cox 879 A.2d 607-08 (“...the Family did state that it would not sell its Cox
shares or support a sale of Cox to a third party.”).
[812]. See, e.g., Pure, 808 A.2d at 446.
[813]. See Cox, 879 A.2d at 607 (“by giving defendants the real option to get rid of cases on the pleadings, the
integrity of the representative litigation process would be improved...”); id. at 619 (“...it was impossible after Lynch
to structure a merger with a controlling stockholder in a way that permitted the defendants to obtain dismissal of the
case on the pleadings.”); id. at 130 (“As important, this incentive would enable transactional planners to know that
they can structure transactions in a way that affords them the opportunity to obtain a dismissal on the complaint.”).
[814]. See Solomon, 672 A.2d at 39 (“In the case of totally voluntary tender offers, as here, courts do not impose any
right of the shareholders to receive a particular price.”).
[815]. See Pure, 808 A.2d at 444 n.43, 445;Cox, 879 A.2d at 606, 607, 643-44, 646;Cysive, 836 A.2d at 549-50.
[816]. See supra citations in note 5.
[817]. The role of law in supporting strong capital markets is considered in both the Pure and Cox opinions. See
Pure, 808 A.2d at 433-44;Cox, 879 A.2d at 646 (the Lynch Doctrine should be reformed because it is inhibiting
transactions that provide “efficiency for the economy in general”).
[818]. For consideration of the role of economic thought in contemporary corporate law, see, e.g., STEPHEN M.
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BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS (Foundation Press 2002). For a more progressive
analysis, see LYNNE L. DALLAS, LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY: A SOCIOECONOMIC APPROACH (Carolina
Academic Press 2005).
[819]. ADOLPHE A. BERLE JR., AND GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932).
[820]. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 179.
[821]. Gilson and Gordon, supra note 5.
[822]. See, e.g., Blair & Stout, supra note 66; Lynn A. Stout, The Shareholder as Ulysses: Some Empirical Evidence
on Why Investors in Public Corporations Tolerate Board Governance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 667 (2003). For
discussion of team production's place in the evolution of corporate legal theory see Peter C. Kostant, Team
Production Theory and the Progressive Corporate Law Agenda, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 667 (2002).
[823]. As used in contemporary corporate legal scholarship the term “rent-seeking” refers to the pursuit of above
market returns through the exploitation of an advantage nonsusceptible to competition, for example an anticompetitive regulation. For a study analyzing rent-seeking, see Sanjay Gupta and Charles W. Swenson, Rent Seeking
by Agents of the Firm, 46 J. LAW & ECON. 253 (2003) (creating an empirical model to measure rent-seeking by
corporate executives and then applying it to firms' political contributions to see if they track managers' interest in tax
relief relevant to executive compensation). Admittedly, the board's placing the committee in the role of advocate for
the minority, in facing up to the controller, is a slight departure from the basic model, but the team production
construct still has relevance, especially with the board in the background and the controller looming.
[824]. See, e.g., DAVID SCIULLI, CORPORATE POWER IN CIVIL SOCIETY: AN APPLICATION IN
SOCIETAL CONSTITUTIONALISM (New York University Press 2001).
[825]. See, e.g., Linda C. McClain & James E. Fleming, Some Questions for Civil Society-Revivalists, 75 CHLKENT L. REV. 301 (2000).
[826]. At first glance, the Cox court's Dual Ratification proposal is consonant with these theoretical frameworks as
well; not only does the Cox court affirm the importance of voluntary consent, it requires Dual Ratification unlike the
court in Lynch that allows either shareholder or director consent to shift the border of proof. The Cox court proposes
that the two forms of consent are complementary to one another; that they provide heightened protections to
minority shareholders over Lynch. According to Cox, directors are more effective negotiators, but the Cox court also
allows for the possibility that the independent director may be lazy or inept or less than independent and
recommends a requirement of minority shareholder ratification, as a check on the directors' diligence and judgment.
See Cox, 879 A.2d at 618-19. However, there is a significant difference between employing consent as a burden
shifting device and using it as a rationale for limiting judicial review.
[827]. Cox, 879 A.2d at 647 (“By now, experience has proven that special committees and independent board
majorities are willing to say no to controllers. Experience has also shown that disinterested stockholders, given a
non-coercive choice, will reject low ball tender offers by controllers.”).
[828]. We are only beginning to see empirical studies on freezeouts. In Cox the court was highly critical of the only
study that provides some data on committees' acceptances and rejections of controllers' offers, see Subramanian,
Theory & Evidence, supra note 23. There is information about settlement rates in suits filed against freezeouts, but
not information relevant to Cox's assertion about committees' disapprovals of unfair offers in Thompson and
Thomas II, supra note 51. Weiss and White's study also contains empirical analysis of claims and settlements in
freezeouts, but their data does not illuminate whether directors have genuine freedom to disapprove unfair
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freezeouts. Weiss & White, supra note 641.
[829]. The question was hotly debated in the late 1980s when there were many leveraged buyouts. See, e.g., William
T. Allen, Independent Directors in MBO Transactions: Are They Fact or Fantasy?, 45 BUS. LAW. 2055 (1990).
[830]. See supra note 767.
[831]. See, e.g., Cox & Munsinger, supra note 90. On the subject of the organizational dynamics that influence
groups to avoid conflict and side with the popular perspective, see Richard H. McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict:
The Economics of Group Status Production and Race Discrimination, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1003 (1995).
[832]. Marleen A. O'Connor, Women Executives in Gladiatorial Corporate Cultures: The Behavioral Dynamics of
Gender, Ego and Power, 65 MD. L. REV. 465, 494 (2006); James D. Westphal, Defections from the Inner Circle:
Social Exchange, Reciprocity and the Diffusion of Board Independence in U.S. Corporations, 42 ADMIN. SCI. Q.
161, 163-64 (1997); Donald C. Langevoort, The Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Law, Norms, and the
Unintended Consequences of Independence and Accountability, 89 GEO. L.J. 797, 811 (2001) ( “For a variety of
reasons, the natural gravitational pull is away from diversity towards collegiality.”).
[833]. The “tightly-knit” nature of corporate boards, even after the recent financial accounting scandals, is illustrated
by the enormous outpouring of negative comment letters resulting from the SEC's proposed conservative version of
a shareholder nomination rule. See Proposed Rule: Security Holder Director Nominations, SEC Rel. No. 34-48626,
68 Fed. Reg. 60784 (Oct. 23, 2003).
[834]. The CEO is unlikely to take a position adverse to the controller and therefore may be unhelpful to the outside
directors in terms of what information is shared. See generally Lawrence E. Mitchell, Structural Holes, CEOs, and
Informational Monopolies, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 1313 (2005); James D. Westphal, Board Games: How CEOs
Adapt to Increases in Structural Board Independence from Management, 43 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 511 (1998); Daniel R.
Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1259, 1282 (1982) (opining that outside
directors' limited information about operating details limits their utility in crucial respects).
[835]. See Bernard Black, Brian Cheffins & Michael Klausner, Outside Director Liability, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1055,
1138-39 (2006).
[836]. For a discussion of the time constraints that may limit outside directors' utility, in relation to executive
compensation issues, see, e.g., Michael B. Dorff, Does One Hand Wash the Other? Testing the Managerial Power
and Optimal Contracting Theories of Executive Compensation, 30 J. CORP. L. 255, 266 (2005).
[837]. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, What Enron Means for the Management and Control of the Modern Business
Corporation: Some Initial Reflections, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1233, 1242 (2002) (considering director compensation).
[838]. Report of Investigation by the Special Investigative Committee of the Board of Directors of Enron Corp. 1-17
(Feb. 1, 2002), available at http:// news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/enron/sicreport/sicreport020102.pdf; William W.
Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1275, 1305-15 (2002) (describing
extensive self dealing transactions at Enron); Robert Prentice, Enron: A Brief Behavioral Autopsy, 40 AM. BUS.
L.J. 417, 428-34 (2003) (explaining how decisional heuristics and cognitive biases can help explain the actions of
various actors, including outside directors in the Enron scandal); Arnoud W.A. Boot & Jonathan R. Macey,
Monitoring Corporate Performance: The Role of Objectivity, Proximity, and Adaptability in Corporate Governance,
89 CORNELL L. REV. 356, 368-73 (2004) (noting that boards tend over time to internalize managers' values and
therefore lose their objectivity as they become unduly influenced by management's perspective). Special problems
arise, of course, in cases in which the controller is the senior executive officer. Note the case of Hollinger
International, Inc. where controlling shareholders allegedly looted $400 million over four years. Hollinger Inc. Says
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SEC May Bring a Civil Lawsuit Against It, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2004, at C2.
[839]. See Bratton, supra note 838, at 1332-34; Gordon, supra note 837, at 1241-44.
[840]. For facts relating to WorldCom's board, see, e.g., In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 294 F. Supp. 2d 392
(S.D.N.Y. 2003).
[841]. Emerging Commc'ns, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 70, at *140-47.
[842]. Cox, 879 A.2d at 619, 647. Institutions are more likely to focus on individual firms where there is a buyout
offer, but the well-discussed limits to institutional investor activism are still powerful in freezeouts. See, e.g., James
D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Letting Billions Slip Through Your Fingers: Empirical Evidence and Legal
Implications of the Failure of Financial Institutions to Participate in Securities Class Action Settlements, 58 STAN.
L. REV. 411, 425-28 (2005); Edward Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of Institutional Shareholder
Activism, 79 GEO. L.J. 445, 466-68 (1991). Furthermore, there will also be conflicts between larger and smaller
institutional investors in public companies.
[843]. Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor Voice, 39 U.C.L.A. L. REV.
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